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Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850*
RICHARD H. CHUSED**

In the middle of the nineteenth century, numerousjurisdictionspassed
actsfor the protection of married women'sproperty. Many commentators hold the view that these acts were part of a concertedattack on the
institution of coverture and theprevailingsocietal view of marriedwomen. Professor Chused takes afresh look at this conception, tracingthe
development of theproperty rightsof women in the early 1800s. In Part
, hepresentsarchivalmaterialthatrelects an increase in wives' control
offamilypropertypriorto the enactment of marriedwomen's property
laws. Part II presents an analysis of the legal arena in thispre-enactment period, illuminatingreforms that representeda growing trend to
amelioratesome of the more extremefeaturesof coverture law. In Part
III, the author uses recent literatureon women in the early 1800s to
show that this trend was accompaniedby growth in the responsibility
women hadfor theirfamilies. Professor Chused concludes that it is
likely that the enactment of marriedwomen'sproperty laws reflected an
increase in women'sfamiy responsibilities,more than their emergence
into the largercommercial andpolitical world
INTRODUCTION

1848 is commonly thought of as the year the women's rights movement began. That year witnessed both the Seneca Falls Convention and the adoption
of the well-known New York married women's act. The dearth of literature
on women's law in the 1800-1850 period' has made it all too easy for the legal
community and the modem feminist movement to label 1848 as the pivotal
year. The confluence of events in 1848 has created a mythology that the married women's acts adopted in the 1840's were a frontal attack on both the institution of coverture established by the common law and the prevailing cultural
view of women as repositories of domestic virtue. Because a public women's
movement and married women's legislation appeared in the same decade, it is
* © 1983 by Richard H. Chused, Washington, D.C.
** Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A number of people have

worked with me intensely on this and related projects during the last two years. My colleague Wendy
Williams, with whom I teach Women's Legal History, has spent so much time talking with me I have
lost all ability to state the extent of her contributions to this article. My gratitude rather than a precise
credit will have to suffice. Marjorie Brown, David Zolensky, Robert Stack, Elizabeth Ungar, and Robin
Fradkin have provided terrific research assistance. I could not have completed this project without
their help. Thanks are also due to Jim Oldham, another colleague newly immersed in legal history, for
his guided tour through research into English law.
1. While the literature on women is now growing very rapidly, there is still a remarkable shortage of
material on the early 19th century. The best of the general histories is E. FLEXNER, CENTURY OF
STRUGGLE (rev. ed. 1975). Flexner's section on the Seneca Falls Convention describes some of the

early experiences of those women who organized the meeting, particularly their exclusion from the
1840 World Anti-Slavery Convention in London which barred all women. Id at 71-77. The recent

release of N. BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-

CENTURY NEW YORK (1982) provides a major improvement in the state of the literature.
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thought that women petitioning for change must have "caused" the state legislatures to act. As with many areas of women's history, such speculation may
be flawed.
This article takes a fresh look at the development of married women's property acts by making use of three different sets of materials: Archival records,
case law and legislative sources, and recent historical literature. Courthouses
and archives have records of potentially enormous importance. Property ownership and trends in the disposal of property should reveal a great deal about
the pressures leading to the adoption of married women's property acts. My
archival work was originally structured to establish an agenda for further research rather than to be a comprehensive study, but this tentative look produced so much useful information that it is appropriate to reveal it now.
Results of this work are discussed in Part I.
Part II of this article delves into the vast case law and legislative record of
legal events occurring before the married women's acts were adopted. This
material includes not only the married women's property acts and related
cases, but also an array of legislative and judicial documents in other areas of
importance to women. Inheritance standards, probate codes, and divorce law,
for example, tell a great deal about developments in married women's property
law. In reviewing this material I placed particular emphasis on investigating
the importance of English law as a model for American development, the degree to which norms existing in 1840 were actually altered by the new legislation, property law reform trends before 1840, and the relationship between the
property acts and other areas of women's law in the first half of the nineteenth
century.
All of this material should be viewed against the backdrop of current literature on women in the first half of the nineteenth century. Recent books present a large amount of new and useful information.2 By and large historians
have concluded that role changes for most early nineteenth-century married
women involved increased family responsibilities, not greater participation in
the larger commercial and political world. Such a conclusion is consistent with
2. Five works have provided much of the background for my own research in early reform of women's property law. Mary Beth Norton and Linda Kerber have each written a wonderful book on the
changing status of women at the turn of the 19th century. M. NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE
REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800 (1980); L. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE
REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1980). C. DEaLER, AT ODDS:
WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (1980) describes

substantial developments in the history of the family during the first part of the 19th century. N. Corr,
THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD:

"WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1977) weaves to-

gether many of the threads of women's special sphere in the early 19th century. And Keith Melder's
thesis charts the vast array of social, cultural, and political enterprises of women in the first decades of
the 19th century. K. Melder, The Beginnings of the Women's Rights Movement in the United States,
1800-1840 (1965) (unpublished thesis). Other books of importance for this period include E. FLEXNER,
supra note 1, at 1-77; B. BERG, THE REMEMBERED GATE: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEMINISM, THE
WOMAN AND THE CITY, 1800-1860 (1978); N. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE
IN THE UNITED STATES (1962); E. Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights of Married Women, 18001861 (February 1960) (unpublished thesis); P. RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF FEMALE EMANCIPATION (1980); M. Salmon, The Property Rights of Women in Early
America (1980) (unpublished thesis); J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978); C. DIENES, LAW, POLITICS AND BIRTH CONTROL (1972). See
also Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Famio Law: Child Custody, Adoption and the
Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 1038 (1979).

19831

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY LAW

1361

the results of my own archival and legal research which suggests that the early
married women's acts made only modest adjustments in coverture law, and
that these adjustments generally confirmed rather than confronted prevailing
domestic roles of married women. The recent literature is discussed in Part III.
As the nineteenth century began, real property owned by a married woman
in a legal estate was subject to the management and control of her husband.
Personal property of a wife became the property of her husband as soon as he
reduced it to possession. Where equity courts existed, separate equitable estates could be created for married women's property, but the protections to be
provided a wife by the equitable forum had to be specifically delineated in the
document creating the estate. Although married women's property acts significantly altered the old rules by the end of the nineteenth century, the early wave
of reform statutes appearing before 1850 have been given credit for accomplishing too much in the reform of married women's legal status.
In combination, the three parts of this study produce a coherent picture of
the developments leading to the adoption of the early acts. The archival work
suggests that use of equitable separate estates for married women increased
before 1850. Analysis of legislative materials and judicial opinions shows that
a number of legal norms having an economic impact on married women were
modified before married women's acts appeared. Several reforms, including
the liberalization of inheritance rules and divorce laws and the enlargement of
benefits for widows and abandoned women, appeared in the early decades of
the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, developments in the culture at large created a milieu sympathetic to changes in coverture law. Romantic notions of
family formation and maintenance, introduction of industrial production, and
increases in literacy and educational goals for children gave women significant
family roles. When distressed economic times appeared after 1839, the moment was right for legislatures to codify a portion of the equitable separate
estate tradition by insulating wives' property from their spouses' creditors.
The acts, usually adopted with little lobbying from women, created a special
set of assets available for family use when husbands found themselves in
trouble with creditors. Only after this initial wave of debtor protection measures appeared did the women's movement get deeply and successfully involved
in substantial reform of coverture law.
I.

A

STUDY OF WILLS AND TRUST DEEDS
A.

INTRODUCTION

While it is generally (and erroneously) supposed that the first married women's property act appeared in 1839, 3 little is known about the changes in
property ownership patterns and the economic status of women in the decades
prior to the appearance of the new legislation. Important questions about
whether the mid-century legislation "codified" existing practice, whether mar3. In reality the acts began to appear in 1835. See infra note 205 and accompanying text (Arkansas
act passed in 1835). The use of 1839 or 1840 as an approximation of the beginning of a transition
period, however, is appropriate. Most of the early married women's acts appeared in the 1840's. See
infra notes 207-11 (listing acts).
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ried women gained financial influence within the family before 1840 and
whether married women benefitted from the separate equitable estate, are answerable only by doing a great deal of sleuthing in courthouse records. 4 For
two reasons, this study was designed to search for changes in participation
rates of women in the property system and in the dispositional patterns of
family property, rather than for alterations in women's wealth. First, wealth
studies suggest that married women's economic status did not change much
relative to men's during the nineteenth century. Second, the married women's
acts themselves did not legitimate any radical shifts in the economic status of
women. One therefore should not expect changes in the patterns of women's
wills and deeds during the early decades of the nineteenth century to display
dramatic movements of money or other assets. Rather one would hypothesize
that the mild changes made by the married women's acts would be preceded
by some shifts in the ways families disposed of or controlled their assets. This
study suggests that such shifts occurred.
What little is known about women and the economy before 1850 confirms
the need to be cautious about claiming that married women's acts caused or
resulted from significant shifts in wealth between men and women. During the
late eighteenth century subsistence farming was giving way to commercial production and home industry, particularly spinning, needlework, and weaving.5
Trade was becoming more pronounced and some men began to leave home to
go to work. Increasing agricultural efficiency6 and expanding markets began
to separate household from work. It became possible for some women, and
4. Two other studies of courthouse documents are available. They are Salmon, Women and Property
in South Carolina: The Evidence From MarriageSettlements, 1730-1830, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 655
(1982) [hereinafter Salmon, South Carolina], and N. BASCH, supra note 1, at 100-12. Salmon's study
asks some of the same questions posed here and uses somewhat similar research techniques.
5. N. COTT, supra note 2, at 21-30. Women played a significant role in these areas, particularly in
the provision of cloth for home use. An 1810 government report estimated that two-thirds of all clothing, hosiery, and linen was produced at home. See Summer, Historyof Women in Industry in the United
States, in 9 REPORT ON CONDITION OF WOMEN AND CHILD WAGE-EARNERS IN THE UNITED STATES
37-50 (1810 & photo. reprint 1974).
6. See N. COTT, supra note 2, at 23-24. During the 19th century, yields per acre for wheat and corn
stayed fairly constant. But the man-hours required to produce this yield declined substantially. Data

from U.S.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 500 (1976) [hereinafter STATISTICAL HISTORY], was used in producing

this table:
Wheat
Man hrs./
Year
Yield/acre
100 bushels
1800
15*
373
1840
15*
233
1880
13.2
152
1900
13.9
108
* These figures are estimates.

Corn
Yield/acre
25*
25*
25.6
25.9

Man hrs./
100 bushels
344
276
180
147

Similar changes in the raising of cotton occurred. Some of this improvement in efficiency probably
arose because of improvements in tools such as the cotton gin, scythe, and plow. See Rasmussen, The
Mechanization of.4griculture, 247 Sc. AM. 76 (1982). There is much debate over the rate of increase in
agricultural output in the early United States. The traditional view is that output increased moderately
before 1840. Parker & Whartenby, The Growth of Output Before 1840, in TRENDS IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 191 (National Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1960).

Others have argued that there was a more substantial growth in output. Gallman, The Agricultural
Sector and the Pace of Economic Growth: U.S. Experience in the Nineteenth Century, in ESSAYS IN
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necessary for others, to undertake chores in addition to those crucial for the
operation of a subsistence farm. While the location of activity for most was
still the home or a business attached to the home, 7 sending children off to work
in others' homes, in schools, or in the towns became a possibility in some
cases.8 Although home industry diminished in importance during the first decades of the nineteenth century, teaching, domestic service, and mill work by
unmarried women became commonplace by the 1830's. 9 Wages for single women rose rapidly between 1820 and 1850 when they reached fifty percent of the
male level, a plateau which has remained almost unchanged to this day.' 0
But the impact of these changes on the economic standing of married women was not great. Women who did work were usually single and tended to
obtain low-paying jobs. By 1840, many who had worked as young women
were married and without paying jobs, carrying with them only memories of
their prior work."I Historians have provided us vivid anecdotal descriptions of
the differences between the lives of married and unmarried women to demonstrate that by 1840 many women considered marriage to be a large step from
relative freedom into an important, but confining, social role.' 2 Even as late as
1890 less than five percent of all married women worked,' 3 and women's share
of the nation's wealth did not rise during the nineteenth century. Wealth studies suggest that white women constituted less than ten percent of wealth holders and that wealth holders constituted less than two percent of the total

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC HISTORY: THE OLD NORTHEAST 35 (D. Klingaman & R. Vedder

eds. 1975).
7. For example, shops and boarding houses both drew women's attention. N. COTT, supra note 2, at
42-43.

8. Id at 31-36.
9. Id at 36-37; S. LEBERGOTT, MANPOWER IN ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE AMERICAN RECORD SINCE
1800 520 (1964). By 1830, women and children comprised a large percentage of the industrial labor
force, which they maintained despite a relative decline in the textile industry after 1830. A. GOLDIN &
N. SOKOLOFF, WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: EVIDENCE

FROM THE MANUFACTURING CENSUS (NBER Working Paper No. 795, 1981). Even on the frontier,

working single women comprised a significant segment of the community. See J. JEFFREY, FRONTIER
WOMEN: THE TRANs-MISSlSSIPPt WEST 1840-1880 87-94 (1979). Dramatic increases in teaching employment also appeared as a result of the development of universal elementary education. See W.
ELSBREE, THE AMERICAN TEACHER: EVOLUTION OF A PROFESSION IN A DEMOCRACY 199 (1970); 1 T.
WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 460-83 (1929); Bernard & Vinovskis, The Female School Teacher in Ante-bellum Massachusetts, 10 J. Soc. HIST. 332 (1977). Bernard and Vinovskis conclude that one out of every five antebellum Massachusetts women taught school
during her lifetime, even if the total percentage of women in the entire workforce at any one time was
small. Bernard & Vinovskis, supra, at 338.
10. A. GOLDIN & N. SOKOLOFF, THE RELATIVE PRODUCTIVITY HYPOTHESIS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE AMERICAN CASE, 1820-1850 (NBER Working Paper No. 795, 1981). As of 1970, full-time
white women workers earned about 59% of a male worker's wage. STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra note 6,
at 305.
11. In fact, the proportion of working married women remained very low until recently. See A.
GOLDIN & N. SOKOLOFF, supra note 10. It is unlikely that women's labor produced much wealth for
most women. Wages were too low. See id
12. See N. CoTT, supra note 2, at 80-83.
13. STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra note 6, at 133. Data from STATISTICAL HISTORY at 129-34 provides
additional material for this table:
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population in the Revolutionary War years, 14 and that in 1860, women's and
children's wealth still constituted less than ten percent of men's wealth. 15 Av6
erage men's wealth was much higher than women's.'
Thus, one would not expect a study of intestate and testate estates to display
dramatic increases in women's wealth. Rather, discussion of the evolution of
women's property law during the first half of the nineteenth century must focus on the mechanisms by which wealth was controlled. While some tentative
effort is made here to look for wealth indicia in the archival data, the primary
focus is on changes in the dispositional patterns for women's property.
B.

METHODOLOGY

Document studies were undertaken in Dukes County, Massachusetts, and
Baltimore City and County, Maryland, for the period 1800 to 1850.17 The
different sizes of the document banks available necessitated somewhat differYear

% of labor force
that is female

single

% of female labor force that is:
widowed/
married
divorced

1870
14.8
1880
15.2
1890
17.2
68.2
17.9
1900
18.3
66.2
18.4
1910
19.9
60.2
15.7
1920
20.4
77.0*
1930
22.0
53.9
17.2
* For this entry, single also includes widowed and divorced women.

13.9
15.4
24.7
23.0
28.9

By 1979, the situation was quite different, with 60% of the female labor force married and 50% of the
married women working. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES:

1980 402 (101st ed. 1980) [hereinafter

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].

It is possible that the five percent married women working data is misleading. Even though few
unmarried women were working at any one time early in the 19th century, a large number of women
worked at some time before marriage. See supra note 9. Perhaps by 1890, a large number of married
women had worked at some point (probably before starting a family), even if only five percent of
married women worked at any particular point in time.
14. A. JONES, WEALTH OF A NATION TO BE 39 (1980).
15. L. SOTLOW, MEN AND WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1870 200, n.12 (1975).
16. Compare L. SoLTow, THE RISE OF LITERACY AND THE COMMON SCHOOL IN THE UNITED
STATES 156 (1981) with L. SoLTow, supra note 15, at 23, 64-65, 156. This outcome is confirmed by the
very tentative data available from the Dukes County wills study which show that the men's estates
tended to be much larger than the women's. The average size of the nine male inventories reviewed
was over $6000 (These wills were not randomly selected. Rather, they were picked because they involved petitions by women for widow's allowances). The female inventories averaged a bit less than
$950. See infra Table 8.
17. Given the original exploratory purposes of this research, the locations were chosen for reasons of
convenience. There are, however, important characteristics of these two locations which make them
very useful. The Baltimore area provides both urban and rural areas for study. The lack of significant
differences between the two areas is itself interesting. See infra note 63 (comparing Baltimore city and
county results). The two areas also provide different legal milieus, with Maryland probably having a
stronger equity tradition. Compare M. SALMON, supra note 2, at 162-82 (discussing Maryland's equitable enforcement of marriage settlements) with E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 44-45 (discussing Massachusetts' refusal to create equity courts or grant equity powers to its law courts). Consistent results
between the two areas give some basis for suggesting that future replicative work will reveal similar
trends.
The Dukes County study was made at the Courthouse in Edgartown, Massachusetts, on Martha's
Vineyard. For the years in qcuestion, the clerk took the handwritten indices and recorded document
books out of her safe. There is no cataloging system. The indices are basically in chronological order.
Next to each name in the index is a list of documents recorded in the case, and next to each document is

. 1983]
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ent research techniques in the two locations. In Dukes County the Register of
Probate Index provided a list of volume and page entries for matters in which
documents were recorded. Prior to 1820 about one-third of the indexed matters gave only the name of the person involved in court action followed by an
entry like "records not recorded." After 1820 the index was much more complete. A "no record" entry might not even involve a deceased person, because
the index also included other probate matters such as guardianships and incompetencies. The total number of entries was not very large. Meaningful
data therefore are useful only for periods of a decade or longer. The number
of men's and women's estates (both with and without wills) and the number of
"no record" entries for each decade is displayed in Table 1.
TABLE

1:

DUKES COUNTY RECORDS

Years

Male
Estates

Female
Estates

Male
No
Record

Female
No
Record

1801-1810
1811-1820
1821-1830
1831-1840
1841-1850

44
39
88
88
92

1
3
14
17
16

21
28
5
5
0

0
2
1
1
0

All the recorded women's wills in Dukes County from 1801-1850 were read. A
number of the women's estates (both testate and intestate) contained inventories; they were also read. Some men's wills involving disputes over spousal
estate shares were reviewed as well.
The Baltimore study was done from a significantly larger document base.
Sampling was necessary. Index data on estates with wills were taken for the
years 1800, 1805, 1810, 1815, 1820, 1825, 1830, 1835, 1840, and 1846.18 All
women's wills were read for the years 1810, 1825, 1840, and 1846. A few men's
wills were read for 1810, 1825, 1840, and 1846 as well. 19 Finally, a search was
made in the deed index for trust documents establishing separate estates for
married women. Documents discovered in the index were read for the years
1810, 1825, and 1840.
C.

THE LEGAL STAGE IN

1800

As the nineteenth century opened, the status of women's property was in the
a book and page number where it may be found in the volumes of recorded documents. I simply
recorded the names, documents, books, and page numbers that I was interested in and looked them up.
The same basic system operates at the Maryland Hall of Records in Annapolis, except that the volume of records was much larger, and the recorded documents were on microfilm. Indices to the Register of Wills and the land records for Baltimore were checked first. Relevant volume and page numbers
were listed and the materials were read.
18. 1846, rather than 1845, was selected to provide an additional year of breathing space from the
married woman's acts adopted by Maryland in 1842 and 1843.
19. The men's wills were sampled by turning the microfilm crank 10 times and reading the first male
will to appear thereafter.
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midst of a lengthy period of transformation. While land transfer systems had
been streamlined and married women's dower rights had been modified to
permit easier transfer of titles, 20 substantial reform of the testate and intestate
roles of women had just begun. Reforms of the post-Revolutionary War era
enhanced the ability of women and children to be beneficiaries of intestate
estates. Even before primogeniture was abolished in England, many of the
American colonies had rejected it. A deluge of reform statutes finished the job
after the Revolutionary War. 2 1 New laws covering intestate succession in New
England provided for descent to widows and children of both sexes.2 2 These
statutes were of considerable importance because the vast bulk of people never
wrote wills. 2 3 The changes in intestacy rules, therefore, operated to provide a
minimum level of economic security for some surviving widows and children.24 Thus, well before 1800, married female children and widows could
inherit property. And even though wealthier men of the early nineteenth century tended to will assets to women in life estates or other forms that insulated
the property from the creditors of present or future husbands, 2 5 it was not uncommon for married women to own assets long before women's property acts
were adopted.
Most jurisdictions, however, did not pass statutes granting married women
contractual or testamentary control over property held at law until well into
the nineteenth century. 26 The power to dispose of property by will was
granted in a few places early in the nineteenth century, but statutory reform
most commonly occurred after 1850.27 Will studies suggest that women did
20. See infra notes 157-82 and accompanying text (discussing reforms affecting ease of transfer).
21. R. MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 72-81 (1930). England did not abolish
primogeniture until 1926. Id at 77. Fee tails met the same fate as primogeniture in the colonies. Id at
82-103.
22. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 57-60 (1973).
23. Id at 220.
24. The intestate succession reforms also had some of the same effects as dower reform-land was
less likely to be encumbered by future interests that would lower its marketability. Primogeniture mandated takers for a significant period of time. The new intestate succession statutes provided for estates
to be divided into shares and distributed. While some assets would be distributed to tenants in common, partition was available to settle ownership disputes and, if necessary, to force sales of the disputed
assets. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 57-58.
25. Id at 220-21. This trend may have begun to disintegrate by mid-century. See infra Table 13.
26. Connecticut is an interesting exception, providing for wills in 1809. This is particularly puzzling
because the Connecticut colony is thought to have been most restrictive of women's property rights,
See M. SALMON, supra note 2, at 324-39. What, then, were women being permitted to transfer by will?
A study of estate records in Connecticut should be fascinating.
27. In general, women lost their interest in personal property upon marriage and therefore had nothing to will before 1800. As to real property, instruments in the nature of wills for the disposition of
equitable estates were sometimes enforced, but they were seldom written. Women could dispose of
personal property with the consent of their husbands. See 2 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF MARRIED WOMEN 421-36 (1875); M. SALMON, supra note 2, at 119-25. Salmon found records of
decisions from the 1790's permitting women to devise their own property in Pennsylvania and Maryland. M. SALMON, supra note 2, at 119 n.49. In my study of Maryland wills, women began to write
wills with greater frequency as the 19th century unfolded. But most of the will writers were either
widows or unmarried women, and most of the property being willed was personal, not real. In general,
legislation providing women with the power to write wills came slowly. While some states acted during
the early decades of the 19th century, there is no clear time period in which this reform arrived. Some
states had fairly well-developed equitable rules permitting married women to write wills if their deeds
permitted it. See infra note 29. Statutes appeared in a few states at very early dates. Connecticut: Act
of May, 1809, ch. VII, 1809 Conn. Pub. Acts 15 (May Sess. 1809); Florida: Act of June 29, 1823, 1825
Florida Territorial Legis. Council Acts 101 (2d Sess. 1823); Ohio: Act of Feb. 18, 1808, ch. XVIII, § I,
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not make wills in significant numbers until after 1800.28 For the most part, a
married woman's property was disposed of at death either by the operation of
intestate succession laws or by the constraints contained in the equitable instrument establishing her title to the property. 29 These inheritance rules followed the more general structure of coverture law under which a married
woman's real estate was subject to the management and control of her husband, and her personal property, once in the possession of her spouse, was
permanently lost by the wife. While a number of exceptions to these rules
arose in various areas of the United States, especially in jurisdictions with
1807 Ohio Acts 64 (1808). The Ohio statute was re-enacted in slightly revised versions in 1810, 1840,
and 1852. While the roots of the Ohio legislation presumably were in the Northwest Ordinance, more
study of this statute is needed. It is also a bit of a mystery why Connecticut moved so early. Warbasse
suggests that judicial changes of heart over the old common law rules made legislative action necessary.
E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 15-16. Florida's statute probably resulted from its Spanish civil law
heritage. A few states also adopted statutes that basically codified the common law rule that wives
could write wills with their husband's consent. Maryland: Act of Mar. 10, 1843, ch. 293, § 6, 1842 Md.
Laws (1843); Massachusetts: Act of Mar. 3, 1842, ch. 74, 1842 Mass. Acts 527; Pennsylvania: Act of
Apr. 8, 1833, No. 128, § 2, 1833 Pa. Laws 249. Other states adopted statutes permitting women to write
wills in pursuit of powers. New York: N.Y. Rev. Stat., art. 3, §§ 80, 87, 110, 1829 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 731;
Pennsylvania: Act of Apr. 8, 1833, No. 128, § 2, 1833 Pa. Laws 249. A few states adopted limited wills
acts in the 1840's. Alabama: Act of Feb. 4, 1846, No. 19, §§ 1-3, 1845 Ala. Acts 23, 24 (1846) (abandoned or mistreated wives only); Indiana: Act of Jan. 26, 1847, ch. LXXIX, 1846 Ind. Acts 108 (1847)
(real property only); New Hampshire: Act of July 2, 1841, ch. 157, 1841 N.H. Laws 533 (deserted
wives) and Act of June 27, 1845, ch. 236, 1845 N.H. Laws 235 (real property). Most states adopted
general wills-enabling statutes after 1850. The exceptions include Michigan: MICH. CONST. of 1850,
art. XVI, § 5; Pennsylvania: Act of Apr. 11, 1848, No. 372, §§ 5-6, 1848 Pa. Laws 536, 537; New York:
Act of Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 375, 1849 N.Y. Laws 528. The later enactments include Arkansas: ARK.
CONST. of 1868, art. XII, § 6; Georgia: REV. CODE § 2375 (1867); Indiana: Act of Mar. 3, 1859, ch.
CXLI, 1859 Ind. Acts 245; Kansas: Act of Feb. 11, 1858, ch. 2, 1858 Kan. Territorial Sess. Laws 327;
Massachusetts: Act of May 5, 1855, ch. 304, 1855 Mass. Acts 710; New Jersey: Act of Apr. 12, 1864, ch.
CCCXCVI, 1864 N.J. Laws 442; New Hampshire: Act of July 8, 1854, ch. 1522, 1854 N.H. Laws 1418;
Act of July 4, 1860, ch. 2342, § 3, 1860 N.H. Laws 2248; North Carolina: N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X,
§ 6; Rhode Island: 1856 R.I. Pub. Laws 68 (Jan. Sess. 1856); South Carolina: Act of Dec. 12, 1866,
1866 S.C. Acts 473; Tennessee: Act of Feb. 21, 1852, ch. CLXX, § 4, 1851 Tenn. Pub. Acts 259. In
some states, late enactments still prohibited married women from writing wills. See Kentucky: Gen.
Stats., ch. 113, § 2 (1873).
28. K. LOCKRIDGE, LITERACY IN COLONIAL NEw ENGLAND 38 (1974); A. JONES, supra note 14, at
39. A. JONES, AMERICAN'COLONIAL WEALTH: DOCUMENTS AND METHODS (1977) (3 volumes) repro-

duces all the inventories used in Jones' WEALTH OF A NATION TO BE. There were 82 women's estates.
Forty-two wrote wills, 39 died intestate and for one woman, testacy status is not known. This 52% rate
of testacy is a bit lower than that found in Dukes County. See infra Table 7.
29. In a number of states, early equity cases provided that married women could write wills to dispose of real property if the instrument giving title permitted it. See Beach v. Manchester, 56 Mass. (2
Cush.) 72 (1848); Wilkinson v. Wright, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 576 (1846); Yates Will, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 215
(1834); Lewis v. Hudson, 6 Ala. 463 (1848); Shaw v. Dawsey, 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 247 (1841); Ewing v.
Smith, 3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 417 (1813); Rogers v. Smith, 4 Barr 93 (Pa. 1840); Lowery v. Tiernan, 2 H. &
G. 34 (Md. 1827); West v. West's Executor, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 373 (1825); Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal
Church, 17 Johns. 548 (N.Y. 1820). A will devising personal property required the husband's consent,
unless an instrument under which property was held provided a right to dispose of property by will.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Hudson, 6 Ala. 463 (1844); Reed v. Blaisdell, 16 N.H. 194 (1844); Marston v. Norton,
5 N.H. 105 (1830); Yates Will, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 215 (1834). See also 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 41236.
A few states applied the equity rules very liberally, holding that general statements creating a separate estate implied the right to dispose of the property by will. Lamb v. Wregg, 8 Port. 73 (Ala. 1838);
Lewis v. Hudson, 6 Ala. 463 (1844); Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 17 Johns. 548 (N.Y. 1820).
Kentucky appeared to be such a jurisdiction, Yates Will, 32 Ky. 215 (1834), but a narrow rule emerged
later, Wilkinson v. Wright, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 576 (1846). Maryland took the opposite trend. Compare
Tarr v. Williams, 4 Md. 68 (1853), with Cooke v. Husbands, 11 Md. 486 (1857).
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strong equity traditions supporting the creation of separate estates for married
women, wives were treated as civilly dead persons in many situations.
Massachusetts and Maryland common law followed these general trends. In
Massachusetts, case law placed severe constraints on married women's right to
will property at law, prohibiting the devising of real estate and requiring the
husband's consent for the devising of personal assets.30 Both of the married
women's wills found in Dukes County were written in 1810, though they were
not probated until 1815 and 1821. The scarcity of married women's wills probably reflects the common law rules. A statute permitting married women to
write wills with their husband's consent was adopted on March 3, 1842, but the
act was construed to prohibit devises to husbands. 3 1 This result was overruled
by statute on April 15, 1850. In 1842, Maryland adopted a statute permitting
married women to write wills with their husband's consent. Married women's
property acts were passed in 1842 and 1843. In both Maryland and Massachusetts the power of a wife to dispose of equitable property at death was limited
to the rights granted by the instrument under which she took title.3 2
The development of inheritance rights of women and children during the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries required some method for legitimating the holding of property by married women. Finding the methods used
before 1840 is sometimes difficult. Although the Baltimore document study
suggests the separate equitable estate was the logical choice in most jurisdictions, America's varied reception of equity forces legal historians to search
state-by-state for the ways in which women typically held property. While
English chancery had both developed rules for a wife's separate estate and
declared dower inapplicable to equitable estates by the end of the eighteenth
century, the colonies did not uniformly adopt chancery. 33 While the Southern
colonies generally had equity courts, New England practice was spotty. 34 The
Northwest Ordinance specifically called for reception of the common law, but
was silent as to equity.35 Although this omission was probably not meant to
prohibit creation of equity courts, 36 not all the territories so understood it,
leading to different results in the various jurisdictions. 37
Not until well into the nineteenth century did most American states and
30. Osgood v. Breed, 12 Mass. 525 (1815).
31. Morse v. Thompson, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 562 (1849).

32. Beach v. Manchester, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 72 (1848); Lowery v. Tiernan, 2 H. & G. 34 (Md. 1827);
Miller v. Williamson, 5 Md. 219 (1853).

33. Katz, The Politics of Law in ColonialAmerica: Controversies Over Chancery Courts and Equity
Law in the Eighteenth Century, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971);
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 47-48; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 38-42; Wilson, Courts of Chancery
in the American Colonies, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 779 (1908); M.
SALMON, supra note 2, at 150-233.
34. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE 62 n.1 (1836); E. Warbasse, supra note
2, at 39-48. M. SALMON, supra note 2, at 150-233, catalogues in great detail the differences in equity
traditions in four states, concluding that the Southern jurisdiction she studied maintained stronger traditions than the Northern areas.
35. See generally Blume, Chancery on the American Frontier, 59 MICH. L. REV. 49 (1960).
36. Id at 54.
37. Despite the terms of the Northwest Ordinance, Michigan gave its supreme territorial court equity
jurisdiction as early as 1805. Id at 55-56. But the early history of chancery in the territories varied,
and Congress frequently had to step in later to resolve any lingering ambiguities. See Blume & Brown,
TerritorialCourts and Law: Unfying Factors in the Development of American Legal Institutions, 61

MICH. L. REV. 39, 54-59 (1962).
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territories have chancery courts. While Story argues that equity, once adopted,
was accepted with much less variation than the common law, 38 there is little
modem commentary analyzing his arguments. Thus, during much of the
formative period of English chancery rules on coverture,39 America was in a

state of "equitable disarray." Although some have attributed the cool reception given equity courts to antipathy to the English crown,40 a more sophisticated explanation suggests that the desire of colonial legislatures to control
chancery courts rather than leave them to the prerogatives of the crown led
some areas to resist the adoption of equity. There was less opposition to the
principle of equitable relief itself than to the institutions supporting it.a t Furthermore, there is evidence that substitutes for equity, such as private bills and
42
courts of law serving equity traditions, existed in some jurisdictions.
Colonial and early American reception of equitable coverture rules reflect
the variety in reception of equity law generally. Despite the contentions of
Kent and Story that equity generally provided a release from the more egregious common law coverture norms, 43 there is a growing body of recent work
confirming that the vagaries of local precedential and procedural settings cre-4
ated significant variety among the colonies and newly independent states.
While the resistance to equity in parts of the Northeast during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 45 is one of the causes of the variety, there
are also intriguing indications that private legislative bills were used in some
jurisdictions to alter more traditional coverture rules, 46 and that some common
38. 1 J. STORY, supra note 34, at 62-65.
39. See infra notes 100-96 and accompanying text (discussing English developments).
40. See E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 42-45.
41. See Katz, supra note 33, at 271-72 (resistance to equity recognized the need for such an institution but feared its abuse in the hands of the executive). Warbasse recognized that alteration of New
York's equity practice arose because of complaints about the complexity of equitable procedure, not the
notion of equity itself. E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 217-18.
42. See Katz, supra note 33, at 283; Salmon, Equality or Submersion?" Feme Covert Status in Early
Pennsylvania, in WOMEN OF AMERICA: A HISTORY 92 (C. Berkin & M. Norton eds. 1979).
43. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 136-49 (1826); 2 J. STORY, supra note 34, at 596-

655. Both Kent and Story wrote without close attention to actual practice at the time in the various
jurisdictions. Morris later wrote in a similar vein that equity was a general release valve from the
restrictions of the coverture rules at law. R. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 135.
44. Compare M. SALMON, supra note 2, at 162-8 1; Salmon, supra note 42, at 92-113; and L. KERBER,
pra note 2, at 139-55 with E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 42-48; and J. SPRUILL, WOMEN'S LIFE AND
WORK IN THE SOUTHERN COLONIES 361-64 (1938). For material on reception of equity, see generally
Blume, supra note 35; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 185-86; 1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 447-52 (rev. ed. 1981); 1 J. STORY, supra note 34, at 62-64. Some of the carefully written commentary in 19th-century treatises confirms that equitable coverture rules were received in a variety of ways.
See 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 16-22 (1873); J. SCHOtJLER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 167-69 (3d ed. 1882) [hereinafter SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS]; I J. SCHOULER,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 264-66 (rev.
ed. 1921). This last work is the sixth edition, as revised by Blakemore, of a work originally written in
1870.
45. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing resistance to equity in Northeast).
46. Until the mid-19th century, private bills were sometimes passed in traditional equitable coverture areas. L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 150-51 (petitions for feme-sole status); J. SPRUILL, supra note
44, at 36 1-62 (petitions for feme-sole status); Zainaldin, supra note 2, at 1043-44 (petitions for divorce,

legitimacy of birth, change of name, and adoption); E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 75, 169 (petitions for

feme-sole status). For an unsatisfactory history of special bills, see Cloe & Marcus, Special and Local
Legislation, 24 KY. L.J. 351, 355-58 (1936). Cooley wrote at length about special bills in his famous
treatise, but only those bills dealing with granting new trials, conferring power on guardians to sell
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law courts acted as surrogate equity courts. 4 7 The use of the separate estate as
a model in many of the married women's acts indicates that equity's influence
grew as the nineteenth century unfolded.4 8 In fact, there is some evidence that
reception occurred in reverse-American treatises were being "received" in
49
England during this period.
While it is fair to suggest that the chancery picture varied in the era before
the adoption of married women's acts, the lack of scholarship on private bills5
and common law forms of equity in the coverture law makes it difficult to
evaluate the situation. Furthermore, the increased use of equity precedents in
the nineteenth century occurred shortly before the emergence of movements to
merge law and equity,5' to restrict legislative authority to enact private bills,5 2
lands, validating irregular judicial proceedings, and divorces. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 103-35 (5th ed. 1883).
From my own research, the state of Alabama is an interesting example. On March 3, 1848, the state
legislature enacted a law providing that abandoned married women could apply to chancery for a
decree permitting them to act as feme soles. Act of Mar. 3, 1848, No. 40, 1847 Ala. Acts 100 (1848).
During that same session of the legislature, private bills granted feme-sole status to 35 women. Among
them were acts for the relief of Mary Sitton, Act of Jan. 15, 1848, No. 368, 1847 Ala. Acts 411 (1848);
Mary H. Clopton, Act of Feb. 29, 1848, No. 370, 1847 Ala. Acts 412 (1848); Margaret Craig, Act of
Mar. 4, 1848, No. 372, 1847 Ala. Acts 413 (1848); Martha C. Towles, Act of Mar. 2, 1848, No. 373, 1847
Ala. Acts 414 (1848); Christian Linington Child, Act of Mar. 3, 1848, No. 374, 1847 Ala. Acts 415
(1848); Susannah C. Waldron and Kitsey Ann Stephens, Act of Feb. 22, 1848, No. 375, 1847 Ala. Acts
415 (1848); Aurelia Mary Carpenter, Act of Mar. 3, 1848, No. 377, 1847 Ala. Acts 416 (1848); Obedience Ledlow, Act of Feb. 25, 1848, No. 377, 1847 Ala. Acts 416 (1848); Mary Brame, Act of Feb. 11,
1848, No. 378, 1847 Ala. Acts 417 (1848); Susan B. Gee, Act of Feb. 28, 1848, No. 379, 1847 Ala. Acts
417 (1848); Sylvia Fowler, Act of Mar. 4, 1848, No. 380, 1847 Ala. Acts 417 (1848); Mary Peoples, Act
of Mar. 6, 1848, No. 381, 1847 Ala. Acts 418 (1848); Bethaney Grimes, Act of Mar. 3, 1848, No. 383,
1847 Ala. Acts 418 (1848); Mourning Hanelson, Act of Mar. 4, 1848, No. 384, 1847 Ala. Acts 419 (1848);
Elizabeth Rickard, Act of Mar. 6, 1848, No. 387, 1847 Ala. Acts 420 (1848); Olivia Lanier, Act of Feb.
21, 1848, No. 391, 1847 Ala. Acts 421 (1848); and Eliza N. Randall, Act of Feb. 4, 1848, No. 392, 1847
Ala. Acts 422 (1848). The practice of enacting private bills for abandoned wives was a longstanding
habit. A review of Alabama state session laws (I did not look at territorial enactments) reveals that
such private bills were enacted very frequently after 1840 and with lesser frequency as far back as 1826.
The legislature did not meet in 1846. Alabama switched to biannual sessions after 1845. I found that 4
women were granted feme-sole status by such acts in the 1845 session, 35 in 1844, 10 in 1843, 10 in
18 4 2 , 5 in 18 4 1, 2 in 1840, 2 in 1839, 2 in 1838, 6 in 1837, 3 in 1836, 3 in 1835, 4 in 1834, 4 in 1833, 2 in
1832, and I each in 1831, 1828, and 1826. There also was a scattering of other private acts dealing with
the power of married women to sell slaves and dispose of property as guardians or administrators.
47. See the tempting generalizations by Katz, supra note 33, at 283, and the tidbits on Pennsylvania,
Liverant & Hitchler, .4 History of Equity in Pennsylvania, 37 DICK. L. REv. 156 (1933); 1 J. BISHOP,
supra note 27, at 9-12; and Fisher, The.administrationof Equity Through Common Law Formsin Penn.
sylvania, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 810 (1908). See generally M.
SALMON, supra note 2 (discussing common law courts and equity).

48. Kent's COMMENTARIES appeared in 1827, Story's in 1836. That equity and the notion of the
wife's separate equitable estate were "in the air" by the 1820's seems clear. Illustrations of its use appear
in this era, even in New England. See Porter v. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt. 410 (1847) (dispute over 1824
trust); Ayer v. Ayer, 33 Mass.(16 Pick.) 327 (1835) (dispute over 1824 trust involving transfer of asset
from mother to daughter). See also Conway v. Hale, 5 Tenn. (4 Hayw.) 1 (1817).
49. See Simpson, Th Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Princiolesand the Forms of Legal
Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 632, 671 (1981).

50. For starters, I undertook a study of Ohio's private bills in the 19th century. Although divorce
and other expected subjects were treated by private bills, there was nothing to suggest that the legislature of Ohio was a forum used to loosen the boundries of coverture. This may be because Ohio had an
early and strong equity tradition, or because dower was protected. See infra note 173 (discussing extent
of dower rights in Ohio). In any case, the dearth of bills on the subject suggests that there is vast stateby-state variation in this area.
51. M. HoRwrrz, THE 'TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 265-66 (1977), suggests that the
merger of law and equity in the second half of the 19th century was an effective limit on equity. To the
extent this is true in coverture law it significantly complicates analysis of both equity and the role of
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and to codify the law generally. The equitable separate estate, therefore, was
not only a precursor to the married women's acts,5 3 but was also enmeshed in
the more general package of reform movements in the first half of the nineteenth century. For example, New York's enactment of substantial reforms in
trust law, which made the establishment of married women's estates more difficult, is an intriguing sign of the links between married women's law reform
and the early nineteenth-century movement to merge law and equity and reform pleading practices.5 4 More research must now be done to link codification of coverture rules to the equitable and legislative situations extant in states
other than New York."5
The great variety in early American chancery practice is particularly important for analysis of married women's acts. The language of separate estates
became an important part of much of the legislation. The chancery model,
which permitted the use of special trust instruments to provide for married
women's assets, was formalized, and the complexity of early formats was abandoned in favor of simple conveyancing language. Whatever the differences
between American and English chancery law may have been, there can be
little doubt that the idea of a separate estate was well-known in America long
before married women's acts were adopted. It also seems certain that the slow
growth in the use of the married women's separate estate eventually compelled
married women's property acts. In New York, for example, the married woman's act of 1848 was
adopted in the same legislative session that adopted the Field Code, two years after equity courts had
been abolished and three years after the state Chancery Court had held that an active trustee was
necessary in separate equitable estates. See L'Amoureaux v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Barb. Ch. 34, 5 N.Y.
Ch. 288 (1845); E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 205-29. While Horwitz's theory that equity in New York
was limited may be true, it is not clear that his theory may be extended to other states. In addition, the
New York equity changes were apparently not duplicated elsewhere before married women's acts were
adopted. The New York setting is particularly interesting because of the clear interplay between law,
equity, procedure, judicial decisions, and the reshaping of women's roles. See generally P. RABKIN,
supra note 2, at 61-90 (discussing the New York setting); N. BASCH, supra note I (same).
52. C. BINNEY, RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
6-7 (1894). It is interesting to note that far-reaching constraints were imposed on the enactment of
private bills by the New York Constitution adopted in 1846, only two years before passage of New
York's first married women's act. Id at 7.
53. E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 289, notes that states with strong equity traditions tended to lag
behind other states in adopting married women's acts, thus casting doubt on any theory that equity led
to enactment of the statutes. Although Warbasse's theory may be true for acts adopted after the initial
wave of debt statutes, see infra notes 263 (listing separate estate statutes of the 1850's) and 361 (listing
earnings statutes of the 1870's), she appears to be partially in error as to the early acts. The lag may
simply confirm the idea that the early acts were not very far-reaching and that the later statutes found
tougher sledding in the more traditional Southern legal milieu.
54. P. RABKIN, supra note 2, at 52-90. Rabkin's work on the relationship between the codification
movement and the New York married women's act is very useful. Not only is it consistent with Horwitz's general description of the rise of codification in the first half of the 19th century, M. HoRwiTz,
supra note 51, at 17-18, but it also begins the task of linking coverture rules to other general trends in
the legal arena.
55. One of the interesting questions not answered by Rabkin's work is the relationship outside of
New York between changes in rules of civil procedure and the emergence of married women's acts.
New York was among the first states to revamp its procedural system. To the extent that equity and
law were merged, legislation might have been necessary to preserve existing equitable rights of married
women. Examining equity practice prior to the adoption of married women's acts might prove a useful
line of inquiry in states that adopted reforms in court practice about the same time they passed married
women's legislation. At first glance, it does not appear that significant procedural reform occurred
before married women's property acts were passed in other jurisdictions.
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a simplification of the process by which a separate estate was created and
maintained.
But just as with disposition of women's property at death, there was probably not enough married women's property held at equity in 1800 to command
the attention of late eighteenth-century reformers.5 6 Nor was there yet a general cultural desire to permit a married woman, rather than the person creating
an equitable separate estate, to control the disposition of a separately held asset.5 7 Not until separate equitable estates were routinely used by both men
and women to control family wealth, rather than simply by wealthy fathers to
protect their daughters from creditors of untrustworthy husbands, would the
law likely respond with significant alterations in form. Therefore, one of the
most important tasks for any archival study of married women's property is to
investigate8 the changing rates at which equity was used to protect such
property. 5
D.

FINDINGS

The proportion of recorded wills in Massachusetts and Maryland written by
women rose significantly between 1800 and 1850. 59 At first glance, the data on
wills in Tables 2 and 3 supports the thesis that women began to exercise more
control over property as the nineteenth century developed.
TABLE

2:

DUKES COUNTY

60

Years

Number
of Male
Wills

Number of
Female Wills

Percent of
Wills Written
By Females

1801-1810
1811-1820
1821-1830
1831-1840
1841-1850

40
26
46
35
45

1
2
10
12
13

2%
7%
18%
26%
22%

56. Note that women generally did not write wills before 1800, see supra note 28 and accompanying
text, and that women held very little property before 1800. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying
text.
57. Even after 1800, married women's ability to dispose of their separate property was generally
limited by the contents of the trust deed under which they took title. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing constraints on women's ability to dispose of their separate property).
58. A trust deed search in Dukes County is yet to be done. In addition, a large sample of male wills
needs to be read. If the female wills are indicative of trends, separate estate language does begin to
appear in some wills after 1830. The data is much too tentative at this point to be useful.
59. Data in both tables are from the indices for Dukes County and Baltimore. These results are
fairly consistent with earlier studies suggesting that women's wills did not appear in significant numbers
until after 1800. K. LOCKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 38, 128 (noting dearth of samples of women's handwriting); A. JONES, supra note 14, at 39 (showing that few women were "wealth holders" in the Thirteen
Colonies in 1774).
60. This data, of course, does not include the "no record" cases. See supra Table 1. The reliability
of the pre-1820 data is therefore more dubious, especially for men. The low number of "no record"
entries for women suggests that their data are more useful.
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TABLE

3: BALTIMORE CITY AND COUNTY

Number
of Male
Wills

Year
1800
1805
1810
1815
1820
1825
1830
1835
1840
1846

Number of
Female Wills

Percent of
Wills Written
by Females
9%
17%
15%
27%
28%
17%
24%
25%
40%
38%

It would be improper to argue, however, that the appearance of more women's wills indicates that women were behaving in remarkably different ways
in 1850 than they were in 1800. There were differences, but they were subtle.
Though the proportion of probated wills written by women rose, it does not
follow automatically that the proportion of women writing wills rose. In fact,
as Table 4 indicates, 6 ' the proportion of women's wills in relation to the adult
death rate 62 in Baltimore did not rise during this period.
TABLE

4:

WOMEN'S WILL-WRITING RATE-BALTIMORE

Time
Period

Avg. Number
of Female
Wills/Yr. for
Baltimore City
and County

Avg. Adult
Death Rate/Yr.
for Baltimore
City

Female Wills
as Percent of
Death Rate

1815-1819
1820-1824
1825-1829
1830-1834
1835-1839
1840-1844
1845-1849

24.2
25.0
26.8
34.4
44.2
38.2
50.4

613.8
948.4
796.2
1189.4
979.2
995.4
1441.2

3.9%
2.6%
3.4%
2.9%
4.5%
3.8%
3.5%

These figures do not give true will-writing rates because the will data cover a
larger geographic area 63 than the death rate data, and the death rates include
61. Death rate data for all Baltimore tables are taken from W. HOWARD, PUBLIC HEALTH ADMINIS1797-1920 521-23

TRATION AND THE NATURAL HISTORY OF DISEASE IN BALTIMORE, MARYLAND,

(1924).
62. "Adult" is defined as those persons age 20 and above.
63. Will data are for both city and county. Where data was available in the wills actually read, there
appeared to be no significant difference between the will-writing rates of the city and county. Since
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both men and women. Nonetheless, Table 4 is very valuable as a trend indicator since the same data bases are used as measuring devices for both genders.
The women's will-writing rate only kept pace with population trends. The
proportion of wills written by women increased in Baltimore only because, as
Table 5 suggests, men wrote fewer wills as the nineteenth century progressed. 64
TABLE 5: MEN'S AND WOMEN'S WILL RATES
FOR SELECTED YEARS-BALTIMORE

Number
Number
Male
Female
of Male
of Female
Baltimore Wills as Wills as
Selected
Wills
Wills
City Adult Percent
Percent
Years
City & County City & County
Deaths
of Deaths of Deaths
1815 and 1820
140
53
1267
11.8
4.2
-1825 and 1830
1835 and 1840
1846

49
75
53

191
153
86

1691
1872
1234

11.3
8.2
7.0

2.9
4.0
4.3

The data for Dukes County are not as easily used to determine trends in
will-writing rates because of the large number of male "no record" entries for
the 1800-1820 period. Death rate data are also not easily available. A crude
estimate may be made by tabulating a will-writing rate based on population
rather than death rates. The results of such a tabulation, as can be seen in
Table 6, produce much less clear data than for Baltimore. Even so, it does
appear that women began writing wills at a greater rate after 1820.
locale was not available in the death rate data and will indices used to compile this data, I had to fudge
a bit and use the wills themselves to find locale and the census to find population trends. Nonetheless,
the data are quite useful as a means of discussing rate change over time, especially since there does not

appear to be any significant difference in will writing rates between city and county when population is
used as a rate base.
City Versus County Will-Writing Rates
Year

% of Population
in City*

1800
1810
1820

46%
63%
66%

1825

-

1830
1840

69%
77%

1846
1850

80%

% Female Wills
From City
100%(2/2)
71% (12/17)

72% (26/36)
74% (31/42)

* This figure represents the percent of the combined
populations of the city and county that resided in the city.
The population data is taken from the decennial census.
The percent data on residence is derived from statements
made in the wills about the residence of the testator.
64. The index was combed for male wills in selected years only. Nonetheless, the trends are quite
clear when compared to the female data for the same selected years. As with Table 4, infra, Table 5
does not give true will-writing rates since the will base is city and county, the death base is city only,
and will-writing rates are figured from total adult deaths, not just male or female deaths.
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TABLE

Years
1801-1810
1811-1820
1821-1830
1831-1840
1841-1850

6:

65

WILL-WRITING RATES-DUKES COUNTY

Number Number
of
of
Female
Male
Wills
Wills
1
40
2
26
10
46
12
35
13
45

Female
Population
Male
Wills as
Wills as
as of
Percent
Percent
Last Yr.
of
of
of
Population Population
Decade
1.3%
3118
0.8%
3290
.3%
1.3%
3517
.3%
0.9%
3958
.3%
1.0%
4540

Just as women may have bucked the male trend to lower will-writing rates,
those women with property may have died testate more frequently than their
male counterparts. The Dukes County index produced some data on the proportion of probated estates that were intestate. These data certainly overstate
the use of wills since many estates were not probated. 6 6 Table 7 gives the
proportion of probated estates that were testate.
TABLE

Years
1801-1810
1811-1820
1821-1830
1831-1840
1841-1850

7:

TESTACY RATE-DUKES COUNTY

Male
Recorded
Estates
Testate (%)
91% (40/44)
67% (26/39)
52% (46/88)
40% (35/88)
49% (45/92)

Female
Recorded
Estates
Testate (01)
(1/1)
-

Number of
"No Record"
Entries
Female
Male

(2/3)

71% (10/14)
71% (12/17)
81% (13/16)

After 1830, twenty-four percent (25/105) of the testate estates were female, but
only seven percent (8/108) of the intestate estates were female.
There are at least two possible explanations for the tendency of the women's
will-writing rate to stay constant while the men's declined, and for women with
assets to write wills at a higher rate than men. First, it is possible that women
were making a subtle statement of goals by attempting to control the disposition of their assets in the face of countervailing male trends. And second, it
may be that constraints on the ability of women to hold property were being
65. Population data is taken from 2 C.E. BANKS, HISTORY OF MARTHA'S VINEYARD (1911). The
population figures in Table 6 are the sums of data for each of the three non-Indian towns on the island
at the relevant times. These data are in the Annals for each town contained in volume 2 of Banks' work
at pages 15-16 of the Annals of Edgartown, pages 5-6 of the Annals of Tisbury, and pages 5-7 of the
Annals of Chilmark.
66. Certainly the vast bulk of people never wrote wills. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 220
(estimating that less than five percent of the persons who died each year left wills that passed through
probate). Similar data for Baltimore was not gathered for this study.
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released so that the opportunities for taking dispositional control were more
frequently available. Some support for both theories is present in the data.
There is something intriguing about women writing wills when the size of
even their probated estates was probably smaller than that of their male counterparts. While the data is too tentative to rely upon with great confidence,
there is certainly a possibility that women with small estates were taking extra
care to guide the disposition of their possessions at death. The Massachusetts
study revealed a number of detailed inventories, though not enough to create a
large sample. The average size of the inventories of women's estates suggests
some income growth among women writing wills in the nineteenth century.
TABLE 8: SIzE OF FEMALE ESTATES-DUKES COUNTY

Number of
Number of
Intestate
Wills with
Average
Estates with
Average
Time
Inventories
Size
Inventories
Size
1840-1850
7
$1364
4
$540
63767
4
871
3
1800-1839
Nonetheless, it appears that these estates were significantly smaller than men's
estates. Among the ten men's estate files examined in which widows requested
an allowance out of their husband's personal estates, eight were intestate. Of
these eight, six were appraised at a value over $1,000. One was appraised at
almost $20,000. Both of the testate estates were very large. While this is certainly not a random sampling of men's estates, the vastness of the difference
between the values of these estates and their female counterparts gives rise to
the thesis that women were writing wills in situations where men would not
have done so. The detailed disposition of small items such as clothing, furniture, and housewares in a large number of the women's wills in both Dukes
County and Baltimore also supports the thesis that women were taking special
care with the disposition of their assets.
An array of other data confirms that even if women were not consciously
exercising control more frequently as the century progressed, men were becoming more willing to let them. Evidence of two sorts is available. First, data
on the gender of beneficiaries demonstrate that both male and female wills
tended to favor women as primary beneficiaries. Second, use of the equitable
estate for married women grew over time and changed in form to permit married women greater dispositional authority.
One of the more fascinating findings of the study, as illustrated by Tables 9
and 10, is that both men and women tended to dispose of property to women
rather than to men. The data gathered preclude the argument that women's
preference to repose assets with women was more pronounced than men's preference to do the same thing. The primary beneficiary of each will was usually
very clear. When there was doubt about a particular will, but all the possibili67. Two other partial inventories existed suggesting administered estates in the range of $30 and
$300, respectively.

1983]

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY LAW

1377

ties were of one sex, the primary beneficiary was tabulated in the "other" category for that gender. When it was not clear whether one sex or another was
the primary beneficiary, the will was labeled as "mixed. '68 The years represent
the year of probate, which was not always the year in which the will was written. These two tables show that both men and women favored women as primary beneficiaries in their wills and that this trend, at least in Baltimore,
increased over time.
TABLE 9: PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES OF WOMEN'S WILLS

Dukes
Primary
County
Beneficiaries
(all years)
Females: Daughter
7
Mother
2
Sister
3
Other
3
Total
15(50%)
Males:
Son
4
Nephew
3
Other
3
Total
10(33%)
Mixed:
Children
2
3
Other
Total
5(17%)
Total Wills 30(100%)

Baltimore:
1810 and
1825
1840
1846
5
11
8
0
1
3
3
3
6
4
4
8
12(43%)
19(49%) 25(53%)
2
6
2
1
0
3
4
3
4
7(25%)
9(23%)
9(19%)
6
4
5
969
7
3
9(32%)
11(28%)
13(28%)
28(100%) 39(100%) 47(100%)

68. The few cases where it was not possible to make any conclusion or the cases where the will could
not be found have not been included in the tables.
69. One of these wills involved charity as the primary beneficiary.
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PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES OF MEN'S WILLS (BALTIMORE)

Primary
Beneficiaries
Female: Wife
Wife, then daughters
Daughter
Other female
Total
Male:
Other male
Total
Mixed: Wife, then children
Children
Other mixed
Total
Total Wills

Total
Male
Wills
6
5
3
5
19(58%)
2
2(6%)
4
3
5
12(36%)
33(100%)

70

1810 and 1840 and
1825
1846
Wills
Wills
0
6
0
5
2
1
4
1
6(46%)
13(65%)
2
0
2(15%)
0(0%)
2
2
1
2
2
3
5(38%)
7(35%)
13(100%) 20(100%)

Of even greater importance than beneficiary trends, the wills demonstrate that
testators of both genders began to grant female beneficiaries, and more importantly, married female beneficiaries, greater control over the ultimate disposition of their assets. While studies of wills have suggested that wealthy men of
the early nineteenth century tended to will assets to women in life estates or
other forms that would insulate the property from creditors or from present or
future husbands, 7 1 the Baltimore data demonstrates that trend may have diminished by mid-century. None of the thirteen men's wills probated in 1810
or 1825 named a wife as the sole primary beneficiary. Of the twenty 1840 and
1846 wills, six named a wife as primary beneficiary 72 and four more provided
for interests in a wife, followed by grants to daughters. Furthermore, the wills
confirm that the equitable estate became an increasingly preferred device as
the century progressed. This was true for both men's and women's wills, although the male sample is small. Table 11 shows the percentage of wills that
either created a trust with a woman as a beneficiary, or used sole and separate
estate language in a grant to a woman, or combined both devices.

70. The Baltimore male sample included 3 wills from 1810, and 10 each from 1825, 1840, and 1846.
The sample was gathered by turning the microfilm crank 10 times and stopping at the next male will.
71. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 220-21.
72. Five of the six were straightforward grants to wives. The other had a restriction if the widow
remarried.
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TABLE 11: USE OF SEPARATE ESTATE-BALTIMORE

Female
Wills
With
Separate
Estate
14% (4/29)
15% (6/41)
25% (12/48)

Year of
Probate
1810 and 1825
1840
1846

Male Wills
With
Separate
Estates
8%(1/13)
73
25% (5/20)

This trend is further confirmed by data on use of deeds creating separate
equitable estates in Baltimore. A search of deed indices was made for January
to June, 1810, 1825, and 1840. This search, as seen in Table 12, revealed that
the appearance of separate estate trust deeds increased at a rate just a bit lower
than women's wills.
TABLE

12:

WILLS

&

TRUST DEEDS FOR SELECTED YEARS-BALTIMORE

Number of
Women's Wills

Year
1810
1825
1840

Number of
Separate Estate
Deeds

Analysis of these deeds also reveals that the later instruments gave married
women more dispositional authority more frequently (see Table 13).
TABLE

13: TRUST DEED DISPOSITIONAL AUTHORITY-BALTIMORE

Year of
Instrument
1810
1825
1840

Full Disposal
Authority

Limited
Disposal
Authority

Life Estate With
Designated
Remainders

The limitations on dispositional authority varied substantially from instrument to instrument. Among the limitations were a spousal consent requirement, designation of a class from whom grantees must be selected, and grant
of either sale or will capacity but not both. If the 1810 and 1825 instruments
are combined, fifty-eight percent (11/19) of the women obtained some disposi73. This entry covers both 1840 and 1846.

1380

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1359

tional authority. Eighty-eight percent (15/17) of the 1840 instruments provided some powers of disposal to women.
Because married women rarely wrote wills in the early nineteenth century,
use of will data alone to tabulate the rates at which women disposed of property at death is artificially low if nontestamentary methods of transfer were
available to wives. Trust instruments granting disposal authority were just
such a substitute for testation. Combining the trust deed data for 1825 and
1840 with the will data produces the intriguing, but tentative, conclusion that
by 1840 the effective will-writing rate for women rose to the same level as for
men. If we assume that the number of trust deeds found for the January to
June periods of 1825 and 1840 represents exactly half of the rate for each year,
then the following table results:
TABLE

Male
Wills
Per
Year Year
1825
1840

95
71

14: WILL/TRUST DEED RATES 74

Female
Wills
Per
Year

Trust
Deeds
Per
Year

19
46

12
30

Male
Wills
Baltimore
as %
City Adult
of
Deaths
Deaths
772
932

12.3
7.6

Female Wills
And Trust
Deeds as %
of Deaths
4.0
8.2

The column for Trust Deeds Per Year includes only deeds giving women
some dispositional authority; the other deeds involve no substitute for testamentary capacity. Similarly, the final column adds wills to trust deeds granting some dispositional authority. Use of death rates is an artificial device for
measuring trust deed rates, and the use of only a two-year sample renders the
results tentative at best. At a minimum it is fair to suggest that by 1840 married women in Baltimore had obtained significantly more authority to dispose
of assets at death than had previously been the case. It may be that the willwriting rate for men fell in part because women were being substituted as testamentary actors.
The Baltimore trust deed data also confirms the availability of equity as a
means of limiting the impact of common law restrictions on married women.
While virtually no married women's wills were found in either Dukes County
or Baltimore (see Tables 15 and 16), 75 the testamentary capacity of married
women did not necessarily remain unchanged between 1800 and 1850.
74. Remember that the will rates in this table are not real since the death base includes all adults in
the city and the will and trust deed rates include both the city and the county. Death rates are taken
from the same source as Table 4, supra.
75. In Tables 15 and 16 the columns labelled "probably widow or single" involve wills where the
circumstances strongly suggested the woman's status, but the status was not stated explicitly. For example, a woman who willed property to her mother, and had the same last neme as her mother was almost
surely a single woman.
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15:

MARITAL STATUS OF FEMALE TESTATORS-DUKES COUNTY

Decade
of
Probate
1801-1810
1811-1820
1821-1830
1831-1840
1841-1850
TABLE

Year of
Probate
1810
1825
1840
1846

16:

Widow or
Single
1
0
7
7
9

Probably
Widow or Single
0
0
1
2
3

Married
0
1
1
0
0

Unclear
0
1
1
3
1

MARITAL STATUS OF FEMALE TESTATORS-BALTIMORE

Widow or
Single
6
8
15
21

Probably
Widow or Single
2
7
14
18
E.

Married
1
0
2
2

Unclear
4
4
15
7

CONCLUSION

The post-1820 appearance of women's wills, the growth in use of the equitable separate estate in wills by both male and female testators, and the increase
in use of trust deeds with disposal powers indicates that some growth occurred
in the ability or propensity of Maryland's women to dispose of property. This
growth, however, occurred within very narrow bounds. The rate at which women's will-writing increased only kept pace with population growth; the proportion of wills written by women increased only because Baltimore men
wrote fewer wills as the nineteenth century progressed. Married women's dispositional authority was constrained by the wishes of their grantors. The use
of trust deeds with dispositional powers, if thought of as substitutes for wills,
may push the women's "will-writing" rate to the level of the men's rate, but
these instruments were inherently creatures of male draftsmen. All this suggests that small changes were occurring. Because women were probably not
wealthier in'relation to men in 1850 than they were in 1800,76 there may have
been a slow trend toward giving women dispositional authority over property
at the expense of some fathers, husbands, and trustees.
76. General historical information suggests that women's proportion of wealth did not rise in the first
half of the 19th century. Compare A. JoNES, supra note 14, at 39 with L. SOLTOW, supra note 15, at 200
n.12. A complete investigation of the reasons for the different will-writing rates of Baltimore men and
women is necessary, but is beyond the scope of the present study. If men of lesser wealth tended to stop
writing wills over time and women of similar or growing wealth began appearing as will-writers, perhaps some rewriting of known history would be possible. If the numbers in Table 8, supra, hold up
with larger samples, some interesting conclusions could be drawn, especially since the 1840's was a time
of deflation. See generally A. COLE, WHOLESALE COMMODITY PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES: 17001861 (1938). On the other hand, whaling produced a great deal of wealth in Dukes County during this
period. The increase in women's wealth, if any, may simply reflect community trends.
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The results of this study confirm that research into the actual use of wills,
trusts, and other forms of control over property will reveal a great deal about
social patterns and customs prior to the adoption of married women's acts.
But the varied reception given equity in America requires caution in drawing
general conclusions from any single piece of research. Two other studies of
early nineteenth-century documents, which reached somewhat different conclusions than this study, suggest an agenda for further work.
Marylynn Salmon, in her study of marriage settlements in South Carolina, 7 7
found that between 1730 and1 1830 control of marriage settlement property by
men remained fairly constant, control by women fell, and control by couples
rose.7 8 Authority, she found, moved from women alone toward joint management by husbands and wives. Salmon, pointing to Mary Beth Norton's conclusion that women's participation in family governance increased in the
decades surrounding the turn of the nineteenth century, 79 suggested that the
changes in control arose because women needed less autonomy as they "exercised more authority over the general fund of family property."8 0 Salmon also
found that descent of settlement property to children increased over time,
while control of descent by women declined. 8 ' She tentatively concluded that
marriage settlement form became more standardized by the nineteenth century, and that the standardized children descent provisions were accepted because wives had become more secure about their financial autonomy while
alive and generally desired their children to have their property at death.8 2
Both Salmon's overall finding that control of marriage settlement property
in South Carolina became more egalitarian by 1830 and my conclusion that
women may have gained authority over property at the expense of some men
are consistent with Norton's thesis that women's role in family decisionmaking
grew m importance between 1750 and 1830. But Salmon's twist that control by
couples replaced control by women is different from my suggestion that control by women replaced control by men. In part this may be due to the different ways the data were gathered. Salmon looked at changes in the form of
marriage settlements over time. I was interested as much in the rates at which
women participated in the property transaction process as in the authority of
women to dispose of trust assets. Insofar as our reviews of trust instruments
alone are concerned, our results may turn out to be consistent. A larger Maryland sample of trusts may change my results. Salmon's look at a century of
documents may have caught a long trend, while my look at half a century may
mirror the last half of Salmon's data. Looking only at the South Carolina
marriage settlements from 1800 to 1830, Salmon does appear to have found a
slight increase in control by women and couples, and a slight decline in control
by men.8 3 In addition, my tentative conclusion that women may have replaced
some men as actors in the property system arises from a look at combined
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Salmon, South Carolina, supra note 4, at 668.
Id at 668-72
M. NORTON, supra note 2.
Salmon, South Carolina, supra note 4, at 669.
Id. at 677-79.
Id. at 677.
Id at 672.
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patterns in both wills and equity instruments, rather than equity instruments
alone. Further research on the rates in which women participated in all sorts
of transactions, in addition to the forms of these transaction, is needed before
solid conclusions may be reached about the status of women just prior to the
adoption of married women's acts.
It is also possible that the studies display significant differences in the use of
equity between the Deep South and the more industrialized border areas. It is
logical to hypothesize that further research into Southern and border state equity documents will provide clues about why Southern states tended to adopt
the first wave of married women's acts insulating wives' property from husbands' creditors, but spurned many other reforms adopted in the North after
1850, while some border jurisdictions moved quickly to revamp most major
common law coverture rules.8 4 If Southern equity documents show that the
role of women was reduced prior to the era of married women's acts, and that
married women's acts were adopted in bad economic times to solidify a fairly
narrow role of married women in equitable separate estates, one would expect
that further legislation to enlarge married women's autonomous role in the
family would not readily be adopted. If border state documents confirm that
women were seen more as autonomous persons in a marriage than as subservient financial partners, one would expect a somewhat different legislative
response.
The only published study of Northeastern documents from the early nineteenth century raises as many questions as it answers. Norma Basch, in her
study of New York married women's legislation, 85 undertook a small study of
wills in Westchester County. Although she sampled only two years of documents, Basch found that there was little change in the content of wills between
1825 and 1850,86 that sons were favored over daughters,8 7 and that women
were usually denied power over the disposition of trust assets or granted only
interests for life.8 8 These results conflict somewhat with my Massachusetts results, where women seemed to fare somewhat better. Basch's work, like mine,
needs to be replicated with much larger samples. In addition, Basch did not
focus on the possibility that women fared better in inter vivos trust instruments
or that participation rates of women in various aspects of property decisionmaking may have increased, even if the contents of wills did not change.
Trust deeds were certainly used in New York, but the lack of comprehensive
recording statutes led Basch not to study them except through judicial decisions.8 9 Nonetheless, Basch's work confirms that the equity jurisprudence in
New York 90 was underlaid with use of trusts in wills at least as early as 1825.
While there is certainly the possibility, affirmed by other work, 91 that North84. See infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text (discussing the first wave of acts insulating wives'
property); see also infra notes 260-73 and accompanying text (discussing reason for and extent of

reforms).
85. N. BASCH, supra note 1, at 100-12.
86. Id at 101-03.
87. Id at 101, 105.
88. Id at 108.

89. Id at 73.
90. See id at 70-100 (reviewing cases).
91. Salmon, South Carolina,supra note 4.
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eastern jurisdictions with equity traditions operated more conservatively
before 1850 than Southern or border states, there is now little doubt that once
the reforming impulses of the abolitionist era struck with full force, many of
the more rigid impulses of Northern coverture law fell. 92 If more complete
explorations of the terms of Northern trusts confirm Basch's findings, it may be
that the great dissonance between the reality of day-to-day property usage and
the aspirations of women in a quickly industrializing region provided significant strength to the Northeastern women's movement after 1850.
II.

THE ADOPTION OF MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACTS

The Baltimore data confirm that the equitable separate estate underwent
significant development from 1800 to 1850, and that the availability of equity
to protect married women's property was known well before married women's
acts were adopted. But equity was not the only impetus for reform of married
women's property law. Like equity, many of the sources for coverture law
reform had both English and American roots. The obvious relevance of English law makes it easy to underestimate the importance of American legal developments. In this section, I place English law in its proper perspective and
expose the multiplicity of American legal developments during the first half of
the nineteenth century that shaped the married women's acts.
A.

THE ENGLISH ROOTS

While Blackstone's famous 1765 commentaries were the focus of much of
the nineteenth-century public debate on women's law, there is remarkably little legal history scholarship on the influence of Blackstone, or even of English
law generally, on nineteenth-century American coverture law. There is literature suggesting that English legal materials were more influential in the 1820's
and 1830's than before, 93 that along with moral revivals and Jacksonian idealization of the strong male farmer came legal Anglicism, treatise writing, and
codification movements. 94 Legal education, which along with education generally, developed and grew from the 1790's through 1830, was heavily influenced by the treatise writers, English law, and Blackstone. 95 Yet these very
facts make it unlikely that Blackstone became the subject for public debate in
the 1840's because contemporary law reflected his eighteenth-century ideas.
Rather, it is likely that conservative segments of the legal and academic communities were searching British treatises for precision in an era of multiplying
sources for legal rules. 96 Blackstone's writings were easily understood both by
92. See infra notes 204-11, 260-73 and accompanying text (detailing reforms).
93. Zainaldin traces the reemergence of conservative English child custody cases in the 1830's, perhaps encouraged by the heavy use of English cites in the treatises of Kent and Story. Zainaldin, supra

note 2, at 1059-68. See also Nolan, Sir William Blaclastone andthe New 4merican Republic: .4 Study of
IntellectualImpact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 731, 759-767 (1976) (discussing the growing influence of Blackstone on legal education in the period).
94. See P. RABKIN, supra note 2, at 40-60; Bloomfield, William Sampson and the CodiFers.: The Roots
ofAmerican Legal Reform, 1820-1830, 11 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 234 (1967); C. COOK, THE AMERICAN
CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM

(1981).

95. See Nolan, supra note 93, at 759-67 (discussing Blackstone's impact on legal education in early

America).
96. See C. COOK, supra note 94, at 46-48 (noting that by 1815 sources for American law were quickly
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men reading to become lawyers in a culture loosening the constraints on entry
into the legal profession 97 and by women publicly criticizing the extant order.
For a number of reasons, Blackstone's vision of reality 98 is a less than satisfactory basis for measuring the influence of English coverture law. First, English law changed between the time Blackstone wrote and the opening decades
of the nineteenth century. Second, by 1800 important differences between
American and English law existed in conveyancing, dower, intestate succession, equity, and divorce. 99 Third, the overall impact of English law on coverture developments was diffuse. So many other influences were at work during
the early nineteenth century that English law was only one of numerous factors. Well before married women's legislation appeared, American law witnessed the arrival of the codification and treatise movements, the rise and
incipient decline of legislative private bills, and the appearance of efforts to
merge law and equity. To ignore these and other legal developments by focusing on Blackstone's version of our English heritage is to miss the peculiarly
American context of married women's property legislation.
1. Change in English Coverture Law
Blackstone wrote his Commentaries while the separate equitable estate of a
married woman was reaching maturity in English chancery courts.1t° Decisions rendered in the late eighteenth century both subjected a wife's separate
property to her debts, and narrowly construed dispositional powers in trust
instruments to avoid overreaching by husbands.' 0 ' The failure of much modem scholarship to note the changes in English law during the very era in which
America began seriously to reconsider the legal status of women is quite remarkable. 10 2 Many have written of English law as if it were monolithic and
proliferating). Case reports, statutes, and books were emerging in a nation with more than twenty
states. Doctrinal and theoretical diversity was becoming commonplace. Uncertainty over legal norms
was becoming a real concern for many.
97. Id at 158-60, 172-73. See also L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 276-78.

98. The 1803 St. George Tucker edition of BLACKSTONE'S

COMMENTARIES

was the most prominent

of the early American editions of the 1765 English treatise. Chapter XV, part III, on the law of husband and wife, at 441-45, is the section most often chastised. There Blackstone writes that "the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs
everything."
99. Divorce is an enormous area all by itself. I have chosen largely to pass by this area for now
because so little good work has been done and the task is so enormous. Blake, supra note 2, does make
it clear that divorce was an early and important area where the colonies differed notably from England.
But the lack of work on the economics of divorce-the relative positions of men and women before,
during, and after marriage-makes it very difficult to evaluate the importance of the growth of divorce
between 1780 and 1840. If the major thesis of this article is correct, one should find reforms between
1800 and 1850 that provided divorced women slightly greater rights to property or money upon divorce.
This would occur not because of any modern notions about protecting women, but to protect increasing
numbers of children coming into the custody of women and to prevent women on the edge of poverty
from becoming public charges.
100. Holdsworth writes that by 1750 property could be set aside in a separate estate or disposed of by
a married woman by will or gift without a husband's consent. 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 275-76 (1938 & photo. reprint 1966).
101. 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 100, at 325-26.
102. There is a fairly large body of literature on the reception of English law. Among the more
interesting items suggesting the diffuse nature of America's reception of English law are G. HASKINS,
LAW & AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 113-40 (1960); M. HoRwiTZ, supra note 51, at 3-30; D.
KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSCHusETTs: ESSEX COUNTY 1629-1692 3-63 (1979); W.
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unchanging.103 Holdsworth notes that English law on married women changed
substantially during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The general outlines of common law coverture rules emerged in the thirteenth century. 104
Upon marriage, the husband gained power and control over his wife's freehold
estate for the term of the marriage, or, upon the birth of a child, for the husband's life, and obtained ownership of his wife's personal property. A woman's ability to contract was suspended upon marriage. Equitable exceptions
to these rules did not emerge until the late sixteenth century,1 05 when antenuptial contracts and trusts for the separate use of the wife appeared.10 6 The
chancery cases also gave wives power to will their separate estates, donate
them to their husbands, sell them to strangers, and perhaps deal with them by
contract. 0 7 Though consent of the husband for the establishment of the separate equitable estate was still necessary, 0 8 equity courts of the late seventeenth
century began to require an "equity to a settlement" to insure some financial
safeguards for wives whose husbands sought to make use of assets in a separate estate.109 This period also saw the emergence of enforceable separation
agreements, support decrees for wives leaving their marital home due to the
fault of the husband," 10 and cases confirming the ability of married women to
execute powers."' Not until the mid-eighteenth century did chancery courts
take the crucial step of recognizing a separate estate created without the husband's consent." 2 In a related development, the courts began to examine dispositions of a separate estate more carefully to avoid coercion by husbands." 13
The separate estate became subject to the debts of married women by the end
114
of the eighteenth century.
Dower also changed dramatically from its fifteenth-century roots.1 15 By the
fifteenth century the one-third share was established, and it was clear that
dower could be avoided if land was sold by means of a fine and the wife was
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHU-

SETS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 1-64 (1975); E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 3-6; Blume & Brown, supra note
37; DePauw, Women and the Law: The ColonialPeriod, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS 107 (1977); Nolan, supra
note 93; Note, The Tennessee County Courts Under the North Carolinaand TerritorialGovernments." The
Davidson County Court ofPleasand Quarter Sessions, 1783-1796, as a Case Study, 32 VAND. L. REV.
349 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Tennessee County Courts]; Goebel, Ex Parne Clio, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 45059 (1954) (reviewing 0. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES (1953)).
103. Authors often speak of the common law without reference to its modification over time. See,
e.g., R. MoRus,supra note 21, at 128, 155, 164, 166, 173, 185, 195, 197; P. RABKIN,supra note 2, at 1922; L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 139-41.
104. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 520-33, 541-43 (1908 & photo, reprint 1966).
105. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 428-29 (2d ed. 1937).
106. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 310-15 (1924).
107. Id at 315.
108. 6 W. HOLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 645 (2d ed. 1937 & photo. reprint 1966).
109. Id

110. Id at 646.
111. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 108, at 180-81.
112. 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 100, at 275-76. See also P. RABKIN, supra note 2, at 81.

Rabkin notes that chancery development gradually permitted fathers to guarantee that the property
they passed on to their daughters would be free from the clutches of untrustworthy husbands. It was to
protect daughters, Rabkin argues, more than to free wives that the chancery acted. Id
113. 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 100, at 276, 324-26.

114. Id at 325.
115. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 104, at 193.
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examined separately by the court. 1 6 Even at this early date, other devices for
avoiding dower had emerged, including the use of jointures and premarital
I7
settlements providing for life estates in the husband's lands at his death."
The development of jointure led to the already mentioned development of
ante-nuptial contracts and trusts for the separate use of the wife. By the middle of the eighteenth century, it was clear that equitable estates were free of
dower."I s While the lack of dower at equity was reversed by statute in 1833,
the same act provided for dower only in lands actually held at death by the
husband:" I9 Thus, the English rules governing both dower and coverture at
equity underwent significant changes from the time America was first colonized in the early seventeenth century through the turn of the nineteenth
century.
Coverture doctrines at law were also under stress in the same period. For
some time before the turn of the eighteenth century, it was clear that married
women divorced from bed and board, abandoned by their husbands, or left
behind after their husband's banishment from the realm could act as single
women.' 20 During the eighteenth century, cases arose where women, living
apart on separate maintenance provided by their husbands after a marital separation, pled coverture as a defense to actions by their creditors. 12 ' Lord
Mansfield, confronted with such a dispute in Corbett v. Poelnitz122 in 1785,
took the opportunity gently to criticize the extant coverture rules at law, and to
bind the separately maintained wife to her contract as if she were a femesole. 12 3 Though the case was overruled after Mansfield left the King's
Bench,' 2 4 it is clear from the judicial turmoil and the commentary of the day
that the less central portions of the coverture rules were under attack even at
law.' 2 5 Mansfield's opinion in Corbett spoke of "new customs and new manners"'126 and noted the growing prevalence of deeds under which a married
woman assumed the appearance of a feme-sole.' 2 7 Mansfield's general
penchant for liberalizing rules. of commercial transactions meshed neatly with
his attempt to reform coverture rules 128
as they applied to married women acting
independently in the business world.
116. Id at 193.
117. Id at 196.
118. Id at 196-97.
119. Id at 197.
120. 1 J. POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS 75-77 (1790).
121. See id at 77-93; C. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 217-18 (1936); 1 W. EVANS, A GENERAL VIEW
OF THE DECISIONS OF LORD MANSFIELD 99-110 (1803); Ringstead v. Lady Lanesborough, 99 Eng. Rep.

610, 3 Douglas 197 (1783); Corbett v. Poelnitz, 99 Eng. Rep. 940, 1 Term Rep. 5 (1785); Marshall v.
Rutton, 101 Eng. Rep. 1538, 8 Term Rep. 545 (1800).
122. 99 Eng. Rep. 940, 1 Term Rep. 5 (1785).
123. Id at 945, 1 Term Rep. at 8.
124. Marshall v. Rutton, 101 Eng. Rep. 1538, 8 Term Rep. 545 (1800).
125. See J. POWELL, supra note 120, at 77-93. In the most widely-circulated American edition of
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, that of St. George Tucker issued in 1803, there are a number of notes
critical of the Blackstone version of coverture. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 441-45 (S.G. Tucker ed.
1803). Some of these notes are reprints of those penned by Edward Christian, who had edited an
earlier English edition of the Commentaries. Tucker added a few references, including one to Corbett v.
Poelnitz. Id at 943. See also Nolan, supra note 93, at 736-37.
126. 99 Eng. Rep. at 942, 1 Term Rep. at 8.
127. Id at 943, 1 Term Rep. at 9.
128. Though Mansfield apparently was not well-received in America after the Revolutionary War,
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Another indication of the pressure Mansfield must have felt is revealed by
cases on the custom of London, confirmed by the courts of law beginning at
the end of the sixteenth century and continuing through the eighteenth century. 129 According to the custom, women could sue and be sued on debts arising out of trade in which their husbands did not intermeddle. While the cases
do not reveal whether the custom was more heavily used in Mansfield's time
than in prior centuries, one would certainly hypothesize that it, or some substitute, was. 130 The growth, if any, in the wealth and commercial activity of the
wives of London' 3 ' may have imposed pressures on both the coverture rules at
law and on the equitable'notion of the separate estate. It is quite possible that
use of the custom declined rapidly in the late eighteenth century once equity
had affirmed the ability of women to use separate estates free of their husbands' control.
Changes in English law were well-known in America before 1840. The most
widely used edition of Blackstone, that edited by Tucker in 1803,132 had some
significant debunking notes and commentary. Even suffrage for unmarried
women was implicitly approved in a note saying that women "pay taxes without having the liberty of voting for representatives; and indeed there seems at
present no substantial reason why single women should be denied this privilege."' 133 "I fear," the note goes on, "there is little reason to pay compliment to
our laws for their respect and favour to the female sex."' 34 In addition, the
early American treatises by Kent and Story 35 noted many developments, especially at equity, which had flowered in England since Blackstone's time. My
archival work certainly confirms this. Furthermore, studies of court and other
records in frontier areas indicate that some frontier lawyers and judges paid
lavish attention to English and American precedents in the early nineteenth
century, and that they had access to a wide array of case reports and treatises
see Goebel, supra note 102, at 455-56; M. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 18, his work was better known
and perhaps more influential by the time of Kent and the beginnings of the treatise movement in the
United States. See 2 J. KENT, supra note 43, at 133-36; M. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 257-58; L.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 95.
129. Chamberlain v. Throp, 74 Eng. Rep. 121, 1 Leonard 130 (31 Eliz., 1589-1590); Bowett v. Langham, 124 Eng. Rep. 299, Hetley 9 (3 Car., 1628-1629); Langham against the wife of John Bewett, 79
Eng. Rep. 661, Croke Car. 68 (3 Car., 1628-1629); Barns v. Barns, 90 Eng. Rep. 32, Skinner 66 (34 Car.
2, 1683-1684); Fabian v. Plant, 89 Eng. Rep. 525, 1 Shower, K.B. 183 (3 W. & M., 1690-1691); Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1549, 12 Modem 603 (13 Will. 3, 1702-1703); Mrs. Pool's Case, 88 Eng. Rep. 1021,

11 Modem 253 (8 Anne, 1710-1711); Caudell v. Shaw, 100 Eng. Rep. 1065, 4 Term Rep. 361 (1791).
130. The frequency of reported cases in Viner's Abridgement goes down in the eighteenth century as
compared with the seventeenth century. Perhaps this is because of the increasing utility of trusts, powers, and other devices to avoid the restrictions of the coverture rules at law. There may have been less
need to dispute the legitimacy of the custom if other tools were available to women to protect their
commercial interests.
131. That wives were involved in trade is fairly clear. See M. GEORGE, LONDON LIFE IN THE
XVIIITH CENTURY 168-73, 175, 181-85, 195, 198, 202, 207-08, 427-29 (1925). It is not at all clear that
the same may be said of married women in the United States, since little scholarship exists on the
commercial role of married women in the early part of the century. Two works by E. Dexter, COLONIAL WOMEN OF AFFAIRS: WOMEN IN BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS IN AMERICA BEFORE 1776 (1924)
[hereinafter E. DEXTER, COLONIAL WOMEN OF AFFAIRS] and CAREER WOMEN OF AMERICA 1776-1840
(1950), pay no attention to marital status.
132. See Nolan, supra note 93, at 737 n.38.
133. 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 445 (S.G. Tucker ed. 1803). The note was written by Edward
Christian, an Englishman, not Tucker, shortly before Tucker did his work.
134. Id
135. J. KENT, supra note 43; J. STORY, supra note 34.
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within a very short time after the areas were opened for settlement. 136 Available treatises included not only the expected volumes, such as Blackstone and
137
Kent, but also a number of now obscure American and English books.
There is every reason to believe that the inflience in America of Blackstone's
conservative commentary on coverture law was equally balanced by general
knowledge of the more liberal equity concepts emerging after the Revolutionary War. As Nolan has concluded about Blackstone generally, "The Commentaries did significantly influence the evolution of American institutions,
but their influence on each differed in kind and degree. In every case, however, Blackstone's influence
was more oblique and more diffuse than his biog138
raphers have claimed."'
2. Early Differences Between English and American Coverture Law
Although our legal system was based in very substantial part on English
models, 139 there were enough differences between English and American coverture law to suggest that the United States was marching to a significantly
different drummer by 1800. The earliest settlers were confronted with many
problems not routinely dealt with by English law. There is evidence that women, sometimes even married women, received land grants in some of the Colonies.14° While this practice may have been designed to attract women to the
new Colonies, 14 1 it is also possible that the exigencies of colonial life sometimes forced relaxation of the strict roles of husbands and wives. 142 There is
some literature suggesting that early colonial married women did not labor
under legal restrictions to the extent Blackstone's commentaries would sug136. Brown, FrontierJustice: Wayne County 1796-1836, 16 AM. J. LEG. HIsT. 126 (1972); Blume,
supra note 35, at 88-95; Note, Tennessee County Courts,supra note 102, at 377-82. These studies looked
at cases not generally reported by the digest system. But even in early reported opinions, the
knowledge of chancery developments seems quite up-to-date. See, e.g., Trustees of Methodist Episco&alChurch v. Jaques, 3 Johns. Ch. 77 (N.Y. 1817); Franklin v. Creyon, I Harp. Eq. 243 (S.C. 1824);
renton Banking Co. v. Woodruff, 2 NJ.Eq. (1 H.W.Green) 117 (1838); Porter v. Bank of Rutland, 19
Vt. 410 (1847).
137. Nolan's thesis that Blackstone's influence was somewhat diffuse is lent credence by Brown's
work on the Michigan territorial records. See Brown, supra note 136 (suggesting that frontier lawyers
possessed and used same sources of law as their metropolitan contemporaries).
138. Nolan, supra note 93, at 732.
139. See C. CooK, supra note 94, at 3-45. But even as to the general influence of English law, there
does appear to be some agreement that legislative differences arose in great profusion. The Northwest
Ordinance, for example, required the new territory's Governor and judges to adopt statutes previously
enacted by one or another state "as might be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the
district." Blume & Brown, supra note 37, at 523. See generall BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW: 1776-1836 (1964); Blume, Legislation on theAmerican Frontier,60 MICH. L. REv. 317 (1962).
This provision governed much of the territorial development of the United States, since the Northwest
-Ordinance was extended from time to time to other territories. As a result, territorial statutes tended to
be eclectic in origin. The tendency for legislatures to copy other statutes has appararently been a constant in American legal history. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 78-81. Even in 17th-century
Massachusetts the practice occurred, and it was continued in the other Colonies. See Riesenfeld, LawMaking and Legislative Precedentin American Legal History, 33 MINN. L. REv. 103 (1949); Haskins,
Codfcation of the Law in ColonialMassachusetts: A Study in ComparativeLaw, 30 IND. L.J. 1 (1954).
140. J. SPRUILL, supra note 44, at 9-12, 340; R. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 131; M. RYAN, WOMANHOOD INAMERICA 6-7, 13 (1979). See also the numerous anecdotes of women landowners in E. DEXTER, COLONIAL WOMEN OF AFFAIRS, supra note 131, at 98-125. Unfortunately, Dexter did not focus
on the marital status of her subjects or the impact of coverture rules.
141. J. SPRUILL, supra note 44, at 9-12.
142. See M. RYAN, supra note 140, at 1-40 (discussing roles of women in colonial society).
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gest. 143 However significant the initial colonial land grants to women and the
somewhat looser rules of the earlier colonial era, there is little disagreement
that the practices were altered and that English law became more influential as
the Colonies developed. The more traditional English pattern of the husband's dominance certainly governed in most places during the late seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth century. 44 Nonetheless, early
variations in colonial practice and different traditions in colonial administration left opportunities open for novel American practices to develop.
These generalizations about married women's law coincide with the conclusions drawn in the general literature on pre-Revolutionary War use of English
law in the colonies. As the colonies matured, English legal models became
more important. 4 5 Nonetheless, substantial room was left for independent development of American legal institutions.146 Even though American legal developments were subjected to appellate review by the Privy Council during
much of the colonial era, 14 7 it is likely that such review was used only to protect the Crown's power to direct colonial legal institutions and to promote the
economic interests of Great Britain. 4 8 As Goebel notes, 149 the Colonies, lacking the centralized institutions of the English chancery system, adopted particularized procedural formats from their earliest days.' 5 0 The diffuse system
gave significantly more control to judges than in England.' 5 ' Furthermore, the
diverse needs of the Colonies, and the ability of the settlers to adopt their own
legislation, naturally led to deviations from English common law practice.
Much of the new law avoided Privy Council censure.' 52 Finally, Goebel notes
that the colonists generally acted as if they had the53authority to decide which
English statutes were applicable to their territory.'
By the end of the colonial era, therefore, the American legal system was
peppered with localized procedural systems and variegated lines of cases and
statutes. Judges and legislators alike considered themselves to be repositories
143. R. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 126-200; Gundersen & Gampel, Married Women's Legal Status in
Eighteenth Century New York and Virginia, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 114 (1982).
144. J. SPRUILL, supra note 44, at 340-66; L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 119-84.
145. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 42-49.
146. See, e.g., Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in I SELECT EsSAYS INANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367 (1970); L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 15-16, 30-32.
See generally G. HASKINS, supra note 102 (suggesting diffuse nature of America's acceptance of English
law); M. KAMMEN, COLONIAL NEW YORK: A HISTORY 91-94 (1975) (same); Gundersen & Gampel,
supra note 143 (same).
147. During the earliest years of the colonies, direct English control of American legal development
was weak at best. I R. POWELL, supra note 44, at 99-102; see Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in
Seventeenth Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416 (1931). Only after the Restoration in 1660
did the Crown begin to exercise more control over its colonial domain. This early period of relative
freedom in the colonies planted the seed for much of the power exercised by the judicial and legislative
authorities in the 18th century. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 43-45. Of course, some colonies
developed legal systems from non-English roots because of the early exploration patterns of the European powers. M. KAMMEN, supra note 146, at 91-94.
148. Goebel, supra note 102, at 466.
149. Goebel's piece is a severe critique of 0. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953).
150. See also G. HASKINS, supra note 102, at 113-40.
151. Goebel, supra note 102, at 464.
152. Id at 464; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 43. See also M. HORWITZ, supra note 5 1, at 1-30; W.
NELSON, supra note 102, at 9-10.
153. Goebel, supra note 102, at 465; see also L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 78-81.
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of substantial legal authority. Similarly, the post-war process of deciding
which segments of colonial legal institutions were to be left intact gave a great
deal of discretion to judges, and statutes were received if local demands warranted. The problem for revolutionary era courts was to keep154legal systems
operating, rather than to simply reject, or accept, English law.
Modem legal historians studying coverture are now recognizing that postwar judicial and legislative decisions on the applicability of English law in the
state, territorial, and federal systems were not uniform. 55 An array of recep154. Goebel, supra note 102, at 467-68. Although Horwitz is more sympathetic than Goebel to the
idea that natural law concepts motivated much of the legal community's actions in the 18th century, the
factual predicate for his theory is similar to Goebel's. Compare Goebel, supra note 102, at 456-57, with
M. HoRwITz, supra note 51, at 7-9. See also W. NELSON, supra note 102, at 13-35. Horwitz, like

Morris, supra note 21, is subject to the criticism that he makes very broad generalizations from scattered
evidence. Nonetheless, his generalizations are useful categories even if only as a starting point for measurement. Horwitz argues that Revolutionary War era lawyers had great respect for the common law
system, despite colonial deviations from English rules of law. See also L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at
95-96. Precedent was important in the formation of norms that generally governed the human condition. M. HoRwirz, supra note 51, at 4-5. While common law was equated with the divination of
customary practice and natural law, id at 7-8, statutes were perceived as man-made instruments of the
Crown. While the colonists felt entitled to the common law system, if not its results, id at 8, they felt
free to alter English statutes. As a result, both judges pronouncing the common law and legislators
enacting statutes ignored English solutions when necessary. Not until well after the Revolution did
reactions set in decrying the diversity ofjudge-made law, id at 18, and seeking the general unification
and codification of legal norms, id at 9-30, 253-56. The treatise tradition, which grew vigorously in the
United States after 1820, also undertook to rationalize the diverse case law. The trend began with
Kent's COMMENTARIES in 1827 and Story's COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY in 1836. But before the reaction, judges were emboldened to decide cases by reference to perceived public policy needs, M. HORwrTz, supra note 51, at 30, and legislatures felt free to adopt far-ranging alterations in English law. L.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 97-100. By the turn of the 19th century, Horwitz argues, legal thought had
moved from natural law to law as an instrument of social policy.
155. The best of the recent articles on variations during the colonial era is Salmon, The Legal Status
of Women in EarlyAmerica: A Reappraisal,1 LAW & HIST. REv. 1 (1983). Salmon argues that modem
legal historians may not with confidence rely on the general conclusions of an earlier generation of
historians, including Morris, Beard, Dexter, and Bensen. Johnston opened the recent law journal debates on many of the questions taken up in this paper. Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law
Tradition, the Law School Curriculum and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033

(1972). His cites to R. MORRIS supra note 21, suggest the difficulty Johnston had in deciphering the
reception of English law in a culture as diverse as early America's. Even though chapter III of Morris'
book has been aptly applauded as a path-breaking work, it is most certainly flawed. See M. SALMON,
supra note 2, at 18-21. Morris drew a generally optimistic conclusion about the improved colonial
status of women by noting a number of scattered examples of exceptions to the general English practice. Although these examples are very useful and interesting, they do not arise out of the intense
cultural analysis necessary to support Morris' overall conclusion. See Goebel, supra note 147, at 416
n.3. Indeed, Morris was at times wrong in suggesting that his examples were exceptional and different
from English practice. For example, Morris notes that a Mistress Margarett Brent acted as Maryland
Governor Calvert's executor beginning in 1647. R. M6RRIs, supra note 21, at 132-33. This is said to be
an example of a woman acting as an attorney. But women were acting as executors of estates in England for some time before 1647. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 104, at 528, 544; 7 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 108, at 180. Similarly, in an effort to make American commercial practice seem more open
to women, Morris dismisses the English feme-sole trader status "merely as a local custom in some of the
commercial boroughs," citing 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 104, at 525. But the period Holdsworth
described was much earlier than the 17th century. Morris also ignores other available material on
feme-sole trader status in England. See infra notes 183-96 and accompanying text. The custom of
London can hardly be so easily dismissed. It is also not clear that Dexter's books, COLONIAL WOMEN
OF AFFAIRS: WOMEN IN BUsINESS AND PROFESSIONS IN AMERICA BEFORE 1776 (1924) and CAREER
WOMEN OF AMERICA 1776-1840 (1950) portray any different picture than that of London given by M.
George in chapter IV of LONDON LIFE IN THE XVII CENTURY (1925). The colonies may have been
more open to businesswomen than England, but Morris fails to make a case for that view. Morris also
suggests that ante-nuptial contracts calling for husbands to dispose of assets by will to their wives were
not clearly enforceable in England in.the 17th century, while they were in the Colonies. R. MORRIS,
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tion statutes was passed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
and they differed in the era of English common law to be followed, the acceptance of equity, and the binding force of statutes. 156 Reception statutes frequently gave courts some discretion to decide which English precedents or
statutes to apply. In addition, legislatures took upon themselves the task of
resolving many disputes by passing private bills. In this milieu, pre-war
changes in coverture-related legal norms were unlikely to be impeded by English interests. After the war, there was room for legal institutions to reexamine
coverture law.
Development of Conveyance Reforms.
From early in the eighteenth century, simplified documentary systems of land transfer emerged in most, but not
all, of the Colonies. 57 The vast number of land transfers occurring in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries required simple conveyancing methods.
Warranty and quit claim deeds emerged in easily useable forms early in the
eighteenth century.' 58 The Northwest Ordinance provided for transfer of
59
property by deed, free of the technical constraints of English common law. 1
supra note 21, at 135-36. Morris ignores, however, the contemporaneous development of trusts in England that served the same purposes. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 106, at 312-15. Finally, Morris'
examples are localized. There is no way to know the depth or breadth of the colonial practice from his
discussion.
156. Although some American reception statutes referred to specific dates for determination of the
English common law to be received, almost all the reception statutes allowed local judges discretion in
deciding when to declare the law to be "received." Even in areas where reception statutes designated a
specific date, judges were left with discretion to adopt later English case law. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
22, at 97-100. It is therefore predictable that the American legal system absorbed some segments of
English law and rejected others.
The most comprehensive summary of reception provisions appears to be I R. POWELL, supra note 44,
at 72-363. Every state's situation is discussed. A number of states had time-specific provisions. In
1776, for example, Virginia adopted a statute providing for reception of "the common law of England,
and statutes or acts of parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign
of King James the First 1607, and which are of a general nature, not local to that Kingdom." 1 REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 135 (1819). The statutory segment of this provision was significantly narrowed in 1792 after Jefferson completed a general statutory revision project for the state.
Blume & Brown, supra note 37, at 480. Massachusetts provided in its first constitution that "All the
laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and approved. . . and usually practised on the courts
of law shall still remain and be in full force until altered or repealed by the legislature; such parts only
excepted as are repugnant to the rights and liberties contained in this constitution." MASS. CONST. ch.
VI, art. VI (1780). While this was later construed broadly to permit discretionary adoption of English
law, Commonwealth v. Churchill, 2 Metc. 118 (Mass. 1840), it obviously lacked the certitude of Virginia's code. The Virginia Ordinance of 1776 was adopted by the territorial government of the Northwest Territories in 1795. Blume & Brown, supra note 37, at 39. The Northwest Ordinance itself
provided simply that the territory's inhabitants should have the "benefits of. . .judicial proceedings
according to the courts of the common law." Id
The statutes frequently left much discretion with courts. In Vermont a fairly typical statute was
passed providing for reception of common law "not repugnant to the Constitution, or to any acts of the
legislature of this state." I Vt. 118 (1793). A contemporaneous commentary on this act by the Chief
Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court noted that circumstances were different in America from England, that monarchy and aristocracy had been overthrown, and concluded that the reception statute
should not be read to accept principles "which from the peculiar circumstances of that government,
exist only in England." Chipman, A Dissertation on the Act Adopting the Common and Statute Laws of
England, I Vt. 117, 138 (1793).
157. R. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 69-72; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 54-57; G. HASKINS, supra
note 102, at 171-73. New York, interestingly enough, was among the later states to alter its conveyance
rules. See Gundersen & Gampel, supra note 143, at 125-27 (1982); M. SALMON, supra note 2, at 31-37.
158. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 207-09.
159. Blume, supra note 139, at 326-27.
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While these provisions were probably inserted in the Ordinance to benefit the
Ohio Company, which was seeking rights to develop Ohio, 160 they had effects
on coverture rules as well. The use of a fine and recovery to convey a married
woman's interest in her husband's land gave way to joint conveyance accomplished by signature.161 Even though many Colonies, states, and territories retained the English practice of approving a land sale only after a married
woman was separately examined before a judge or magistrate, 162 the general
liberalizing of conveyancing practices had substantial impact.' 63 While in
hindsight the ease with which a wife's dower or other interest in real property
164
could be transferred may be viewed as a double-edged sword,
there is little
165
doubt of its importance in early American women's law.
Development of Dower.
Among the active debates in women's legal history, that involving reception of English dower may be the most lusty. The
notion that dower was imported untouched from England is universally
viewed as untenable. 166 The debate concerns whether the American changes
were more' 67 or less 16 8 favorable for women than the English law. Scholars on
both sides of the controversy may be correct. Nineteenth-century scholarship
indicates that dower was treated more favorably in some parts of the country
than in others.' 69 Some Colonies and states awarded dower in equitable estates; others did not. 170 Some states awarded dower in land held during coverture, others only in land held at death.' 7 ' Although Pennsylvania law has
recently been strongly criticized, 72 evidence suggests that neighboring Ohio
160. Id
161. R. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 147-55; L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 145; 1 J. BISHOP, supra note
27, at 406-10.
162. 1 C. SCRIBNER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOWER 29-31, 37 (1867) (practice retained in
Connecticut, New York, and North Carolina); 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 410-15; M. SALMON, supra
note 2, at 37-83.
163. Dower, for example, was easier to defeat by conveyance than in England, at least at law. See 1
J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 312-15; 2 C. SCRIBNER, supra note 162, at 268-78.
164. The use of separate examinations to protect women from overreaching husbands could act beneficially. It could also be an unnecessary hurdle, or could lapse unfairly into informality. See L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 145; Salmon, supra note 42, at 101-06.

165. Despite the easing of transfer restrictions, the general content of the husband-dominating coverture rules certainly continued. Married women's contracts were still not generally enforced, so
promises to convey or warranties to guarantee title were frequently unenforceable. Immediate conveyances without contractual preliminaries were easier.
166. J. SPRUILL, supra note 44, at 359-60; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 59, 375-76; L. KERBER,
supra note 2, at 123-32, 146-48; M. HoRwr-z,supra note 51, at 56-58; R. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 15564; Salmon, supra note 42, at 106-08. Though not cited by the recent authors, the only significant 19thcentury American treatise on dower confirms the recent work. See 1 C. SCRIBNER, supra note 162, at
23-57 (state-by-state review of dower law describing numerous state-by-state differences from English
law).
167. See generally R. MORRIS, supra note 21, and J. SPRUILL, supra note 44 (arguing American
changes in dower were more favorable to women).
168. See generally L. KERBER, supra note 2; M. HORWITZ, supra note 51; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
22; and Salmon, supra note 42 (arguing American changes in dower were less favorable to women).
169. See 1 C. SCRIBNER, supra note 162, at 23-57; M. SALMON, supra note 2, at 264-98.
170. 1 C. SCRIBNER, supra note 162, at 382-90, 396-417.
171. Id at 589-601.
172. See Salmon, supra note 42, at 108. Salmon's judgment that dower was placed in jeopardy by
18th-century Pennsylvania law may not tell the entire story. Scribner writes:
But the courts of Pennsylvania have not left the widow to the uncertain and precarious
provision contemplated by the above statute. That enactment being limited to the estate
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had a lengthy tradition of protecting married women's dower interests.' 73 In
addition, England was limiting the impact of dower during the eighteenth century. The substantial use of equity practice in England led to very general
avoidance of dower rules during the reception eras. 174 When dower reform
came before Parliament in 1833, dower was extended to equitable estates, but
only those actually held by the husband at death.175 Thus, whether American
law was more or less favorable to women may be impossible to assess with
certainty.
The early dower statutes exhibit several interesting characteristics. They
were sometimes passed in acts containing more general conveyancing reforms
permitting transfer by deed, 176 or with provisions for the separate examination
of married women. 17 7 The link between conveyance reform and dower is also
illustrated by those statutes that provided widows a right to reject either dower
or the provisions of their husbands' legitimate wills in favor of a statutorily
prescribed share of their deceased husbands' estates. 178 Such statutes were
passed in some states shortly after the Revolutionary War, and the practice
existed well before the war in some areas.' 7 9 This elective share scheme did
which the husband held at his death, and in respect of which he died intestate, the courts have
determined that as to lands which were aliened by him during the coverture without the concurrence of the wife, or which he attempts to dispose of by will to her prejudice, she may take
her dower as by common law. 3 This doctrine is the result ofjudicial construction, solely, and
appears to be unsupported by any express law upon the subject. It is now too well established,
however, by an unbroken current of authority, to admit of serious question or doubt.
While adopting the rule of the common law to the extent just stated as a part of the law of
Pennsylvania, the courts have gone one step further in behalf of the widow. They have so far
modified that rule as to give dower in equitable as well as legal estates. In Kelly v. Mahan, it
was held that dower may be had of a mere improvement claim, and in Shoemaker v. Walker,
the right of dower in equitable estates was expressly determined. "In Pennsylvania," said
Tilghman, Chief Justice, after remarking upon the doctrine of common law, "the usage has
been more reasonable, and more analogous to the general principles of dower."
1 C. SCRIBNER, supra note 162, at 410. Scribner's footnote 3 refers to a line of decisions starting with
Borland v. Nichols, 12 Pa. (2 Jones) 42 (1849). The intriguing question is whether this case was a shot
out of the blue or a reflection of more long-standing practice. If the latter turns out to be true, the 18thcentury dower statutes in Pennsylvania may not be read to be as harsh to women as Salmon suggests.
Statutes providing widows a right to elect a share of their husbands' estate were passed on Apr. 8, 1833
(1833 Pa. Laws 250, § 11) and Apr. 11, 1848 (1848 Pa. Laws 537, § 11).
173. The Northwest Ordinance provided for dower as did later territorial and Ohio state statutes.
There, in contrast with Pennsylvania, dower was not subject to a husband's debts. Jointure could be
waived under a Jan. 19, 1804, statute. Ch. XIV, § 2, 1804 Ohio Acts 34-35. Equitable assets held at
death became subject to dower under a Feb. 12, 1805, statute. Ch. X, 1805 Ohio Acts § 1. Dower at
law was not restricted to lands held at death, nor did a wife lose the benefit of the increase in value of
the land from the date of its sale to the date of assignment to her. Allen v. McCoy, 8 Ohio 418, 466-67
(1838). For a more complete review of Ohio dower cases see M. Brown, Reception afEnglish Common
Law andChanceryin Ohio 14-22 (1981) (unpublished paper) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
174. 1 C. SCRIBNER, supra note 162, at 367-68.
175. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 104, at 197.
176. 1 C. SCRIBNER, supra note 162, at 31, 38, 44 (New York, Georgia, and New Hampshire).
177. Id at 31, 40-41 (New York, Rhode Island, and Maryland).
178. See id at 27, 33, 36-42, 46, 49-50 (Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Maryland, Vermont, Ohio, and Illinois). See also 2 C. SCRIBNER, supra note
162, at 413-17, 464-97.
179. Many states passed such statutes in the 1820's and 1830's. See infra note 239. But earlier examples of the practice also exist. Kentucky passed a statute in 1797 giving widows the right to elect the
share of their deceased husbands' estates they would have received under intestacy. Act of Feb. 24,
1797, § 24, 1797 Ky. Acts 162. But it is apparent that the practice described in this general enactment
on wills was in existence well before that. See Trigg's Administrator v. Daniel, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 301
(1811). Similarly, Maryland's general codification of the law of wills passed in 1798 provided that a
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not always give widows the right to take a share of the personal estate of their
husbands prior to the payment of debts. It did, however, provide some increased access to wealth while the institution of dower was fading in significance. In cases where a woman elected to take her statutory share, she usually
had to waive her dower rights. Thus these statutes also had the effect of removing dower as an encumbrance upon lands distributed to persons other
than widows.' 80 The same trend is displayed by the late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century growth of statutes permitting or requiring dower to be
awarded in a single cash sum upon the death of the husband.' 8 1 Such release
of dower rights freed the underlying fee simple of constraints impeding alienation. The perceived need, at least in some Colonies and states, to make land
had the
transfer as simple and as free of encumbrances as possible sometimes
18 2
effect of reducing the scope of protection afforded married women.
An interesting contrast to the early developments
Feme-Sole Trading.
in conveyancing and dower law is presented by the general lack of feme-sole
trader acts in the Colonies. One might hypothesize that any historical trend to
protect commercial dealing would carry over to permit women to act and be
held accountable for business contracts. The general colonial acceptance of
the law merchant 83 in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries suggests that
the colonies were not oblivious to the needs of trade. It is also clear that some
women were traders in America. 184 How then can the presence of a broad
feme-sole trader statute in only one colony' 8 5 and the delay in development of
trading rights for married women until late in the nineteenth century be
explained?
Several hypotheses are plausible. Perhaps married businesswomen used
trusts or separate estates, especially in the South. 186 Northern examples of
widow could reject her husband's will in favor of dower and a third of the personal estate. Act of Jan.
20, 1798, ch. 101, 1798 Md. Laws § 15. Here, too, case law suggests that the practice existed long before
the statute. See Coomes v. Clements, 8 Md. 382, 385 (1821). See also North Carolina: Ch. XXXII,
April 1784 Session; Virginia: Ch. LX, October 1785 Session.
180. M. HoRwiTz, supra note 51, at 56-58, suggests that commercial pressures in early America

sometimes led to significant changes in dower rules, effectively denying widows access to the increased
capital values of unimproved land. See also L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 375-76.
181. See 2 C. SCRIBNER, supra note 162, at 612-55. Scribner gives a fairly detailed description of
developments in Maryland and South Carolina. See id at 637-46, 646-50.
182. Kerber's fascinating study of the relation between dower and the treason confiscation acts of the
Revolutionary War era makes an analogous point. To the extent that the threat of losing dower upon
going over to enemy territory was used as a device to influence married women's political loyalities,.
dower was being used for social purposes deemed more important than the economic well-being of
married women. See L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 123-36.
183. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 69.
184. Spruill, supra note 44, at 276-313; E. DEXTER, COLONIAL WOMEN OF AFFAIRS, supra note 131;
E. DEXTER, CAREER WOMEN OF AMERICA 1776-1840 (1950); Gundersen & Gampel, supra note 143, at
129-33. See also Norton, A CherishedSpiritof Independence.- The Life of an Eighteenth Century Boston
Businesswoman, in WOMEN OF AMERICA: A HISTORY 49 (C. Berkin & M. Norton eds. 1979).

185. South Carolina was the single colony. It is described in J. SPRUILL, supra note 44, at 362 n.80;
L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 14849; 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 418-20. Pennsylvania also had an
early (1718) feme-sole trader statute, but it was limited to wives of mariners at sea. See 2 J. BISHOP,
supra note 27, at 420; J. KELLY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 504-05
(1881).
186. See J. SPRUILL, supra note 44, at 362-65. Equity was received more warmly in the South than in
the North. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text (discussing practice of equity in the states).
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feme-covert trader trusts may have existed which have not yet been uncovered.' 87 Legislative private bills were used in some jurisdictions to grant women the power to trade, but extensive studies of this activity have not been
done. t8 8 Other areas that may reveal explanations for the lack of trader statutes include the law of agency, 89 the use of arbitration, 190 and the use of specialized business tribunals for which reported decisions were not generally
published.1 9' The most likely explanation, however, is that many of the women operating businesses outside their homes were not married, 92 and that
the few married businesswomen worked with their husbands or subjected93
themselves to the general rule that a wife's income belonged to her husband. 1
In contrast to the development of the custom of London in England, American
law simply may not have reflected
commercial reality for the few married wo194
men involved in business.
Thus, by 1800 American law had freed land from some of the constraints of
technical conveyance and dower rules while apparently leaving married women's business rights constrained by coverture doctrines. The reduction of
home industry and the rise of a wage system for employed women may have
meant that there was little need to free them from commercial constraints.
And certainly trading by a married woman separate from her husband and her
home was likely to be subject to some public disapproval. 95 While the begin187. Some feme-sole trader trust cases do exist in the northeast. See North Am. Coal Co. v. Dyett, 7
Paige Ch. 9 (N.Y. Ch. 1837); Stammers v. Macomb, 10 N.Y. Common L. Rep. (2 Wend.) 454 (1829).
188. See J. SPRUILL, supra note 44, at 361-62; 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 475-76 (Alabama); M.
BENSON, WOMEN IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 241 (1935) (Virginia); L. KERBER, supra note 2,
at 150-52 (Connecticut). It is intriguing that many states later imposed specific restrictions on passage
of bills dealing with land transfers of persons under civil disabilities. See C. BINNEY, supra note 52, at
143-44.
189. Old American treatises suggest that married women may have been treated as agents of their
husbands even when the relationship was established by practice and behavior rather than by express
documents. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 8 (1844); 1 F. LIVERMORE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 28-34 (1818); J. DUNLAP, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 163-64 (1847). See also M. BENSON, supra note 188, at 240.
190. J. MORSE, THE LAW OF ARBITRATION AND AWARD 26-29 (1872) has a fascinating suggestion
that businessmen could voluntarily agree to arbitrate with a married woman in the early 19th century.
191. This was certainly a common practice in mercantile England, but there has been no investigation of the phenomenon here.
192. The presence of large numbers of married women in the labor force is a 20th-century phenomenon. At the end of the 19th century, less than 20% of women were in the labor force. About 40% of
unmarried women, but only five percent of married women, were in the labor force. The number of
married women in the labor force increased significantly during World War II, fell a bit after the war,
and then began a sustained climb. STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra note 6, at 133 (table of women's employment). Today, over half of married women are in the labor force. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra
note 13, at 402 (table of women's employment).
193. See I J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 140-42.
194. See L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 152; Gundersen & Gampel, supra note 143, at 131. An early
Massachusetts case certainly suggests that absent use of a trust or other device, feme-sole traders operated at some risk. In Russell v. Brooks, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 65 (1828), Eleanor Swan operated a fur
manufacturing business while her husband Joshua visited her on Sundays and lived in adultery with
another woman. The case apparently arose because the husband's business had become insolvent in
1819, leaving his estate heavily indebted. The couple had separated in 1815, but had not divorced. The
court held that money received and notes taken by the wife in her separately operated business prior to
the 1821 death of her husband were owned by his estate. Id at 67.
195. Even the most famous of 19th-century women tended to withdraw from public life upon marriage and risk censure upon reentry before divorce or widowhood. Biographers are now beginning to
be quite sensitive to the problems such constraints caused. See generally J. FURNAS, FANNY KEMBLE:
LEADING LADY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY STAGE (1982). Furnas devotes considerable attention
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nings of reform of land transfer and inheritance rules in order to insure the
economic viability of surviving widows in the face of dower's decline was perfectly compatible with the late eighteenth-century emergence of concern for
family well-being, 196 feme-sole trading by married women may have been seen
as quite another matter.
3. Summary
This review of reception resolves a few issues and opens up many more.
While English law and equity provided substantial impetus to the development of coverture law in this country, each American jurisdiction developed
variations from the general pattern. English influence, however, was not the
most significant barrier to the reform of American coverture law. The more
liberal aspects of English equity were also influential during the early nineteenth century. In addition, too many important differences between English
and American law had appeared by 1800 to conclude that the later reform
movement was simply a throwing off of colonial remnants. Rather, it appears
that by 1800 American legal institutions were beginning to grapple with changing family patterns and growing commercial interests. Divorce was growing
just as romantic companionate marriage emerged. New methods of providing
surviving spouses and children with means of support were emerging at the
same time that substantial impediments to transfer of property were being removed. The vast difference between married men and women in their job
patterns and wealth made it easy to legislate separately about their property,
and to create different systems of control. The very notion of a separate estate
for married women, which was reaching maturity at the time historians tel us
that the modern family was emerging, could be expected to grow and take on
characteristics consistent with the still limited but expanding role of most early
nineteenth-century married women. The unfolding of these developments is
the next part of the tale.
B.

THE MARRIED WOMEN'S ACTS

During the 1700's women rarely publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the
legal institution of coverture.' 97 Alterations in legal rules before 1800 were
to the marital controversies of Fanny Kemble, including property disputes, problems with her English
property trust, and loss of contact with her daughters from the time of her divorce until the daughters
reached the age of majority.
196. See infra notes 336-39 and accompanying text (discussing Degler's work on the emergence of
the American family).
197. There certainly were some early examples of women pressing their male contemporaries for
significant alterations in gender roles. Among the most famous of these early exchanges is that between
Abigail and John Adams, Abigail writing to John that "If particular care and attention is not paid to
the ladies, we are determined to foment a rebellion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any laws in
which we have no voice or representation." Abigail Adams to John Adams, Mar. 31, 1777, in FAMILIAR
LETTERS OF JOHN ADAMS AND HIS WIFE, ABIGAIL ADAMS, DURING THE REVOLUTION 149-50 (C. Ad-

ams ed. 1876). The correspondence is reprinted in a readily available documentary history, THE FEMINIST PAPERS 7-15 (A.S. Rossi ed. 1973). Like most women in her day, however, Abigail Adams largely
kept her ideas private, in letters to her husband and to her friends. See L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 7385. Some English materials were beginning to find their way to these shores, such as Mary Wollstonecraft's VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1792) and the lectures and pioneering work in

education of Scotswoman Frances Wright. See E. FLEXNER, supra note 1, at 27-28. It really was not
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generated more by economic needs than by any widely articulated desires to
redefine the role of American women.198 By the late 1840's the nature of the
debate changed. Legal rules became subjects of public debate, statutes were
adopted in a number of jurisdictions, movements arose, and controversy
boiled. What happened? The roots for this change are certainly not limited to
the need for simplified means of exchanging land. The married women's acts
themselves reflect the complexity of developments in the first half of the nineteenth century.
According to conventional historical views, 199 Mississippi adopted the first
married women's property act in 1839.2 00 In fact, the acts were passed in at
least three waves, beginning in 1835, and each wave arose for somewhat different reasons. The first group of statutes, passed almost entirely in the 1840's,
dealt primarily with freeing married women's estates from the debts of their
husbands. 20 By and large these statutes left untouched the traditional marital
estate and coverture rules. The second wave of legislation, the most frequently
discussed, established separate estates for married women. These statutes appeared over a long period of time beginning in the 1840's and ending after the
Civil War.20 2 The third set of statutes took the important step of protecting
women's earnings from the institution of coverture. These laws generally did
not appear until after the Civil War, although Massachusetts enacted an early
statute in 1855.203
The first wave of legislation protecting the property of married women from
the debts of their husbands emerged in a deluge. Almost every state and territory then in existence adopted such legislation. 2 °4 While there were a few general patterns to the enactments, their terminology differed and remarkably
little verbatim copying occurred. The earliest statute I have found that deals
until the 1830's, when the Grimke Sisters surfaced, that women's issues became subjects of widespread

public debate. See infra note 346 and accompanying text (discussing Grimke Sisters).
198. Though individual petitions were filed with legislatures, see L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 85-99,
it would be a generation before more organized and overt activity would emerge.
199. The only work noting the existence of the 1835 Arkansas statute is E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at
159.
200. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 185. See Brown, Memorandumon the Mississippi Women's Law

of 1839, 42 MICH. L. REv. I110 (1944) (discussing the origin of the Mississippi statute and the debate
surrounding its passage). In fact, Florida moved well before Mississippi, and as this article later suggests, there were a number of other legislative actions which were precursors to the later women's acts,
Florida's statute appears to have been the result of a desire to protect marriage arrangements made
under civil law before the territory became American, since only pre-1824 married women were protected by the legislation. W. CORD, A TREATISE ON THE LEGAL AND EQUITABLE RIGHTS OF MARRIED

WOMEN 719 (1861); E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 77, 163.
201. See infra notes 204- 1land accompanying text (discussing first phase).
202. This legislative phase overlapped with the debt statutes. But the early statutes inevitably needed
refinement to account for ambiguity, enlarged goals, or hostile judicial reception. For some of the
separate estate statutes, see infra notes 207, 209, and 263.
203. Massachusetts' act was adopted on May 5, 1855. For other earnings statutes, see infra note 361.
204. Finding this statutory material is difficult unless one has access to the session laws and codes of
all the states and territories. The session laws are now available on microfiche, but for the benefit of
readers who are not fortunate enough to have access to such material, I have included in the notes that
follow citations to some of the major 19th century treatises that discuss married women's acts. The
treatises used are J. BISHOP, supra note 27; W. CORD, supra note 200; J. KELLY, supra note 185; J.
ROBINSON, THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE (1890); R. TYLER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
INFANCY AND THE LAW OF COVERTURE (1873). In addition, references to these statutes by E.

Warbasse, supra note 2, have also been included. On the New York acts, see P. RABKIN, supra note 2;
N. BASCH, supra note 1.
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directly with marital property and husband's debts was adopted by the territorial legislature in Arkansas in 1835.205 This largely undiscussed piece of legislation protected a wife's property from debts incurred by her husband prior to
20 6
marriage. Only Alabama appears to have borrowed this legal formula.
Following Mississippi's lead in 1839, three other states protected married women's slaves from their husband's creditors. 20 7 A number of jurisdictions protected only the real property of married women from debts of their
husbands. 20 8 Most statutes, however, went further and included both real and
personal property under the umbrella of protection.20 9 About half of the legis205. Act of Nov. 2, 1835, 1835 Ark. Terr. Laws 34-35; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 159.
206. In 1846, after a long period of acting by private bill, Alabama adopted an act granting feme-sole
status to abandoned married women. Act of Jan. 31, 1846, 1845 Ala. Acts 24 (1846). Jurisdiction to
handle such cases was given to the equity courts in March 1848. The last section of the 1846 act
protected the property of married women from ante-nuptial debts of the husband. This scheme lasted
only two years. On March 1, 1848, Alabama adopted a separate estate married women's act. Act of
Mar. 1, 1848, 1847 Ala. Acts 79 (1848).
207. Mississippi: Act of Feb. 15, 1839, ch. 46, 1839 Miss. Laws 72; 2 J. BIsHOP, supra note 27, at 535;
W. CORD, supra note 200, at 722-23; J. KELLY, supra note 185, at 427; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 13860. Maryland: Act of Mar. 10, 1843, ch. 293, 1842 Md. Laws 33 (1843); E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at
155-59. Kentucky: Act of Feb. 23, 1846, ch. 368, 1845 Ky. Acts 42 (1846); 2 J. BIsHOP, supra note 27, at
515-16; W. CORD, supra note 200, at 603-06; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 173. Arkansas: Act of Dec.
8, 1846, 1844 Ark. Acts 38 (1846); 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 478-79; W. CORD, supra note 200, at
731-32; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 159-60. The Maryland statute is very similar to Mississippi's. It
added, however, sections giving married women the right to make a will and to retain up to $1,000 as
separate property. Arkansas' statute is also much like Mississippi's. Kentucky took a separate path,
merging its slave provisions with others protecting the real property of married women from the debts
of husbands. The Mississippi, Maryland, and Arkansas statutes also have very general provisions apparently creating a separate estate in married women.
208. The earliest of these statutes was that of Maryland: Act of Mar. 1, 1842, ch. 161, 1841 Md. Laws
(1842); 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 100. Statutes followed in Connecticut: Act of June 10, 1845, ch.
XXXIX, 1845 Conn. Acts 36; 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 7; W. CORD, supra note 200, at 736; J.
KELLY, supra note 185, at 336; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 191. Iowa: Act of Jan. 2, 1846. ch. 5, 1845
Iowa Terr. Acts 40 (1846); E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 204-05. Kentucky: Act of Feb. 23, 1846, ch.
368, 1845 Ky. Acts 42 (1846); see supra note 207. Indiana: Act of Jan. 23, 1847, ch. VI, 1846 Ind. Acts
45 (1847); E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 205. Vermont: Act of Nov. 15, 1845, No. 37, 1847 Vt. Acts 26
(1845); J. KELLY, supra note 185, at 526; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 192. North Carolina: Act of Jan.
29, 1849, ch. XLI, 1848 N.C. Sess. Laws 12 (1849); 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 555-56; J. KELLY,
supra note 185, at 463. Tennessee: Act of Jan. 10, 1850, ch. XXXVI, 1849 Tenn. Pub. Acts 111 (1850); 2
J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 569; J. KELLY, supra note 185, at 517-18. Maryland's statute was a very
simple, one sentence enactment. In fact, Maryland adopted a more detailed statute modeled after Mississippi's about a year later. See supra note 207. The statutes in Connecticut, Iowa, Indiana, Vermont,
North Carolina, and Tennessee are similar in content, but the language in each varies from the prior
enactments.
209. Michigan: Act of Mar. 11, 1844, No. 66, 1844 Mich. Pub. Acts 77; 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at
532-33; J. KELLY, supra note 185, at 416; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 202-03. Maine: Act of Mar. 22,
1844, ch. 117, 1844 Me. Acts 104; 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 518; R. TYLER, supra note 204, at 675; E.
Warbasse,supra note 2, at 200-01. Massachusetts: Act of Mar. 25, 1845, ch. 208, 1845 Mass. Acts 531; 2
J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 525; J. KELLY, supra note 185, at 411; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 190-91.
Alabama: Act of Jan. 31, 1846, No. 20, 1845 Ala. Acts 24 (1846); W. CoiRD, supra note 200, at 725; J.
KELLY, supra note 185, at 291; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 170 (ante-nupital debts only), and Act of
Mar. 1, 1848, No. 43, 1847 Ala. Acts 79 (1848) (real and personal property generally); Florida: Act of
Mar. 6, 1845, No. IX, 1845 Fla. Terr. Laws 24; Ohio: Act of Feb. 28, 1846, 1845 Ohio Laws 75 (1846);
W. CORD, supra note 200, at 709- 10; J. KELLY, supra note 185, at 467; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 205.
New Hampshire: Act of July 10, 1846, ch. 327, 1846 N.H. Laws 307; 2 J. BIsHOP, supra note 27, at 544;
J. KELLY, supra note 185, at 444; R. TYLER, supra note 204, at 681-82; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at
191. New York: Act of Apr. 7, 1848, ch. 200, 1848 N.Y. Laws 307; 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 54547; W. CORD, supra note 200, at 649; J. KELLY, supra note 185, at 455; R. TYLER, supra note 204, at
635-36; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 205-40. Pennsylvania: Act of Apr. 11, 1848, No. 372, 1848 Pa.
Laws 536; 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 560-61; W. CORD, supra note 200, at 660-63; J. KELLY, supra
note 185, at 486-87; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 236. Missouri: Act of Mar. 5, 1849, 1848 Mo. Laws
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lation also included general statements that married women could hold property separate and apart from their husbands. 2 10 These generalized attempts to
permit married women to control their own property were frequently construed narrowly by the courts.2 1' This judicial hostility made it apparent that
later legislative efforts would be required to complete the married women's
property reform movement.
There are a number of explanations for the appearance of the first wave of
married women's acts in the 1840's. First, widespread economic problems
prompted numerous changes in debtor's law and made exemptions of property
from attachment by creditors a pressing concern. Second, legislation chipping
away at a number of the harsher consequences of coverture law had been enacted in earlier parts of the century. Abandoned women and widows were the
objects of much attention; divorce laws changed; imprisonment of women for
debt disappeared; and family law developed. If further reform was to occur,
the institution of coverture had to become the focus of attention. Third, the
fact that public debate about the role of women in society and legislation protecting the property of married women appeared in the same decade is not
mere coincidence. Although it is difficult to argue that lobbying or petitioning
by women or their supporters led directly to the passage of most of the debt
statutes, the legal and cultural developments of the first third of the century
certainly created a more sympathetic environment for their enactment.
1. The Economy of the 1840's and Debtor Legislation
The economic climate of the 1840's was established by the Panic of 1837.
Some have called the depression that followed one of the worst in our history,
describing devastation in virtually every phase of the economy. 2 12 Others argue that the economic problems were concentrated in trade and commercial
67 (1849); J. KELLY, supra note 185, at 433. Connecticut: Act of June 22, 1849, ch. XX, 1849 Conn.
Acts 16; 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 7; W. CORD, supra note 200, at 737; J. KELLY, supra note 185, at
336; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 190. Wisconsin: Act of Feb. 1, 1850, ch. 44, 1850 Wis. Laws 29; 2 J.
BISHOP, supra note 27, at 572; W. CORD, supra note 200, at 715. New Jersey: Act of Mar. 25, 1852, ch.

CLXXI, 1852 N.J. Laws 407; 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 545. These statutes are remarkably varied in
content. Those of Alabama (second act), Michigan, Maine, Massachusets, Iowa, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin each have clauses providing that a married woman's property should be hers
as if she were unmarried, or in her own name. The acts of Alabama (first act), Ohio, Missouri, and
Connecticut lacked such phraseology. In addition, some of the acts dealt with other subjects such as
abandoned wives (Alabama's first act); intestate shares (Alabama's second act); conveyancing (Ohio);
husband's trusteeship in the property of his wife (Connecticut); ante-nupital contracts, conveyancing,
intestacy, wills, and trusteeships (Massachusetts and New Hamshire); conveyancing, wills, and intestacy
(Pennsylvania), and wills (Wisconsin). Rhode Island, in its codification of 1844, also adopted a general
debt statute. E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 197.
210. See supra notes 204-09.
211. The hostile reception given the New York act has been told by others. See P. RABKIN, supra
note 2, at 125-38; E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 237-40. Warbasse also tells of similar hostility in Maine,
Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania. E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 201, 237, 241-44. Courts in other states
may have been more favorably disposed to married women's acts. See M. Brown, Reception of English
Common Law and Chancery in Ohio, 67-75 (1981) (unpublished paper) (copy on file with author). The
state courts in Oregon also construed their acts broadly. See Brummet v. Weaver, 2 Or. 168 (1866). As
with much of the legal history in this area, the possibility of a mixed picture is high. But there is little
doubt that the narrow contents of most of the first wave of married women's acts, together with judicial
hostility, necessitated the passage of more legislation in following years.
212. R. McGRANE, THE PANIC OF 1837 1 (1965).

19831

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY LAW

1401

sectors of the economy, not in industrial and agricultural production. 2 13 In
any case, a number of strains in the economy of the young United States appeared about this time. Extensive land speculation in the Western states and
territories occurred during the 1830's. Revenues from land sales skyrocketed
in the middle of the decade. 2 14 Government investigations of widespread land
office abuses also occurred. 2 15 In 1836 Congress considered legislation to return to the states a budget surplus generated in significant part by land sales.
In 1837, however, following a precipitous decline in land revenues, Congress
found itself confronting a budget deficit. 2 16 Large-scale borrowing by states
and territories for the construction of internal improvements occurred in the
1830's. After the panic, states heavily obligated to pay off internal improvement bonds found themselves at or near bankruptcy. 21 7 Textile and other
manufacturing industries grew dramatically in the Northeast in the 1830's.218
After the panic, however, industry was in general decline. Cotton sales overseas boomed in the 1830's, but by the following decade the world's cotton trade
was in disarray due to falling prices.2 19 Prices for slaves also fell dramatically. 220 The cause of the economic collapse is the subject of some debate, but
most explanations focus on some or all of the following factors: Excessive land
speculation, enormous balance of trade deficits, heavy borrowing for internal
improvements by states and territories, concentration of bank ownership, decline in European demand for cotton, and President Jackson's dismantling of
the national bank and issuance of the Specie Circular in 1836.221 Whatever the
cause or causes of the panic, the resulting economic stress was the impetus for
the enactment of numerous pieces of legislation on bankruptcy, banking, and
debtor's rights at both the federal and state levels. A look at some of this
legislative activity makes the first wave of married women's property acts a
logical part of a much larger movement of economic reform.
Proposals for bankruptcy legislation at both the federal and state levels appeared frequently during the first half of the nineteenth century. Prior to 1841,
Congress had enacted bankruptcy legislation only once. This early act, passed
in 1800, was designed as a five-year measure, but was repealed after only three
years.22 2 After the onset of distressed economic times in 1839, new demands
213. P. TEMIN, THE JACKSONIAN ECONOMY 148-77 (1969).

214. Revenues from land sales rose from four million dollars in 1833 to almost $25 million by 1836.
That extraordinarily rapid rise was followed by an even more precipitous decline to just under $7
million in 1837. Sales fell further to about $2 million a year in the mid-1840's. P. TEMIN, supra note
213, at 168; HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 451 (1957). For a general review of land
speculation see R. MCGRANE, supra note 212, at 43-69; HAMMOND, supra note 214, at 452-53; P.
GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 177-78 (1968).

215. R. MCGRANE, supra note 212, at 58-61; P. GATES, supra note 214, at 173-75.
216. HAMMOND, supra note 214, at 451-52; S. REZNECK, BUSINESS DEPRESSIONS AND FINANCIAL

PANICS 92-93 (1968).
217. R. MCGRANE, supra note 212, at 9-13, 19-24, 30-35, 112-14, 128-30.
218. Id at 96-112; B. BERG, supra note 2, at 40-42.
219. HAMMOND, supra note 214, at 467-77. Cotton prices fell steadily from the late 1830's to the
middle of the 1840's. G. WRIGHT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COTTON SOUTH 96 (1978). P.

GATES, supra note 214, at 177-78.
220. R. MCGRANE, supra note 212, at
221. See supra notes 212-20 (literature
222. For a short but information-laden
P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS

116-18.
discussing the Panic of 1837).
summary of the history of federal bankruptcy legislation, see

IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND
BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900 16-30 (1974). Coleman is also a rich bibliographic source.
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arose for federal bankruptcy legislation. An act was adopted in 1841, and
thousands of debtors found relief under its terms. 22 3 Though the act was
quickly repealed, it did serve to relieve some of the immediate pressures on
debtors. Not until the Panic of 1857, and the economic dislocations caused by
the Civil War, did pressure again build for the adoption of national bankruptcy legislation. 224 Although the short-lived federal provisions of 1841 had
relieved much of the need for state bankruptcy laws, a few states also adopted
or modified bankruptcy laws in this period. 225 The federal government also
took steps to protect
merchants who were defaulting on bonds posted to cover
226
customs charges.
Although most states did not adopt bankruptcy laws during the 1840's,227
many did enact legislation protecting debtors and eliminating abuses in banking.22 8 These enactments frequently included provisions requiring that prop229
erty sold at the behest of creditors be appraised and bring a minimum price,
extending the types and value of property exempt from execution to pay
debts, 230 exempting homesteads from attachment both during life and at
death, 23 ' abolishing imprisonment for debt, 23 2 and, of course, insulating married women's property from the debts of their husbands.
The first wave of married women's acts meshes very nicely with this statutory reform movement. Laws exempting assets from attachment had existed in
some form for decades and were simply extended in the 1840's. The married
women's acts operated much like exemption laws. If the new model of family
223. S. REZNECK, supra note 216, at 96. In New York alone, 8000 debtors filed for relief under the
federal act. P. COLEMAN, supra note 222, at 128-29.
224. P. COLEMAN, supra note 222, at 24.

225. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maryland passed such statutes. See id at 50-51, 84, 171-75.
Other states, such as New York and South Carolina, had long-standing insolvency relief systems. Id at
105-29, 179-90.
226. S. REZNECK, supra note 216, at 91-92.
227. Part of the reason for the hesitancy of the states to enter the field was a fear that states could not
constitutionally legislate on bankruptcy. A series of early 19th-century Supreme Court decisions had
raised concern in this area. See P. COLEMAN, supra note 222, at 31-36.
228. R. MCGRANE, supra note 212, at 121-22; S. REZNECK, supra note 216, at 94-95.
229. J. MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
THE CIVIL WAR 45-46 (1906). See generally P. COLEMAN, supra note 222 (discussing each state).
230. The vast number of bills enacted in this period makes short summaries difficult. Rather than
try, it makes more sense to simply refer readers to a few sources in which this material is described.
The best I have found is P. COLEMAN, supra note 222. The author provides a state-by-state survey of
laws adopted in each jurisdiction during a period of more than 200 years. This survey describes in
detail the content of bankruptcy laws, appraisal and minimum value laws, exemption statutes, and
imprisonment for debt reforms. See also R. McGRANE, supra note 212, at 91-144; S. REZNECK, supra
note 216, at 85-96; 7 J. MCMASTER, supra note 229, at 45-49, 153, 183; H. FARNAM, CHAPTERS IN THE
HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES TO 1860 150-52 (1938).
231. Homestead acts are thought to have appeared for the first time in this period. 2 A. CASNER,
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 810-11 (1954), discusses the Texas act of 1839. Development after 1840
was quite widespread. See Dillon, The Homestead Exemption, 10 AM. L. REG. 641 (1862); Note, State
Homestead Exemption Laws, 46 YALE L. J. 1023 (1937). P. COLEMAN, supra note 222, also reviews
homestead laws.
232. The movement to abolish imprisonment for debt began long before the Panic of 1837. The final
phase of this movement, however, occurred in the decade of the 1840's. A number of states abolished
debtor imprisonment in this period. Among them were New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, North Carolina, and Georgia. P. COLEMAN,
supra note 222, at 62, 68, 78, 119, 139, 149-51, 177, 210, 224, 235. The system of imprisonment no
longer made sense in an era when commercial interests relied more and more on secured transactions,
commercial paper, property attachments, and garnishment. Id at 261-64.
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finance appearing in the first half of the nineteenth century called for men to
undertake financial risks for the benefit of their families, then setting aside
wives' property simply provided another body of exempt assets when the risk
taking went sour. The statutes themselves reflected this reality. Almost without exception, women's acts which insulated only slaves or land from attachment appeared in argicultural and Southern states, while the more urban areas
adopted broader laws protecting property generally. 233 Since women generally
had less property than their husbands, it was logical that legislators would see
wives' property as a safe way of adding to the pool of assets insulated from
attachment. While these acts may also be justified because they preserved inherited property from rapacious husbands234 or provided married women with
some independent means of support, they also provided some husbands
and
23 5
families with continued access to assets despite bad economic times.
While the connection between the first wave of married women's acts and
233. The correlation between the degree of urbanization in 1850 and the content of the first wave of

married women's acts is really quite remarkable. Below is a table presenting urbanization values derived from STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra note 6, at 24-37. Of those states adopting debt statutes protecting only slaves or real property, only Maryland was heavily urbanized. The Maryland legislation
did, however, contain general statements regarding married women's separate equitable estates. Of the
fourteen states passing more general legislation, only Alabama, Florida, Michigan, and Wisconsin had
less than 10% of their population living in urban areas. Wisconsin was more urbanized than most of the
states that passed limited statutes and Florida's act may be explained by Florida's civil law background.
See supra note 200 (discussing Florida). See also supra notes 204-09 (listing state statutes).
Type of Debt Statute
Real

Property

% Urban

State
Slave
Property
generally
in1850
Alabama
x
4.5
Arkansas
x
0
Kentucky
x
x
7.5
Maryland
x
x
32.5
Mississippi
x
1.8
Iowa
x
5.2
Indiana
x
4.5
N. Carolina
x
2.4
Tennessee
x
5.2
Vermont
x
1.9
Connecticut
x
15.9
Florida
x
0
Maine
x
13.6
Massachusetts
x
50.7
Michigan
x
7.3
Missouri
x
11.9
New Hampshire
x
17.0
New Jersey
x
17.6
New York
x
28.2
Ohio
x
12.2
Pennsylvania
x
23.6
Rhode Island
x
55.8
Wisconsin
x
9.5
Alabama's first statute does not fit well into any particular model, since it dealt only with property held
before marrige.
234. Such motivation was certainly part of the debate over some married women's acts passed later
in the decade. See P. RABKIN, supra note 2, at 91-98.
235. The earliest statutes did not alter the husbands' management and control of property and a
number of the later debt statutes were construed consistently with this view. See supra note 211 and
accompanying text (describing limitations of acts).
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the Panic of 1837 is impossible to dismiss, 2 36 other factors also must have been
at work. The country had seen bad economic times before 1840, while married
women's acts were a new legislative response. The fact that many of the acts
had general statements adopting the notion of a separate estate for married
women's property also suggests a broader purpose. The acts must therefore
237
have been part of a larger evolution in the treatment of women by the law.
2. Statutory Precursors to the Married Women's Acts
A very substantial body of legislation affecting women appeared before
1840. Probate laws were modified, abandoned wives gained greater economic
protection, imprisonment of women for debt was largely abolished, and federal land grant policy displayed some desire to protect widows. By 1840 most
of the obvious ways of increasing married women's access to property without
altering the traditional coverture rules had been exhausted. If further reform
was to occur, married women's acts would have to appear.
As previously mentioned, colonial and early territorial and state governments had dramatically simplified conveyancing law and had eliminated primogeniture.2 38 Dower rules were swept up in this process, leading many
jurisdictions to permit married women to waive dower by deed and separate
examination and some jurisdictions to permit dower only in lands actually
owned by the husband at death. One might hypothesize that as more women
lost access to dower, inheritance rules would change to provide widows greater
access to their deceased husbands' personal estates. Such a movement would
still give first priority to creditors in distributing the assets of an estate, but it
would also increase the likelihood that widows of solvent husbands would
emerge with some assets. Probate codes adopted in many states in the first
third of the nineteenth century extended the late eighteenth-century reforms in
intestacy law. The new codes permitted widows to reject their husbands' wills
in favor of the share of the estate mandated by law.23 9 The well-known eight236. The connection has even been discussed in litigation. See Kleinert v. Lefkowitz, 271 Mich. 79,
259 N.W. 871 (1935). Some scholars have picked up the connection as well. See E. Warbasse, supra
note 2, at 146-59, 202-05.

237. In fact, a good argument can be made that the 1840's was a decade of reform in a wide array of
areas important to women. In addition to the emergence of married women's acts, changes appeared in
divorce, child custody, and abortion laws. State statutes that significantly altered the English rule that

abortions before quickening were lawful began to appear for the first time in the 1840's. See generally
Zainaldin, supra note 2; J. MOHR, supra note 2. Both property reform and restrictions on abortion were
consistent with the emerging special sphere of 19th-century women.
238. See supra notes 157-82 and accompanying text.
239. E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 72, examines developments in New York, Pennsylvania, and Mississippi. But the changes were far more extensive than that. I have found a number of statutes that
gave widows access to a share of their deceased husband's personal estate. Alabama: Act of Dec. 22,
1812, ch. 1, 1812 Ala. Acts 259; Indiana: Act of Jan. 29, 1831, ch. XXIX, 1830 Ind. Acts 209 (1831);
Maine: Act of Mar. 23, 1835, ch. 180, 1835 Me. Acts 280; Maryland: Act of Jan. 20, 1798, ch. 13, 1798
Md. Laws (no page); Massachusetts: Act of Feb. 18, 1833, ch. XL, 1833 Mass. Act 547; Michigan: Act
of Mar. 30, § 1, 1825 Mich. Terr. Acts 8 (statute providing for extension of debtor exemption statute to
estates of husbands); Mississippi: Act of Feb. 9, 1839, ch. 24, 1839 Miss. Laws 33 (statute providing for
extension of debtor exemption statute to estates of husbands); New Hampshire: Act of July 2, 1822, ch.
XXXXI, 1822 N.H. Laws 30; Ohio: Act of Mar. 23, 1840, § 46, 1839 Ohio Laws 126 (1840); Pennsylvania: Act of Apr. 8, 1833, No. 143, 1832 Pa. Laws 316 (1833) (provides generally for widow's
election of dower, but grants elective share of personal estate only when husband's will was drafted
before marriage); Act of Apr. 11, 1848, No. 372, 1848 Pa. Laws 537 (full election); Vermont: Act of
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eenth-century practice of permitting widows to reject their husbands' wills in
favor of dower 240 was expanded to include access to a share of the personal
estate. The entitlement was generally the same as the amount provided by
intestate succession statutes. Many of these statutes also provided widows with
some priority over creditors. 24 1 The new probate codes did not alter the traditional rules that gave a husband the right to manage his wife's real estate and
the right to own outright the personal property the wife brought to the marriage. If all went well financially during the marriage, however, the probate
reforms of the early nineteenth century entitled widows to receive a segment of
their husbands' personal estates, perhaps regaining some of what they had lost
upon marriage. Without directly attacking the coverture rules, probate reform
242
was an avenue for altering slightly the economic impact of the common law.
Early nineteenth-century legislation also eroded some of the other economic
consequences of the coverture rules. Abandoned or deserted wives, left by the
general content of the common law without either feme-sole status or property,
were granted some relief by changes in the divorce statutes243 or by acts specifNov. 15, 1821, ch. 3, 1821 Vt. Acts 55. In addition, case law suggests that other states had long-standing
practices of providing widows an elective share of the personal estate. See Illinois: McMurphy v.
Boyles, 49 Ill. 110 (1868); Kentucky: Trigg's Adm'r v. Daniel, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 301 (1811); Tibbs v.
Tibbs' Ex'r, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 112 (1846); Maine: Brown v. Hodgon, 31 Me. 65 (1849); Massachusetts:
Crane v. Crane, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 422 (1835) (by a progression of statutes starting in 1783, with the

final stages in 1816 and 1833); Missouri: Davis v. Davis, 5 Mo. 111 (1838) (by statute adopted in 1825).
See also 2 C. SCRIBNER, supra note 162, at 257-60 (describing long-standing practice in South Carolina,
and statutes in Missouri, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Vermont). Other material on this
issue may be found in M. SALMON, supra note 2, at 264-73; 1 C. SCRIBNER, supra note 162, at 23-57;
Cahn, Restraintson Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 141 (1936); J. SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, supra note 44, at 279. Friedman erroneously writes that forced share statutes did not appear
until the middle of the 19th century. Friedman, The Law of the Living, The Law ofthe Dead- Property,
Succession and Society, 1966 Wisc. L. REv. 340, 361.

240. See M. SALMON, supra note 2, at 257-63. Increased ability to gain access to personal property
and to obtain cash in lieu of dower also appeared by 1800. Id at 264-73, 298-319.
241. The statutes in Alabama provided priority only for real property, Indiana provided for a small
amount of money ($100) to be free of debts, Massachusetts law provided priority to creditors, Michigan
and Mississippi used the debtor exemption model as the bases for their statutes, and New Hampshire
and Vermont gave the courts authority to make an allowance for a widow from an insolvent estate.
242. These statutes would obviously have limited impact where husbands disposed of their estates by
gift before death, or dissipated the assets. But these problems could only be attacked by directly confronting the doctrines of coverture. In addition, there is some evidence that the statutes reflected fairly
closely the habits of even the least generous husbands in writing their wills. There are few reported
cases in which wives exercised their options to renounce the wills of their husbands. Studies of wills
suggest that there was usually no reason to do so. Gundersen & Gampel, supra note 143, at 121-24. The
wills of men in the Baltimore study generally confirm this, because wives were a frequent primary
beneficiary. See supra Table 10. Nonetheless, the Dukes County wills also suggest the potential importance of the rules for Widows who rejected estates. Petitions for widows' allowances that requested
control over some or all of the personal estates were almost always granted. Eight out of the 10 petitions
read were granted in toto, one in part, and the other result is not known. Though the requested
amounts were usually small, they sometimes involved assets of great importance to a struggling widow.
One case gave a widow furniture and both family cows; another all the furniture. Some of the decisions
involved substantial amounts, such as over $1,200 in personal property in one case and a ship in another. The practice is discussed in Crane v. Crane, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 422 (1835).
243. There was a significant rise in the number of divorces in the first third of the 19th century. L.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 181-84. While this did not necessarily indicate any increase in domestic
dissatisfaction, see C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 166, there is little doubt that significant changes occurred in divorce law and practice during the opening decades of the century. Desertion was among
the grounds that began to find favor in this period. R. RIEGEL, AMERICAN WOMEN: A STORY OF
SOCIAL CHANGE 127 (1970); N. BLAKE, supra note 2, at 48-63. A number of states shortened the period
of desertion required to obtain a divorce. For example Alabama, which adopted a five year desertion
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ically granting them some economic rights against their departed husbands. 244
This trend is demonstrated nicely by a string of Alabama private bills granting
deserted wives feme-sole status. 245 The bills emerged in the mid-1820's and
disappeared in the 1840's with the passage of general legislation for the benefit
of deserted wives. Those husbands not fulfilling the expected obligation to
provide their spouses with support began to find that the coverture rules no
longer came to their aid. The reforms were not dramatic. They did little more
than redefine the meaning of coverture to exclude some husbands who were
not providing support for their families. But during the 1840's there was little
room left for enhancing the economic status of mistreated wives unless the
coverture rules themselves were altered.
The slow development of protections granted to abandoned, deserted, and
divorced women in the first decades of the nineteenth century provides a context in which one would expect to find alterations in child custody and support
obligations. Indeed, the case law suggests that women gained greater custodial
rights during the first third of the century and that the modem "best interests
of the child" test emerged more fully in the decade of the 1840's.246 The
change evident in the reported case law finds even more vivid confirmation in
the records of one state, Maryland, in which private bill divorces providing for
custody by women began to appear after 1820.247
Other statutes also singled women out for special treatment. 24 8 During the
statute on March 10, 1803, shortened the period to two years by legislation passed on December 21,

1820. Blake notes that by 1850, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Ohio, Kentucky, and Georgia had adopted legislation providing for divorce on the ground
of desertion for a time shorter than the seven year presumptive death period. Numerous private divorce bills also were passed. N. BLAKE, supra note 2, at 48-56.
The development of Maryland divorce law is quite revealing. A student author discovered 535 private legislative divorces between 1790 and 1850. Three divorces occurred between 1790 and 1800, 30
between 1801 and 1810, 28 between 1811 and 1820, 95 between 1821 and 1830, 295 between 1831 and
1840, and 84 between 1841 and 1849. Maryland adopted a divorce statute on March 1, 1842, displacing
much of the demand for private bills. Gilpatrick, Marital Infidelity in Nineteenth Century Maryland 10
n.61 (1982) (unpublished paper) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
244. Other than Alabama, a number of states adopted legislation protecting abandoned married
women. Iowa: Act of Jan. 17, 1840, ch. 81, 1839 Iowa Terr. Laws 152 (1840); Kentucky: Act of Feb. 7,
1843, ch. 103, 1842 Ky. Laws 19 (1843); Maine: Act of Feb. 2, 1828, ch. 380, 1828 Me. Acts 1148;
Massachusetts: Act of Mar. 16, 1833, ch. 127, 1833 Mass. Laws 693; New Hampshire: Act of Dec. 24,
1840, ch. 573, 1840 N.H. Laws 488; Act of July 2, 1841, ch. 607, 1841 N.H. Laws 533; North Carolina:
Ch. 44, 1828 N.C. Laws 25; Ch. 28, 1829 N.C. Laws 27; Rhode Island: Act of June 2, 1841, 1841 R.I.
Laws 43; Tennessee: Act of Oct. 18, 1825, ch. 10, 1825 Tenn. Laws 8; Vermont: Act of Nov. 2, 1846,
No. 128, 1846 Vt. Pub. Acts 34. See also I J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 11, 140-42; R. TYLER, supra
note 204, at 484-86. The statutes were not all designed to adapt to new family roles. Enactments indicating antipathy to early 19th-century Christian communist celibate groups also appeared. See Ohio:
Act of Jan. 11, 1811, ch. 8, 1810 Ohio Laws 13 (1811) (act provided that a court could grant a woman a
share of the estate of a man who joined "himself to any sect whose rules and doctrines require a
renunciation of the marriage covenant, or forbid a man and woman to dwell and cohabit together in
the conjugal relation"). These trends apparently had their American roots in disputes arising over the
legal rights of women deserted during the Revolutionary War. M. SALMON, supra note 2, at 132-43.
245. See supra note 46 (listing private bills).
246. Zainaldin, supra note 2, at 1052-74. This is one of the most interesting and important legal
history articles on women and children before 1850.
247. Private bills for divorce in Maryland began awarding custody of children to wives in the 1820's.
Between 1823 and 1846, 21% of private divorce bills granted mothers custody of their children. Gilpatrick, supra note 243, at 18.
248. The variety of statutes is amazing. Arkansas enacted a tax exemption statute for poor widows.
Act of Nov. 21, 1829, 1829 Ark. Terr. Laws 102. Connecticut provided for the support of widows
pending the resolution of probate. Act of May 21, 1825, ch. 10, 1825 Conn. Laws 72. This was a fairly
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1820's a number of states prohibited the imprisonment of women debtors. 249
Abolition of the practice for men generally did not occur until later.2 50 A
number of reforms in debt imprisonment were adopted throughout the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 25 1 *Useof debtor oaths, extension of
prison bounds to include fairly large areas beyond the jail walls, prohibition of
imprisonment for petty debts, and release of debtors when creditors declined
to pay the cost of imprisonment had significantly reduced the importance of
debtors' prisons by the 1820's.252 Nonetheless some women continued to be
imprisoned until the practice was prohibited. 253 All these reforms may have
been only symbolic, because poorhouses were growing in popularity during
the same period. 254 There are some indications, however, that the abolition of

debt imprisonment for women may have been related to the early nineteenthcentury tendency to provide protection for widows and abandoned women.

Such women were more likely to be without means of support than young
unmarried women and children. During the first third of the nineteenth century, abandoned and widowed women were more likely to be isolated from
extended families or friends than in the previous century. The growth of industrial cities and the opening of the Western territories provided ample occasion for husbands to leave their families or for widows to find themselves

without means of support. As the nineteenth century progressed, changes in
poor laws dealt with these developments, at least in one jurisdiction, by procommon reform showing up in many state codes. Some states provided that wives of husbands under
uardianship could join in suits for the partition of land. See Maine: Act of Feb. 1, 1831, ch. 485, 1831
e. Acts 1269; Massachusetts: Act of Feb. 21, 1831, ch. 54, 1831 Mass. Laws 569. Many states adopted
statutes permitting husbands to join suits previously being pursued by their wives when they were
unmarried in order to avoid abatement of the action. See Michigan: Act of Mar. 27, 1835, 1834 Mich.
Terr. Laws 180 (1835). A number of states also adopted acts permitting wives to insure the lives of their
husbands. See Maryland: Act of Feb. 23, 1841, ch. 212, 1840 Md. Laws (no page) (1841). Other states
provided that certain portions of a husband's estate would be exempt from creditors. See New York:
Act of Feb. 16, 1824, ch. 44, 1824 N.Y. Laws 32.
249. Coleman provides a great mass of detail on changes in imprisonment for debt legislation. Women were freed of the possibility of debt imprisonment in Connecticut (1826), Georgia (1847), Maryland (1824), Massachusetts (1831), New Hampshire (1831), New Jersey (1818), New York (1828), North
Carolina (1823), Pennsylvania (1819), and Vermont (1834). P. COLEMAN, Supra note 222, at 77-78, 235,
177, 45, 62, 138, 119, 224, 149, 68 (respectively). Georgia was a bit late, but that state had adopted other
reforms in the 1820's that virtually removed imprisonment from the list of available creditor remedies.
Id at 235.
250. Connecticut (1842), Delaware (1841), Georgia (1858), Maryland (1830), Massachusetts (1857),
New Hampshire (1840), New Jersey (1842), New York (1831), North Carolina (1844), Pennsylvania
(1842), and Vermont (1838). See P. COLEMAN, supra note 222, at 78, 210, 235, 177, 52, 62, 139, 119,
224, 151, 68 (respectively). The abolition movement was primarily a Northern enterprise, since Southern states had adopted very effective debtors' oath provisions earlier in the century. Available data
suggests that by the time the reform movement got rolling, many more people were being imprisoned
for debt in the North than in the South. See FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOSTON PRISON DisciPLINE SOCIETY (1830) (2,742 debt imprisonments in the North and only 35 in the South in 1829).
251. See P. COLEMAN, supra note 222, at 9-15, 249-68.
252. Randall, Imprisonmentfor Debt in America: Factand Fiction, 39 Miss. VALLEY HIST. Rv. 89
(1952).
253. The SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOSTON PRISON DISCIPLINE SocIErTY 443-447 (1831) reports on a survey of jailers in Massachusetts. Although there were a number of women reported to
have been jailed in Boston, a much smaller number had been jailed in other counties. The report's
findings are logical as cities were likely to contain more "disconnected" women. These findings are
comparable to the findings of a study of poor laws in Maryland. The Maryland study found that
outpensions for widowed or deserted women were most common in Baltimore. See infra note 255.

254. L.

FRIEDMAN,

supra note 22, at 190-92.
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viding outpensions to increasingly large numbers of such women. 25 5 This development is consistent with other legal developments occurring in the same
period. Even in places where divorce for desertion was available, the imposition of substantial waiting periods meant long delays before women could obtain relief. Moreover, statutes like Alabama's, which provided feme-sole status
to abandoned wives, would not take care of everyone. It is likely that some
deserted women who were unable to work were given poor relief if their husbands left no property behind.
Finally, widows and women who headed families also appeared as something of a protected class in federal land grant policy. While some early land
provisions explicitly provided benefits for white males only, 256 other legislation
for the benefit of widows of deceased land claimants appeared in the early
decades of the century. 25 7 By the 1840's land grant legislation routinely provided grants for heads of families 258 in addition to widows. Although federal
land grant law never fully absorbed the married women's property move255. C. McKenna, Women, Welfare, and Work in Maryland: A Historical Survey of the First Two
Hundred Years 25-29 (1982) (unpublished paper) (copy on file with author). McKenna found a signifi-

cant increase in the number of women receiving outpensions in the first few decades of the 19th century, particularly in the cities. In addition, a number of private bills were also adopted. The pensions
and private bills frequently benefitted women with children.
256. See Ordinance of 1785, 28 J. CONT. CONG. 375 (1785); An Act Authorizing the Grant and
Conveyance of Certain Lands to the Ohio Company of Associates, 1 Stat. 257 (1792). Much early
legislation was gender neutral in terminology, speaking only of "purchasers" or "settlers." It is not
presently known whether women, even single women, were able to make use of such provisions. See
An Act Providing for the Sale of the Lands of the United States, in the Territory Northwest of the River
Ohio and Above the Mouth of Kentucky River, 1 Stat. 464 (1796); An Act Making Provision for the
Disposal of the Public Lands in the Indiana Territory and for Other Purposes, 2 Stat. 277 (1804). This
sort of legislation was sometimes amended to take care of widows and heads of families. See An Act to
Grant Pre-emption Rights to Settlers on Public Lands, 5 Stat. 251 (1838) (amending earlier pre-emption
act passed in 1830). The variety of terminology in the early land acts is staggering. It is fair to suggest
that the notion of "family head" grew in prominence as the century unfolded and that early on women
unaccompanied by living husbands became eligible to hold the status of "family head."
257. See An Act for the Relief of the Refugees From the British Provinces of Canada and Nova
Scotia, 1 Stat. 547 (1798); An Act Making Provision for Certain Persons Claiming Lands Under the
Several Acts for the Relief of the Refugees From the British Provinces of Canada and Nova Scotia, 2
Stat. 712 (1812) (private bill granting land to a widow and a remarried widow). By 1830 many states
had statutes providing that widows would be heirs to their deceased husbands and federal land rode
piggyback on these provisions. See An Act to Authorize the Investigation of Alleged Frauds Under the
Pre-emption Laws and for Other Purposes, 5 Stat. 619 (1843); Johnson v. Collins, 12 Ala. 322 (1847).
See also 2 J. GALES & W. SEATON, PUBLIC AcTs OF CONGRESS RESPECTING THE SALE AND DisPosITION OF THE PUBLIC LANDS 548, 557 (1838) (discussing two Commissioner of General Land Office
decisions issued in 1831 holding that Pre-emption Act of 1830, 4 Stat. 420, permits widow to act as a
settler and to perfect her deceased husband's claim).
258. See, e.g., An Act for Granting Lands to the Inhabitants and Settlers at Vincennes and the
Illinois County, I Stat. 221 (1791); An Act Regulating the Grants of Land, and Providing for the Disposal of the Lands of the United States, South of the State of Tennessee, 2 Stat. 229 (1803); An Act Giving
the Right of Pre-emption, in the Purchase of Lands, to Certain Settlers in the States of Alabama, Mississippi, and Territory of Florida, 4 Stat. 154 (1826); An Act to Grant Pre-emption Rights to Settlers on
Public Lands, 5 Stat. 251 (1838). By the 1840's the term "head of family" was used in federal land laws.
See An Act to Appropriate the Proceeds of the Sales of Public Lands and to Grant Pre-emption Rights,
5 Stat. 453 (1841). This Act was routinely administered to include female heads of families within its
ambit. See 1 W. LESTER, LAND LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND DECISIONS 360-65 (1860) (Circular to Registers and Receivers of the United States Land Offices issued Sept. 15, 1841, construing Pre-emption Act
of 1841 and making it clear that widows and female heads of families included within its terms). In the
1850's married women were still precluded from purchasing most federal lands unless state or territorial law permitted them to do so. See id at 466.
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ment, 259 it did reflect the early nineteenth-century trend to provide special
treatment for female heads of families and widows.
3. Married Women's Acts, Separate Estate Trust Deeds, and a Glance at
Later Developments
Legal developments between 1800 and 1840 tended to protect married women by adjusting the impacts of coverture without altering the central features
of married women's status. By 1840 there was a somewhat greater likelihood
that legal institutions would attempt to assist a married woman in distress because of death, abandonment, poverty, or divorce. The increase in such legal
responses suggests a change in attitude toward those women who fell off the
edge of the separate domestic sphere. Whether the cause of the fall was extrinsic to the marital relationship or a rupture of the marriage, recognition began
to be given to the particular problems confronting some married women.
While these legislative changes were emerging, the separate equitable estate
became more widely understood, and, if the Baltimore will and trust deed
study reflects general trends, more widely used. 260 By 1850 the legal strands
began to merge. The separate estate, even before it was converted from an
equitable contrivance to a statutory entitlement, was often set aside as a special
class of property immune from the husband's debts and thus available to sustain the family in troubled times. Because the documents creating separate
estates had long been used to insulate property from creditors,26 1 thus causing
courts of equity to require that husbands in debt seeking access to their wives'
separate estates set aside an equity to a settlement to protect a portion of their
spouses' wealth. 262 Women had long been the subject of special legislative
attention, so that the earliest of the married women's acts could hardly have
been perceived as radical. But they were important. Like trust instruments,
they generally did not give married women control over the disposition of their
separate estates, but they did set the stage for later263legislation and judicial
decisions that loosened the dispositional constraints.
259. The closest federal land law came to a married women's act was the Oregon Donation Act, 9
Stat. 496 (1850), which explicitly granted land to married women. This is the only such piece of legislation I have found. It is interesting to speculate on why federal land law did not reflect the developments on the state level after 1850. It is likely that once state law developed to permit married women
to contract, there was little need for federal law to change. Even if married women could not purchase
land directly, they could gain title by deed after the federal patent was issued. Many, if not most, of the
purchases of land by persons moving to the frontier territories were not directly from the government
but from others who had already obtained title to the land. By the time state law had fully developed to
permit women to control their own earnings, most of the good federal lands open for private settlement
had already been sold. For background and history of federal land sales, see generally Cole, Cyclical
and Sectional Variations in the Sale of Public Lands, 1816-1860, 9 REv. ECON. STATISTICS 41 (1927);
Danhof, Farm-Making Costs and the "Safety Valve 1850-1860, 49 J. POL. ECON. 317 (1941); Gates,
The Role of the Land Speculator in Western Development, 66 PA. MAG. HIsT. & BIOG. 314 (1942).
260. See supra notes 59-92 and accompanying text (archival study).
261. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 220-22. The trust deed study confirms the same fact. See supra
Tables 12, 13, and 14 and accompanying text.
262. Equity to a settlement had a strong tradition in England in the 17th century. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 106, at 314; 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 108, at 645. The tradition continued
here. See N. BASCH, supra note 1, at 89-96; 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 449-516; 2 J. STORY, supra
note 34, at 630-50.
263. Legislation creating a separate estate for married women appeared over a wide range of years
beginning in the 1840's and ending after the Civil War. Most of this legislation was enacted before the
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If in 1850 there was still debate over whether women could own property
without the intervention of a trustee, 264 trustees became unnecessary by 1860
in the North and 1870 in the South. If equity was a changing and sometimes
uncertain means for legitimizing married women's control of property, then a
legal estate created by statute could substitute nicely. If previously only
wealthy men and women could afford to create the documents needed to formalize a separate estate, permit women to retain title to their personal property, insulate married women's property from creditors, and provide for its
disposition at death, there was eventually room for language in a simple deed
or transfer agreement to automatically serve all these and other ends. Thus,
the fact that the early married women's acts fit into a network of mild reforms
from 1800 on should not blind us to the significance of their arrival. They
were, after all, the earliest examples of a long stream of statutes focusing specifically on the economic consequences of women's property ownership during
marriage. The fact that many of the statutes adopted after the mid- 1840's contained provisions that may have been intended to do more than insulate married women's property from a husband's debts gave the blossoming feminist
movement reason to hope that further reforms would occur.
Despite the well-known connection between legislative petitioning and lobbying by a few women in the late 1840's and the passage of a few of the married women's acts, 265 most of the early acts, modest and conservative in tone,
were compatible with prior and contemporary legislation of the most ordinary
sort. Even the New York act of 1848,266 the best known of all the early statutes, was extremely narrow in scope. The first two sections of the act insulated
a married woman's property from her husband's debts and also declared that
the property "shall continue her sole and separate property, as if she were a
single female. ' 267 The third section provided that property coming to married
war. Mississippi, Maryland, Arkansas, Alabama, Michigan, Maine, Massachusetts, Iowa, New York,

and Pennsylvania each adopted debt statutes with separate estate provisions. See supra notes 207, 209.
These acts were passed between 1839 and 1852. Another batch of separate estate statutes was adopted
in the following decade in the newly burgeoning territories, and after the war in the Southern states.
The states adopting such acts included Michigan: Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 168, 1855 Mich. Laws 420;
Illinois: Act of Feb. 21, 1861, 1861 IlL.
Laws 143; Ohio: Act of Apr. 3, 1861, 1861 Ohio Laws 54;
Delaware: Act of Mar. 17, 1865, ch. 572, 1865 Del. Laws 663; Georgia: Act of Dec. 13, 1866, No. 204,
1866 Ga. Laws 146; Vermont: Act of Nov. 21, 1867, No. 21, 1867 Vt. Acts 29; Tennessee: Act of Mar.
2, 1870, ch. 99, 1869 Tenn. Laws 113. These statutes, especially the early ones, did not, on their face,
remove the need for a trustee. Sometimes this was accomplished by later statutes, see Maryland: Act of
May 24, 1853, ch. 245, 1853 Md. Laws 323; statutes cited infra note 361; and by court decision. Harris
v. Harris, 42 N.C. (7 Ired. Eq.) I11 (1850); Gibson v. Walker, 20 N.Y. 476 (1859); Harding v. Cobb, 47
Miss. 599 (1873); Blood v. Humphrey, 17 Barb. 660 (N.Y. 1854); Burnett v. Hawpe's Ex'r, 25 Gratt. 481
(Va. 1874); Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572 (1879); Maiben v. Bobe, 6 Fla. 381 (1855).
264. In New York, there was a 20-year debate over the relationship between equity and married
women's estates. See P. RABKIN,Msupra note 2, at 61-105. Since equitable language was so often used in
the statutes, it was reasonably common for courts to call upon equity precedent to construe the new
statute. See id at 125-38.
265. See E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 205-36; P. RABKIN, supra note 2, at 106-17.
266. Act of Apr. 7, 1848, ch. 200, 1848 N.Y. Laws 307.
267. The act reads in full:
AN ACT for the more effectual protection of the property of married women.
Passed April 7, 1848.
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly do enact as
follows:
§ 1. The real and personal property of any female who may hereafter marry, and which she
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women in the future "from any persons other than her husband" shall be held
"to her sole and separate use, as if she were a single female. '268 It is this "sole
phrase which later generations have pointed to as breakand separate use" 269
through language.
The similarity of the statute's sale and separate use phraseology to typical
language in equitable instruments and its presence in sections dealing with
debt made narrow construction almost inevitable. Equity courts frequently
had construed trust instruments containing sole and separate use language but
lacking explicit grants of dispositional authority to deny married women the
right to contract about or will separate estate assets. The statute only prohibited "disposal" of a separate estate by husbands, leaving intact the range of
other restrictions, providing husbands with management authority, and
preventing unilateral contractual or testamentary disposal by wives. The statute's primary effect was to create a new category of exempt assets for family
use. The special sphere of married women was thus largely confirmed. Assets
belonging to married women were to be set aside and insulated from the harsh
realities of the commercial world. Married women's property, like married
women themselves, was to be specially treated and protected. Indeed, the statute underscores the limited sphere of women by providing that assets received
by a wife directly from her husband would not be free from her husband's
debts. 270 A married woman was not easily going to become a device for insulating a husband's assets from commercial liability. These were the features of
the early married women's act that finally persuaded conservative New York
legislators to support the 1848 bill.271 Neither substantial harm to creditors
nor great risks of family divisiveness were likely to result from this sort of
legislation.
The growing use of equitable separate estates confirms the same trends.

Property management was a fairly new adventure for most married women.
shall own at the time of marriage, and the rents issues and profits thereof shall not be subject
to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts, and shall continue her sole and
separate property, as if she were a single female.
§ 2. The realand personal property, and the rents issues and profits therof of any female now
married shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband; but shall be her sole and separate
property as if she were a single female except so far as as the same may be liable for the debts
of her husband heretofore contracted.
§ 3. It shall be lawful for any married female to receive, by gift, grant devise or bequest, from
any person other than her husband and hold to her sole and separate use, as if she were a
single female, real and personal property, and the rents, issues and profits thereof, and the
same shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts.
§ 4. All contracts made between persons in contemplation of marriage shall remain in full
force after such marriage takes place.
268. Id § 3.
269. Other states used similar language before New York. See supra notes 204-09. Section 1 of
Mississippi's 1839 act provided that married women become "seized and possessed of any property, real
or personal, . . . in her own name, and as of her own property." Maine's 1844 statute mirrors the
Mississippi language. Michigan's 1844 statute provides that after marriage, property shall be the "estate of such female after marriage to the same extent as before marriage." Despite the fact that Massachusetts was the scene of much early female agitation on both women's and slavery issues, its first
married women's act was very narrow in content. It basically permitted the establishment of trusts
through ante-nuptial agreements and limited the husband's control of the trust assests.
270. This provision in section 3 was judicially expanded to void conveyances made by wives directly
to their husbands. White v. Wager, 25 N.Y. 328 (1862).
271. See E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 218-29.
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From receipt of inheritances in the eighteenth century, through development
of income by unmarried women, to management of middle class family incomes by some married women by the middle of the century, the domestic
sphere and the separate equitable estate were stretched to accommodate the
presence of money and women's new role in the family. But the stretch was
narrow. Independent commercial endeavors by married women were not included on the mid-century reform agenda. Married women were singled out
for special treatment, their assets were subject to dispositional constraints established by others, and their property was largely controlled for the benefit of
their families. The appearance of both married women's acts and separate
estate instruments suggests that a married woman's property was largely
viewed as a family resource or as a safeguard for a wife upon her husband's
death or departure, not as mercantile or speculative wealth. Married women
were still homemakers, and the gradual emergence of dispositional authority
over separate property reflects women's greater activity in the home economy
more than their widespread entry into the business world.
But the statutes and separate estates also reflect myriad contradictions. The
very device used to confirm women's special sphere-the separate estate insulated from the husband's debts--created a wedge in the coverture bastion, and
confirmed for women a small degree of independence from their marriage
partners. Indeed, the contradictions go deeper. Despite the prohibition on
debt exemption for property coming to a wife from her husband, the New
York statute, and others as well, created an incentive for husbands to use their
wives' new insulation from creditors to hide assets. While a conveyance to a
third party was necessary to avoid the restrictions on intramarital exchanges,
extramarial property coming to a married woman was not so constrained.
Those with wealth were certainly going to take the bait 272 by using straw party
exchanges or causing extramarital property to be held in their wives' names.
The separate equitable estate was available for similar use. The statutes and
separate estates themselves contained the sorts of contradictions that would
lead later reformers to urge more similar treatment of men's and women's
property by refining the definitions of property owned by husbands and wives
and equalizing the availability of these assets to creditors.2 73
III.

THE HISTORICAL BLANKET

In her address "The Wrongs of Woman" before the 1850 Salem, Ohio, Women's Convention, J. Elizabeth Jones, like speakers at earlier gatherings, spent
much of her time on law and Blackstone.2 74 Jones noted that many women
had conflicting feelings about their position. Some, she said, do not know they
272. See P. RABKIN, supra note 2, at 126-37; S. Breed, Conflicts of Interest: The Evolution of Married Women's Property Rights in Nineteenth Century New Hampshire (1982) (unpublished paper)
(copy on file with author).
273. Breed's paper on women's property rights in New Hampshire, supra note 272, lays out this story
in wonderful detail. Disputes over use of the marital property exemption eventually led to more equitable treatment and creditor access. This was the pattern followed nationally as the century unfolded.
For later married women's acts, see infra note 361.
274. THE SALEM, OHIO 1850 WOMEN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS 52-62 (R. Audretsch ed.
1976) [hereinafter OHIO 1850 WOMEN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION].
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are "robbed of [their] rights," others feel "weak and dependent. '275 Others
fear "to expose their own situation" or "dread of seeming to be out of their
sphere" and therefore masculine. 276 Still others "have no sense of injury" because "all their wants have been duly supplied" or "labor for a mere pittance
because they are women." 277 After making a lengthy critique of the inequities
of the common law and contending that women should obtain the right of
suffrage at the impending Ohio Constitutional Convention, Jones concluded:
We but ask that our equality in point of rights be acknowledged;
we ask that none shall strive to obliterate or deface the image and
superscription our Creator stamped upon our souls. I am aware that
the great mass of women in this country have no sympathy with the
views I have expressed. I wish it were otherwise. I wish they could
be led to see their true position, and be made to understand that the
gallantry and devotion of man is offered them in lieu of a recognition
of their rights, and that it is only in a few rare cases he approaches
and converses with them as equals, as being as fully rational, intelligent and morally accountable as himself, endowed with the same
rights and clothed with the same duties.
But I will not further extend my remarks. I have already said
enough to secure the disapprobation which is always bestowed upon
a woman who thinks and speaks for herself. I have said more than
enough for those women who are contented with their rose-covered
chains and gilded prison-bars; and I could hope that I have said
something to encourage to earnest action those of my sex who feel
that no length of legislation can sanction and sanctify the wrongs that
have been inflicted upon them; that no social usages, however timehonored, can justify the oppressions they have been compelled to endure; that no religious creed, however sanctimonious its supporters,
278
can find the least excuse for the inequality in the church.
This statement is a remarkable indication of the social pressures felt by one of
the more radical of mid-nineteenth-century women. 279 Why would a public
275. Id at 54.
276. Id
277. Id
278. Id at 62 (emphasis in original).
279. Jones' speech also roundly condemned slavery and applauded by name many of the prominent
feminists of her time. After 1840 she consistently turned up at important gatherings of feminists and
abolitionists. Jones lobbied for the adoption of the 1861 Ohio married women's property act, lectured
on health and hygiene (common interests of the feminists of her era), and for a time edited the AntiSlavery Bugle with her husband. 2 E. JAMES, NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN 1607-1950, at 285-86 (J.
James & P. Boyer eds. 1971).
At one point in her speech, Jones noted that she may choose not to
exercise my right so to [vote], after it is accorded to me; indeed all who know my sentiments in
relation to Constitutions and government, and you, Madam President, may not, and all whom
I address may not; but that is no reason why others should judge for us, of the propriety and
expediency of our so doing; that is a right I insist upon exercising for myself, and these 'Daniels' who have 'come to judgment' have me-thinks, assumed an air of wisdom, as foreign to
their own characters as it is derogatory to us.
OHIO 1850 WOMEN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION, supra note 274, at 58 (emphasis in original). At first blush,
this seems to be a statement that Jones would not vote because of social constraints on the role of
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woman of 1850 castigate limitations on her social role while confessing to the
unwillingness of most women to follow her lead?
A brief examination of the historical literature on women in the first half of
the nineteenth century reveals a series of changes relevant to the mid-century
emergence of married women's acts. By 1800 the importance of married women as active participants in the family was more widely recognized. Symptoms of the changes surfaced in a number of ways. Women became more
involved in religious and social service activities, more literate, and more
.deeply involved in raising and educating their children. At the same time that
married women were assuming greater importance in the family and in familyrelated social organizations, single women were beginning to leave home for
reasons other than apprenticeship or marriage. Employment opportunities
beckoned in teaching, domestic service, and the mills. As the nineteenth century unfolded, these trends accelerated, creating very substantial differences in
the roles of single and married women. For many women an active unmarried
life was followed by marital domesticity. Married women's acts reflbcted this
situation. The significant features of the acts did not reject married women's
separate domestic sphere, but recognized the importance of women as caretakers of children and family resources.
A.

THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY WAR ERA

J. Elizabeth Jones did not invent women's conflict over public and private
spheres. Recent literature suggests such tension appeared at least as early as
the Revolutionary War era. Both Norton and Kerber contend that the Revolutionary War was a catalyst for some redefinition of women's social position.
They note that the pre-Revolutionary War domestic role of women took on a
different content by the end of the eighteenth century280 due to participation of
women in the Revolutionary War political scene through economic boy28 3
cotts, 2 1' home production, 282 and political correspondence and discussion.
By coping with the inevitable disruptions caused by conflict, political disagreements, and absent spouses, women sensed they were participating in important
cultural developments. 284 Kerber finds that at the core of cultural values "a
concensus developed around the idea that a mother, committed to the service
of her family and to the state, might serve a political purpose. '2 85 Norton
agrees, writing that the "war necessarily broke down the barrier which seemed
to insulate women from the realm of politics, for they, no less than men, were
caught up in the turmoil that enveloped the entire populace. ' 28 6 While Norton states that domesticity was no longer denigrated and the feminine sphere
women. It is probably, however, a statement typical of the radical Garrisonian wing of the Abolitionists, who perferred withdrawal from participation in a union with slavery to creation of an anti-slavery

political party or to work with the existing parties. For a history of the Garrisonians, see W. WIECEK,
SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 228-48 (1977).
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 155-299; L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 157-288.
M. NORTON, sutpra note 2, at 157-63; L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 35-39.
M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 163-70; L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 41-45.
M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 170-77; L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 73-85.
M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 195-227; L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 455-67.
L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 283.
M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 297.
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no longer subordinate, 28 7 Kerber prefers a less egalitarian portrayal of Republican Motherhood as a "concept that legitimized a minimum of political sophistication and interest, and only of a most generalized sort. ' 288 Both writers
agree, however, that in contrast to the subservient role of women before 1770,
the Revolutionary War era provided women with a new egalitarian vocabulary, a few well-known, if ridiculed, radical figures, 289 and a potential for limited participation in public events. The stage was set for a cultural redefinition
290
of the married women's separate sphere.
Evidence of conflict over the relationship between a married woman's public
and private life appeared in a number of ways in the years just before 1800.
Since public debate by women was still the extraordinary exception, 29' the evidence is largely confined to other areas. Kerber and Norton both investigated
private correspondence and diaries in their efforts to sort out the effects of the
Revolutionary War.292 Just as women in the nineteenth-century tended to correspond with other women in intimate, supportive ways, 293 literate women of
294
the eighteenth-century have left us a historical record of their friendships.
Female friendships and correspondence were symbolic of the larger possibilities for group female activity,295 and consistent with the already
noted ten296
dency of women (and men) to will property to other women.
Despite the basically private nature of the separate sphere, women began to
participate in some worldly activities before the eighteenth-century was complete. Petitioning, particularly by widows, arose. 297 Female societies and auxiliaries to male voluntary groups appeared during the war to organize home
production, nursing, and fund-drives. 298 These groups continued in a different
guise after the war. Female religious, reform, and service societies proliferated
in the last two decades of the century. 29 9 Although most female societies dealt
30 1
with matters closely related to the domestic sphere3°° or religious concerns,
the societies inevitably led women to make public choices. The economic panics in the late eighteenth century30 2 and the appearance of impoverished wo287. Id at 298.
288. L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 285.
289. For a description of public reaction to Mary Wollstonecraft's VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF
WOMEN (1792), see L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 224-25, and M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 251-52.
290. See M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 228-55 (discussing emergence of the "reverance of self' dur-

ing post-war period); L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 73-113 (discussing women's emerging role outside the
home both during and after war). See also C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 191-92 (attributing women's
separate sphere in 18th century to society's new emphasis on freedom and individualism).
291. But see L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 99-110 (describing women's campaign to raise funds for
troops during war, commonly referred to as "Philadelphia Project").
292. M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 309-14; L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 289-93.
293. C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 144-50.
294. N. CoTr, supra note 2, at 185-99.
295. M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 105-09.

296. See supra Tables 9 and 10.
297. L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 85-99 (petitions included requests to cross enemy lines to join
husbands and claims for property left behind).
298. Id at 99-105.
299. Id at 111-13.
300. Id at 11. Women and children in distress were of particular concern.
301. Id
302. See P. COLEMAN, supra note 222, at 18-19 (economic problems even led to adoption of shortlived national bankruptcy act in 1800).
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men and children, prostitution, town slums, and alcohol abuse created
opportunities for many groups30 of
middle and upper class women to become
3
-involved with social concerns.
The subtle post-war changes in attitudes toward domesticity are also revealed by improvements in female literacy and education. 3°4 If, as both Kerber and Norton suggest, the post-war family was assigned a substantial new
role in the education of children in appropriate civic virtues, then women
themselves had to be literate.30 5 There is no doubt that girls continued to receive lesser educations than boys long after 1800 and that expressions of support for gender equality in education met with strong disapproval. 30 6 Yet
female academies emerged after the war and flourished with the growing public education movement after the turn of the century. 30 7 Literacy rates for women increased after 1780 until the first literacy census, taken in 1850, showed
little difference between literacy rates for men and women. 308 Reading and
writing by women exploded around the turn of the nineteenth century. 30 9 Ladies magazines, as well as fictional and religious reading and writing, became
an important part of many women's lives, though histories and the like were
303. J. FURNAS, THE AMERICANS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1587-1914 313-17
(1969).
304. L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 198-99.
305. Id at 199-200; M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 256-57. Norton adds that the exigencies of the justcompleted war also suggested the need for educated women on the homefront. M. NORTON, supra note
2, at 256.
306. L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 193-221; M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 263-72.
307. L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 198-205.
308. Id at 193. School enrollment among whites age 5-19 also displayed little difference by gender
in 1850. About 59% of boys and 53% of girls were in school. STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra note 6, at
369-70. Very little work on female literacy rates in the early 19th century has been done, but what has
been done suggests that vast changes occurred between 1800 and 1850. While the proportion of women
signing wills in the 18th century was fairly stable at about 40%, K. LOCKRIDOE, sUpra note 28, at 38-41,
men's sigature rates were substantially higher. Lockridge found some evidence for literacy increases
among females in the decades just before 1800. Id at 38. But by 1850 differences between men and
women appear to have virtually vanished. L. SoLTow & E. STEVENS, THE RISE OF LITERACY AND THE
COMMON SCHOOL INTHE UNITED STATES 157-58 (1981). See also GOODSELL, PIONEERS OF WOMEN'S
EDUCATION INTHE UNITED STATES 1-12 (1931); 1 T. WOODY, supra note 9, at 159-60 (during colonial
period percentage of illiteracy was greater among women than men).
309. It is perhaps not accidental that women's wills began to appear in greater numbers after women
became more literate. The will studies produced some additional data on literacy. The recorded Baltimore wills noted whether wills were signed or marked. Similar notations in the Dukes County recorded wills were found to be unreliable. All the wills were probated in 1810 or later, so one would
expect fairly high signature rates. The small size of the sample makes hard conclusions difficult, but
over 60% of women's wills were signed. Surprisingly, no significant change appeared over time.
Women's Will Literacy (Baltimore)
Probate Year

Signed

Marked

Not Known

1810
1825
1840
1846

3
14
23
34

5
5
16
13

5
0
4
I

If the 1810 and 1825 data are merged, 63% (17/27) of the wills where information was available were
signed. Similarly, 66% (57/86) of the 1840 and 1846 wills were signed. The signature rate for males
among the wills read from all four of the sample years was 83% (20/24) with nine unknown. These
results are compatible with the very high (90%) literacy rates of an 1860 sample of married women, L.
SoLTow & E. STEVENS, supra note 308, at 156, and the lower literacy rates (less than 50%) found among
female will writers in the late 18th century. K. LOCKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 38-39.
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still thought of as men's fare. 3 10 The movement to literacy was not without
opponents fearful of introducing worldly concerns into women's lives or causing impure desires among the ladies.31 ' These concerns were particularly important in an era that witnessed a substantial increase in courting freedoms
found philoand premarital pregnancy rates. 3 12 But female novel reading also
3 13
sophical support in the contemporaneous rise of romanticism.
With all this activity in reading, writing, and education, women began to
enter teaching in new ways. The jump from household tutoring of one's own
offspring to the education by unmarried women of a group of children was
14
made by some, opposed by others, but reasonably steady in its growth. 3 By
more
was
woman
the end of the century, a middle or upper class married
or
society
a
voluntary
in
participant
a
likely than her mother to be literate,
politlarger
the
and
role
own
her
between
link
a
of
aware
and
religious group,
3 16
ical culture.3 15 And her female offspring were more likely to be teachers.
Another link between women's domestic role and larger social activities was
found in religion. The domesticity of women was linked to morality and virtue long before the Revolutionary War. 3 17 Women outnumbered men in
churches from very early colonial days, and this trend became very noticeable
by the turn of the nineteenth century. 318 Although teaching and eventually
mill work provided avenues for unmarried women to leave the home, religion
provided that opportunity for their mothers. Some religious groups, particularly the Quakers, provided opportunities for substantial female participation
and even for religious travel. 31 9 Nineteenth-century revivals and camp meet-.
ings, religious fervor, religiously-based social service groups, and the Second
Great Awakening had their roots in the late eighteenth century. 3 20 The conflicts in women's domestic role that emerged in the nineteenth-century egalitarian religious and communal movements were largely defined by the stresses
310. See L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 235-64 (explaining importance of reading fiction to women in

the early republic); N. CoTr, supra note 2, at 64-74 (tracing common theme of domesticity in literary
works appealing to women).
311. L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 239.
312. C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 20; L. KERBER, supra note 2, at 245; M. NORTON, supra note 2, at
51-60; Smith, Dating the American Sexual Revolution: Evidence and Interpretation,in THE AMERICAN

FAMILY IN SOCIAL-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 321 (M. Gordon ed. 1973). Smith found that premarital
pregnancy rates peaked in the later 18th century and troughed in the later 19th. Id at 321-22.
313. See N. COTT, supra note 2, at 76-83 (romanticism conveyed in literature influenced women to
wish for ideal mate); K. MELDER, supra note 2, at 34-47.
314. M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 290-94; C. KAESTLE & M. VINOVSKIs, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY MASSACHUSETTS 26-27 (1980); W. BUTTS & S. CREMINS, A HisTORY OF EDUCATION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 246-47 (1953) [hereinafter BuTTS & CREMINS].
315. M. NORTON, supra note 2, at 289. Norton has compiled some fascinating data on education
trends over time, suggesting that among notable women, the proportion with some advanced education
jumped from 18% for those born before 1770 to 65% for those born after 1770. Id at 288-90.
316. Id
317. See C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 289-303 (women organized as the Social Purist to control
sexuality and became involved in religion and churches).
318. N. Corr,supra note 2, at 126-28.
319. C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 302; K. MELDER, supra note 2, at 77-92; M. NORTON, supra note 2,
at 126-32.
320. See C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 298-305 (during second awakening most converts were women
and women played active role in reform organizations, religious groups, and antislavery movement); J.
FURNAS, supra note 303, at 327-32 (discussing tactics of the leaders of the Great Awakening and camp
meetings); W. McLoUGHLIN, REVIVALS, AWAKENINGS, AND REFORM 98-140 (1978).
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of the post-war era. The use of special sphere ideology to permit movement of
women into religious activities related to, but outside, the home suggested both
the potential for larger change and32 1the role limitations that undoubtedly
guided most married women's lives.

But for most married women the combination of agricultural stability and
the late eighteenth century concern over teaching young children appropriate
social behavior led to concentration on child rearing rather than on activities
outside the home. 322 It is, in hindsight, not surprising that the turn of the nine-

teenth century would see the blossoming of the domestic sphere in all of its
contradictions. 323 Even though modern notions of child rearing and new techniques of manufacturing were emerging, families were still confronted with a
child-rearing experience vastly different from our own. Fertility rates were
extraordinarily high, with live births numbering more than twenty-five percent
of the child-rearing age population.324 The rates peaked around the turn of
the century and declined thereafter. 325 The average household size was over
five and one-half persons, and did not fall below five until the end of the nineteenth century. 326 Despite the large households, infant mortality rates were

321. See C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 298-327 (discussing emergence of "separate sphere" for women
in 19th century; protection of home and preservation of its moral character justified women's active role
in outside world).
322. N. CoTr, supra note 2, at 84-98.
323. Cott's use of the title "Bonds of Womanhood," which she explains on the first page of her book,
supra note 2, is an appropriate signal of the potential for domesticity to be both an uplifting and
binding experience.
324. Miscarriages, still births, and abortions are excluded from this high figure. It is plausible to
suggest that during 1800 over one-third of the white women ages 15-44 became pregnant. Birth rates
declined throughout the 19th century, with substantial declines starting after 1810. Data from STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra note 6, at 49, fills this table:
Year

Birth Rate for White Women 15-44
(Live births/1000 population)

1800 ....................... 278
1810 ....................... 274
1820 ....................... 260
1830 ....................... 240
1840 ....................... 222
1850 ....................... 194
1860 ....................... 184
1870 ....................... 167
1880 ....................... 155
1890 ....................... 137
1900 ....................... 130
1930 ....................... 87.1
1960 ....................... 113.2
1970 ....................... 84.1
325. W. GRABILL, C. KISER & P. WHELPTON, THE FERTILITY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 1-24 (1958).
326. Household size is now well under three. Putting together material from the STATISTICAL AnSTRACT, supra note 13, at 45, and STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra note 6, at 41, yields the following table:
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high, perhaps averaging fifteen percent. 327 Maternal mortality was also
high.328 The high birth rate and its attendant risks made the occurrence of
pregnancy, the completion of childbirth, and the process of child rearing the
focus of an enormous amount of attention. These events caused awe and fear,
delight and depression with much greater frequency than today. The possibilities for tragedy were remarkably greater than we can imagine. Cott put it
mildly when she wrote that "the arrival of another child posed anxieties. 32 9
B.

THE EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY

Such anxieties produced a rich variety of responses as the nineteenth century
unfolded. Reproductive rates declined more noticeably after the turn of the
century.3 30 There seems to be little doubt that some form of birth control op331
erated to produce the substantial decline in fertility between 1800 and 1850.
Year

Average Household Size

1790 ............................. 5.79
1850 ............................. 5.55
1860 ............................. 5.28
1870 ............................. 5.09
1880 ............................. 5.04
1890 ............................. 4.93
1900 ............................. 4.76
1930 ............................. 4.11
1970 ............................. 3.14
1979 ............................. 2.78
327. Data from Massachusetts suggests that from 1850 until after 1900, about 15% of newborns died.
Earlier rates were presumably of a similar magnitude. The somewhat lower mortality rates for the
1850's, however, suggest the possibility that rates rose contemporaneously with the decline of midwifery. There is need to explore the relationship between death rates and male entry into the birth
process. Were midwives more sanitary? STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra note 6,at 57:
Infant Mortality For Massachusetts 1851-1970
(per 1000 live births)
Time
Rate
1851-54 ......................... 131.1
1855-59 ......................... 122.9
1860-64 ......................... 142.5
1865-69 ......................... 146.3
1870-74 ......................... 170.3
1875-79 ......................... 156.3
1880-84 ......................... 161.3
1885-89 ......................... 158.5
1890-94 ......................... 163.2
1895-99 ......................... 153.2
1900-04 ......................... 141.4
1905-09 ......................... 134.3
1910-14 ......................... 116.7
1915-19 ......................... 100.2
1920-24 ......................... 78.7
1925-29 ......................... 67.6
1970 ............................ 16.8
328. Even in 1915 the rate was over 60 per 10,000 live births. The rate did not begin to fall until after
1930. Presumably 19th-century death rates were at least as high. STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra note 6,
at 57.
329. N. Corr,supra note 2, at 9 1.
330. See supra notes 324 and 325 and accompanying text.
331. C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 181-96, 210-16. The decline in birth rates was also attributed to
improving economic status, while the primary method of birth control was probably abstinence.
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Abortion appears to have been a common practice of the middle class by the
1840's when the first antiabortion laws appeared. 33 2 The variety in early nineteenth-century communal groups probably mirrored the tensions over childbirth present in the larger community. Some sects were celibate,3 33 others
openly espoused birth control, and a number adopted communal living patterns and carefully controlled programs of sexual access to handle the
problems of childbirth.3 34 Some groups, like the Mormons, encouraged childbirth.335 But whether the community chose celibacy, birth control, abstinence,
communal child care, ot high reproduction rates, control over family formation and fertility was central to each group's self-image.
Such control is a major theme in Degler's scholarship. He argues that the
period from 1780 to 1830 witnessed the emergence of the modern American
family characterized by marriage based on affection and respect, greater influence and autonomy for women in the home, child rearing and home maintenance as the wife's primary role, devotion of a larger amount of parental
energy and resources to young children, treatment of young children as persons different from adults and needing special treatment, love, and solicitude,
and smaller family size. 336 Degler and Cott suggest that the emergence of the
modern family both created an opportunity for women to increase their influence within the family and established limitations on the ability of women to
work in the public sphere.33 7 As the separate domestic sphere grew to define
middle class as well as wealthy women's roles, 338 it both legitimated domestically related activity outside the home and created a new standard for defining
339
deviance.
332. See J. MOHR, supra note 2, at 16-18, 86-118. Abortion probably gained in importance when
mechanical means of terminating a pregnancy became preferred over taking of poisons. Abortion frequency apparently rose in the 1840's. Id at 46-85. Use of instruments probably increased during the
mid-19th century. Id at 61, 65. In addition, infanticide probably fell offin importance around the turn
of the 19th century. See Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality and Law, 40 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 359, 392-400 (1978). It is also interesting to note that knowledge of fetal development was
improving in this period. As early as the 1820's some were writing that quickening did not represent
the beginning of vitality but the point where fetal growth permitted movement to be felt. W. BECK,
ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 199-203 (1823). Such knowledge was important to the development of the antiabortion laws. It permitted the emerging professional male doctors to argue that
laws permitting abortion until quickening did not comport with either morality or medical knowledge.
333. The group best known to most 20th-century persons is the Shakers, but a number of other
celibate groups existed. The most prominent during the 19th century may have been the Harmony
Society. See K. ARNDT, GEORGE RAPP'S HARMONY SOCIETY, 1785-1847 (1971); 1 WOMEN AND RELIGION IN AMERICA 47-48, 60-66 (R. Ruether and R. Keller eds. 1981) [hereinafter RUETHER & KELLER].
334. RUETHER & KELLER, supra note 333, at 48-50. The Oneida Perfectionists led by John
Humphrey Noyes also believed in birth control, and communal sexual access and child rearing. The
Owenites, led by Robert Dale Owen and Fanny Wright were also involved in birth control and multiple partners. They were notorious in the 1830's. Id at 49-50, 66-69.
335. Id at 49, 69-70.
336. C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 8-9.
337. Id at 28; N. COTT, supra note 2, at 201.
338. Cott suggests that by 1830 many of the attributes of a modem family had affected middle class
as well as upper class women. N. COTT, supra note 2, at 185. Degler goes further and argues that even
lower class women were affected by the ideology of the separate sphere. C. DEaLER, supra note 2, at
111-43 (discussing role of Afro-American and immigrant women in 19th century).
339. See C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 298-327 (discussing 19th century women's roles outside the
home asjustified by duty to act in world in order to protect morality). Degler finds that little opposition
to female academies emerged while strong disapproval surfaced to women entering college. Id.at 30911. Degler also describes the gradual evolution in patterns for selection of marriage partners from
parental arrangements before the Revolutionary War to romantic selections with parental veto power
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The rapidity of change in definitions of domesticity and deviance in the first
decades of the nineteenth century is difficult to measure. But there is now little
doubt that the definition of women's sphere was under greater strain in 1840
than it was at the turn of the century. The trends of the late eighteenth century
in education and social services accelerated, with a large number of female
34
academies opening after 1810.340 Colleges open to women began to appear. '
Social and moral reform groups emerged in great profusion, spurred by urban
growth, agricultural efficiency, trade and commerce, and economic dislocations and panics. 342 Literary societies, religious charitable societies, missionary groups, associations to aid the poor, temperance societies, and societies for
reform in education, prisons, and treatment of the insane emerged in greater
numbers. 343 Many women found a moral foundation for their work in religion. Although some male religious leaders debated the appropriate scope of
women's activities, women often found support among male religious colleagues for activities that neither challenged male leadership nor endangered
appropriate feminine decorum. 3 4 The generally accepted notion that the virtue and morality of women was superior to that of men made religious groups
a natural milieu in which to develop female leadership.
Many of the prominent women of the early nineteenth century found their
power writing or speaking about issues of moral, religious, or ethical significance. Francis Wright came from Great Britain in 1824 with General LaFayette, met with many prominent Americans, helped establish the colony of
Nashoba to aid in the emancipation of slaves, and participated with Robert
Dale Owen in the New Harmony Community. In 1830 she openly advocated
free thinking and infidelity, free public education for all persons, birth control,
divorce, and married women's law reform. 34 5 She was a radical, outside the
American mainstream of moral and social reform movements. When the abolitionist Grimke sisters346 emerged from their Quaker background to speak in
1836 before women in New York and in 1837 before mixed audiences in Massachusetts, they could already point to Wright's prior speaking tours, as well as
the actions of a number of other women, as the real groundbreaking. Harriet
Martineau, another English woman, gave abolitionist lectures from 1834 to
1836. 347 Mixed prayer meetings occurred in the 1820's,348 and female educators like Emma Willard, Mary Lyon, and Catherine Beecher established feby the end of the 18th century. Id at 9-25. Courtship became much less constrained, and perhaps 10%
of women gave birth to children less than nine months after their marriage. Id at 20. Women were
acting with fewer constraints during courtship, but using marriage as the escape from social
disapproval.
340. N. COTT, supra note 2, at 115-25. See BuTrs & CREMIN, supra note 314, at 239-5 1.
341. K. MELDER, supra note 2, at 115-18; C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 310-15. After three years of
separate treatment, Oberlin permitted women to enroll with men in 1837. C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at
310.
342. See generally B. BERG, supra note 2.
343. K. MELDER, supra note 2, at 77-92, 118-21.
344. Id at 88-94; A. DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 17-139 (1977).
345. K. MELDER, supra note 2, at 59-61.

346. Sarah Grimke migrated to Philadelphia from South Carolina in 1821 and her sister, Angelina,

followed in 1829. K. MELDER, supra note 2, at 156, 192. See also G. LERNER, THE GRIMKE SISTERS
FROM SOUTH CAROLINA: PIONEERS FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND ABOLITION (1971).

347. K. MELDER, supra note 2, at 146.

348. Id. at 73-75.
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male academies,
raised funds, and lectured on women's education before
49
1835.

3

The decades of work in female voluntary societies, moral reform groups,
and religious activities blossomed into significant participation in the abolitionist movement in the early 1830's. Female antislavery societies emerged by
the early 1830's, and women solicited signatures on antislavery petitions beginning in 1835.350 The egalitarian rhetoric of the Revolution, the Enlightenment, and Jacksonian Democracy began to be used publicly by women. The
expansion of suffrage opportunities for white men created an opportunity for
radical abolitionists and feminists to focus America's attention on the appropriate role of women. Less than a decade after the Grimkes' controversial
the similarity between slavery
tour, discussion in mainstream newspapers on 351
and the status of married women was possible.
These developments were given added impetus by fairly constant economic
developments. Economic historians generally argue that per capita wealth increased very moderately between 1800 and 1840, but none are willing to state
that great increases in wealth occurred. 352 The incidence of economic contractions beginning in 1792, 1819, and 1839, 3 53 the fairly constant presence of
debtor reform movements and legislative activity,354 the lack of internal
sources of capital, 355 the reliance on cotton as a major source of external
trade,356 and the enormous internal improvement debts of the 1830's suggest a
growing but struggling economy, heavily reliant on the world economy for
support. While certainty on these issues is not yet possible, it is logical that the
collapse of European trade before the 1819 and 1839 panics, the stress of economic dislocations, and the changes in employment patterns, job descriptions,
and family roles would occur side-by-side with reform movements, religious
and moral revivals, radical agitation, and strong public debates.
It is tempting to conclude that the 1840's blossoming of public debates on
slaves and women completely explains the arrival of married women's acts.
349. Id at 107-15. Mary Lyon founded Mount Holyoke College in 1836. Id at I11.
350. Id at 176-82.
351. An anonymous article entitled Wives and Slaves: A Bone Forthe Abolitionists to Pick was published in 17 DEMOCRATIC REV. 264 (1845) and reprinted in other papers. See N. C. Standard, Oct. 22,

1845, at 8, col. 1.
352. For literature on the 19th-century economy see P. TEMIN, supra note 213; Gallman, GrossNationalProduct in the UnitedStates, 1834-1909, in OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY IN TIlE
UNITED STATES AFTER 1800 3 (National Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1966); Lebergott, Labor
Force and Employment, 1800-1960, in OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE UNITED
STATES AFTER 1800 117 (National Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1966); Parker & Whartenby,
supra note 6; Goldsmith, The Growth ofReproducible Wealthfor the United States ofAmerica From
1805 to 1950, in INCOME AND WEALTH OF THE UNITED STATES: TRENDS AND STRUCTURE 247 (S.
Kuznets ed. 1952); Andreano, Trends and Variationsin Economic Wefare in the UnitedStates Before the
Civil War, in NEw VIEW ON AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 131 (Andreano ed. 1965); A. JONES,
supra note 14.
353. P. COLEMAN, supra note 222, at 19; S. REZNECK,supra note 216, at 51-100; P. MCGRANE,sUpra
note 212, at 1-42.
354. Coleman's book on debtors and creditors exhaustively catalogues the developments. Supra
note 222.
355. Large captial inflows from overseas funded much of the 1830's boom. See North, The United
States Balance ofPayments 1790-1860, in TRENDS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 573, 585-87 (National Bureau of Ecomonic Research ed. 1960).

356. See P. TEMIN, supra note 213, at 152.
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Indeed, there is some truth in the causal link because women actively petitioned for the married women's acts adopted in New York and Pennsylvania
during the later years of the decade.357 But as we now know, the story of
women's property acts is much more complex than a simple tale about progressive ideals winning out over blind forces of reaction. As Degler forcefully
reminds us:
[t]he women's movement throughout the 19th century left untouched
the great mass of women, married and unmarried. At no time were
more than a few thousand women actively involved in the feminist or
suffrage causes. The great preponderance of women either had nothing to do with358feminism, or actually scorned it as unnecessary and
wrongheaded.
The public exposure of contradictions in separate sphere ideology by communal groups, abolitionists, and feminists led many women to fight rather than
accommodate change. The generally middle class nature of the reform movements35 9 spoke peripherally to working class women, many of whom preferred
the ideal image of a comfortable separate sphere at home to the potentially
deviant life of a radical and frequently unmarried feminist. The tracing of
reform movements therefore should not blind us to the obstacles the reformers
confronted. Rather, one must hypothesize that shifts in the nation's economy,
job map, family structure, agricultural productivity, banking practices, and
trade structures would be mirrored by piecemeal, one step to the left, one step
to the right, reforms in legal norms, and that changes would reflect generally
held perceptions about women's appropriate sphere of influence.
CONCLUSION

And, of course, that is exactly what my archival and legal research suggests.
Though by 1850 married women performed new legal roles within the family,
property law still singled them out for special treatment and confirmed their
primary role as family participants. Developments in non-property areas also
confirm the patterns Degler and Cott describe. The culture's growing concentration on wifely domesticity suggests that family law reform should have been
vigorous by mid-century. Indeed, by the 1840's divorce, custody, and adoption
law were conforming to new notions of family and childhood development.
Divorce was more prevalent and easier to obtain, women gained custody of
children more frequently than in 1800, and adoption was becoming an accepted practice. Similarly, the arrival of the first antiabortion statutes in the
1840's signaled the importance attributed to married women's maternal
357. E. Warbasse, supra note 2, at 205-37. Later acts, such as those in Ohio and Massachusetts, were

also supported by women. Id at 265-71.
358. C. DE_,LER, supra note 2, at 306. Degler provides an insightful chapter on why it took so long
to gain women's suffrage. He discusses the reasons why suffrage was perceived as a radical step, including women's wide acceptance of the separate sphere, the perception that voting and politics threatened
the family, and the substantial opposition to the amendment by women. Id at 328-61. Cott also reminds us that the separate sphere was for many an acceptable level of accomplishment. N. Corr,
supra note 2, at 197.
359. See C. DEGLER, supra note 2, at 341 (some radicals realized that giving women the vote would
give middle-class women more influence but would do little to help lower class women).

1424

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1359

role.3 60 While the coexistence of married women's property acts and antiabortion laws seems strange to modem feminists, they were compatible developments in a reform era accepting domesticity as a primary ideology for
rationalizing changes in legal norms.
Although organized women's groups certainly had more influence on property law after 1850, the domestic role model also gained additional authority
by the Victorian era. The appearance of narrow married women's acts and
abortion restrictions in the 1840's was mimicked in the 1870's by the virtually
36 1
simultaneous adoption of legislation protecting married women's earnings
and imposing severe restrictions on the dissemination of birth control information and devices. 362 Even women's suffrage was not achievable without the aid
of moral reformers, protective labor supporters, and an ideology lauding the
capacity of women to make finer moral judgments than men.3 63 Not until very
recent times has the legal system taken seriously the notion that equality norms
rather than special treatment norms should govern the outcomes of genderbased disputes. The basic thrust of Thomas Herttell's 1837 argument 364 in
favor of an early version of the New York married women's act can be substituted for arguments made decades'ater in favor of protective labor legislation
and women's suffrage:
But have not women as much prudence and judgement to save and
manage their property, after as before marriage? Has marriage deprived them of their senses and their wits, as well as of their rights of
property which they possessed before marriage? With the additional
incitement of maternal solicitude for the well-being of her children,
has not a married woman even more inducement to the discreet appropriation of her property to their maintenance, than an unmarried
woman, who has no such immediate motive for the prudent and due
exercise of the right to possess and dispose of her property as she may
please, and as by law she is authorized to do? And with such additional, natural, and maternal obligations, is not the discreet use of her
property by a married woman, for the maintenance of her children,
360. See supra notes 330-35 and accompanying text (discussing abortion, birth control, and the maternal role).

361. The 1870's saw the arrival of statutes protecting earnings of married women in a number of
states. Earnings statutes appeared first in the 1850's, but most of the acts were passed later. Among the

states adopting earnings acts were Massachusetts: May 5, 1855; Kansas: Feb. 11, 1858 (Territorial
Legislation); New York: Mar. 20, 1860; Alabama: Dec. 31, 1868 (free trader statute); Illinois: Mar. 24,
1869; Iowa: Apr. 14, 1870; Ohio: Mar. 30, 1871; Pennsylvania: Apr. 3, 1872; Delaware: Apr. 9, 1873;
Kentucky: Apr. 11, 1873; Arkansas: Apr. 28, 1873; Indiana: Mar. 25, 1879. A few states also adopted
limited earnings statutes, which only protected married women who were no longer living with their
husbands. Pennsylvania: May 4, 1855; Minnesota: Ch. 49 (1860); Iowa: Mar. 12, 1866; Vermont: Nov.
19, 1866; Delaware: Mar. 28, 1871; New Jersey: Apr. 5, 1878. Bishop also discusses codes adopted in
the 1860's and 1870's containing earnings provisions in California, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and Mississippi. 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 27, at 490-91, 507, 512, 520, 524, 530, 536-37.
362. See generally C. DIENES, supra note 2.
363. Indeed, moral reformers and supporters of special workplace legislation for women, not equality minded feminists, were the major backers of women's suffrage. See C. DEGLER, supra note 2, 32861. After the Suffrage Amendment was adopted, the Women's Party quickly became a radical fringe, a
model to be picked up later in the century. See E. FLEXNER, supra note 1, 271-345 (1959).
364. Thomas Herttell, along with John Neal and Elisha Hurlbutt, was among the major male figures
urging reform of women's law in New York from 1835 on.
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as much more to be relied on, than that of her husband, as maternal
is more strong, constant, and unconquerable, than paternal affection?
Are not the cases rare in which unmarried women waste their property? And are not the instances numerous in which men spend their
fortunes in riot, intemperance, extravagance, and every species of irregularity and dissipation? And when their pecuniary resources are
exhausted or impaired, is it not a common practice for men to endeavour, by marriage, to obtain the property of young, inexperienced, unsuspecting, and credulous females, with a view to the means
by which to gratify their avarice, or to continue their dissolute habits
of life? Does not the existing law hold out inducements to mercenary
marriages, by furnishing the means by which worthless fortunehunters are enabled to effect their iniquitous purpose? Is not the alleged law, therefore, the source of the vicious and immoral practices
to which it prompts; and the cause of all the injustice and misery to
which married women become the devoted victims? And is not that
law justly characterized by the vice, immorality, injustice, and misery
consequent on its existence and operation?
That the affirmative are the true answers to the above questions, is
as certain as that such answers prove conclusively, that married women's property would be safer in their own hands, and more certainly
applied to family maintenance, than it now is, when given indiscriminately to good and bad husbands, to be disposed of365
as they please, or
as their good or bad habits may happen to direct.
The property reforms of the 1840's should not be perceived as an attack on
coverture law. Though the seeds of later reforms were planted by the first
wave of married women's property acts, married women's separate domestic
sphere was not seriously challenged by their adoption. The legal changes of
the mid-nineteenth century recognized that the women's role within the family
had changed to encompass greater control over the raising of children and the
disposition of family wealth. But not until this century would such increased
participation in the family lead to broad participation in the political and economic fortunes of the culture at large.

365. Herttell, Remarks Comprising in Substance Judge Herttell's Argument in the House of Assembly of the State of New York in the Session of 1837 in Support of the Bill to Restore to Married Women
the Right of Property as Guaranteed by the Constitution of this State, at 57-58 (1839) (copy on file at
Georgetown Law Journal).

